The Socioeconomic Background of the Divergence of Belarusian and Ukrainian Political Systems

The aim of this paper is to analyze the political, social and economic background of the divergence of Belarusian and Ukrainian transitions. We focus on Belarus in order to find explanation for questions such as why could Lukashenko remain the authoritarian leader of Belarus, while in Ukraine the position of the political elite had proved less stable and collapsed in 2004. On the theoretical framework of elite-sociology, we seek to determine whether the internal factors (as macroeconomic conditions, standard of living, the oppressive nature of the political system and the structure of the political elite) play a significant role in the operation of the domino effect. This article emphasises the determining role of immanent internal factors, thus the political stability in Belarus can be explained by the role of the suppressing political regime, the hindrance of democratic rights and the relatively good living conditions that followed the transformational recession. Whilst in Ukraine, the markedly different circumstances brought forth the success of the Orange Revolution.

Designed for Patience. The Significance of International Factors in the Ukrainian and Belarusian Transitions

This paper focuses on Belarus in order to find explanation as to why could Lukashenko remain the authoritarian leader of Belarus, while in Ukraine the position of the political elite had proved less stable and collapsed in 2004. We seek to determine whether the internal factors (macroeconomic conditions, standard of living, the oppressive nature of the political system) play a significant role in the operation of the domino effect. This article emphasises the determining role of immanent internal factors, thus the political stability in Belarus can be explained by the role of the suppressing political regime, the hindrance of democratic rights and the relatively good living conditions that followed the transformational recession. Whilst in Ukraine, the markedly different circumstances brought forth the success of the Orange Revolution.

Market reform and fiscal laxity in Communist and post-Communist Hungary: A path-dependent approach

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to present a conceptual framework in order to analyse and understand the twin developments of successful microeconomic reform on the one hand and failed macroeconomic stabilisation attempts on the other hand in Hungary. The case study also attempts to explore the reasons why Hungarian policymakers were willing to initiate reforms in the micro sphere, but were reluctant to initiate major changes in public finances both before and after the regime change of 1989/1990. Design/methodology/approach – The paper applies a path-dependent approach by carefully analysing Hungary's Communist and post-Communist economic development. The study restricts itself to a positive analysis but normative statements can also be drawn accordingly. Findings – The study demonstrates that the recent deteriorating economic performance of Hungary is not a recent phenomenon. By providing a path-dependent explanation, it argues that both Communist and post-Communist governments used the general budget as a buffer to compensate the losers of economic reforms, especially microeconomic restructuring. The gradualist success of the country – which dates back to at least 1968 – in the field of liberalisation, marketisation and privatisation was accompanied by a constant overspending in the general government. Practical implications – Hungary has been one of the worst-hit countries of the 2008/2009 financial crisis, not just in Central and Eastern Europe but in the whole world. The capacity and opportunity for strengthening international investors' confidence is, however, not without doubts. The current deterioration is deeply rooted in failed past macroeconomic management. The dissolution of fiscal laxity and state paternalism in a broader context requires, therefore, an all-encompassing reform of the general government, which may trigger serious challenges to the political regime as well. Originality/value – The study aims to show that a relatively high ratio of redistribution, a high and persistent public deficit and an accelerated indebtedness are not recent phenomena in Hungary. In fact, these trends characterised the country well before the transformation of 1989/1990, and have continued in the post-socialist years, too. To explain such a phenomenon, the study argues that in the last couple of decades the hardening of the budget constraint of firms have come at the cost of maintaining the soft budget constraint of the state.

Political polarization and its consequences on democratic accountability

This paper first explores the polarizationthesis, according to which between 1990-2010 political polarization increased to a large extent in the Hungarian political elite and among citizens, although it did not undermine the stability of the political system. Second, it gives an endogenousexplanation for this phenomenon. Third, through theoretical discussion and empirical examples taken from Hungarian politics it is revealed that although growing polarization has not generated regime instability, it reduces, or might reduce, the efficiency of the operation of democracy. Five mechanisms of the effects of ideological polarization which weaken democratic accountability are explored.

"Rentier States" or the Relationship between Regime Stability and Exercising Power in Post-Soviet Central Asia

The paper intends to give an insight into the relations of the economic and political systems of the Central Asian republics using the theoretical framework of the "rentier economy" and "rentier state" approach. The main findings of the paper are that two (Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan) of the five states examined are commodity export dependent “full-scale” rentier states. The two political systems are of a stable neo-patrimonial regime character, while the Kyrgyz Republic and Tajikistan, poor in natural resources but dependent on external rents, may be described as "semi-rentier" states or "rentier economies". They are politically more instable, but have an altogether authoritarian, oligarchical “clan-based” character. Uzbekistan with its closed economy, showing tendencies of economic autarchy, is also a potentially politically unstable clan-based regime. Thus, in the Central Asian context, the rentier state or rentier economy character affects the political stability of the actual regimes rather than having a direct impact on whether power is exercised in an autocratic or democratic way.