Rules-based economic governance in the European Union: A reappraisal of national fiscal rules.

The economic and financial crisis of 2007/2009 has posed unexpected challenges on both the global and the regional level. Besides the US, the EU has been the most severely hit by the current economic crisis. The financial and banking crisis on the one hand and the sovereign debt crisis on the other hand have clearly shown that without a bold, constructive and systematic change of the economic governance structure of the Union, not just the sustainability of the monetary zone but also the viability of the whole European integration process can be seriously undermined. The current crisis is, however, only a symptom, which made all those contradictions overt that were already heavily embedded in the system. Right from the very beginning, the deficit and the debt rules of the Maastricht Treaty and the Stability and Growth Pact have proved to be controversial cornerstones in the fiscal governance framework of the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). Yet, member states of the EU (both within and outside of the EMU) have shown an immense interest in adopting numerical constraints on the domestic level without hesitation. The main argument for the introduction of national fiscal rules was mostly to strengthen the accountability and credibility of national fiscal policy-making. The paper, however, claims that a relatively large portion of national rules were adopted only after the start of deceleration of the debt-to-GDP ratios. Accordingly, national rules were hardly the sole triggering factors of maintaining fiscal discipline; rather, they served as the key elements of a comprehensive reform package of public budgeting. It can be safely argued, therefore, that countries decide to adopt fiscal rules because they want to explicitly signal their strong commitment to fiscal discipline. In other words, it is not fiscal rules per se what matter in delivering fiscal stability but a strong political commitment.

Kockázattal kiegészített Taylor-szabályok becslése Magyarországra = Estimation of risk-augmented Taylor rules for Hungary

Cikkünkben a magyar monetáris politikát vizsgáljuk olyan szempontból, hogy kamatdöntései meghozatalakor figyelembe vette-e az országkockázatot, és ha igen, hogyan. A kérdés megválaszolásához a monetáris politika elemzésének leggyakoribb eszközét használjuk: az ország monetáris politikáját leíró Taylor-szabályokat becslünk. A becslést több kockázati mérőszámmal is elvégeztük több, különféle Taylor-szabályt használva. Az érzékenységvizsgálatban az inflációhoz és a kibocsátási réshez is alkalmaztunk más, az alapspecifikációban szereplőtől eltérő mérőszámokat. Eredményeink szerint a Magyar Nemzeti Bank kamatdöntései jól leírhatók egy rugalmas, inflációs célkövető rezsimmel: a Taylor-szabályban szignifikáns szerepe van az inflációs céltól való eltérésének és - a szabályok egy része esetén - a kibocsátási résnek. Emellett a döntéshozók figyelembe vették az országkockázatot is, annak növekedésére a kamat emelésével válaszoltak. Az országkockázat Taylor-szabályba történő beillesztése a megfelelő kockázati mérőszám kiválasztása esetén jelentős mértékben képes javítani a Taylor-szabály illeszkedését. _____ The paper investigates the degree to which Hungarian monetary policy has considered country risk in its decisions and if so, how. The answer was sought through the commonest method of analysing a countrys monetary policy: Taylor rules for describing it. The estimation of the rule was prepared using several risk indicators and applying various types of Taylor rules. As a sensitivity analysis, other indicators of inflation and output gap were employed than in the base rule. This showed that the interest-rate decisions of the National Bank of Hungary can be well described by a flexible inflation targeting regime: in the Taylor rules, deviation of inflation from its target has a significant role and the output gap is also significant in one part of the rules. The decision-makers also considered country risk and responded to an increase in it by raising interest rates. Insertion of country risk into the Taylor rule could improve the models fit to an important degree when choosing an appropriate risk measure.