Co-ordination and public administration in a global economy — A Hungarian point of view

The purpose of social co-ordination mechanisms is to co-ordinate the activities of individuals and organisations specialised in the distribution of work. The paper reviews five basic types of mechanisms: market, bureaucratic, ethical, aggressive and co-operative co-ordination. Today’s world operates on the basis of a duality: international cooperation is based on nation states, in which the public administrations work according to bureaucratic coordination. However, the increasingly globalised market responds to the logic of market coordination. The article argues that in terms of understanding the working of public administration, the various coordination mechanisms are of crucial importance, especially where various mechanisms meet, such as the relationship between nation states and multinational corporations.

Közjavak optimális előállítása (Optimal production of public goods)

A közjavak közgazdaságilag optimális szintjének előállítása piaci körülmények között általában nehézségekbe ütközik. Napjainkban számos országban többféle közjószág áll rendelkezésre, a szakirodalomban pedig például a nyugdíjrendszer egyes elemeinek közjószágjellegével kapcsolatos felvetések is megjelentek már. Ezzel összefüggésben is érdekes a kérdés, milyen körülmények között fordulhat elő, hogy racionális egyéni döntéshozók egyénileg optimális döntéseikkel valamely közjószág optimális szintjét hozzák létre. Jelen tanulmány ezzel a kérdéssel foglalkozik. / === / It is difficult to produce the economically optimal level of public goods in a market environment. There are many different types of public goods, and today even some aspects of the pension system are considered as such. Still, it is an interesting question if individually optimal decisions made by rational individuals could lead to an optimal level of public goods. The paper attempts to analyze this question.

A gazdaságpolitikai döntéshozatal nemzetek fölötti centralizációja és a közösségi gazdaságtan. Az adóverseny elméletének néhány tanulsága (Supranational centralization of economic policy-making and community economics: some lessons from the theory of tax competition)

Mennyiben képes jelenleg a közösségi gazdaságtan az adópolitikák nemzetek fölötti centralizációjára vonatkozó politikai döntések megalapozására? Válaszunk röviden az lesz, hogy a közösségi gazdaságtan főárama - noha számos releváns gazdasági és politikai tényező hatását sikeresen elemzi - jelenleg nem kínál kielégítőnek tekinthető döntési kritériumokat a döntéshozók számára. Ennek oka, hogy központi szerepet játszik benne egy, a modellek szempontjából exogén és a közgazdasági elmélettől idegen tényező: a kormányzatok jóindulatára, pontosabban annak mértékére vonatkozó premissza. Tanulmányunk az adóverseny fiskális föderalista elméletét vizsgálja, és megpróbál általánosabb szinten is a közszektor gazdaságelméletének jelenlegi állapotára, valamint továbbfejlesztésére vonatkozó tanulságokat levonni. A kiutat az elméleti zsákutcából a kormányzati működés és döntéshozatal, valamint a kívánatos gazdaságpolitikai döntések elméletének összekapcsolása jelentheti. Erre megtörténtek az első kísérletek, de a szisztematikus és átfogó elemzés egyelőre várat magára. / === / How far can community economics provide a basis for political decision-making on supranational centralization of taxation policies? The short answer here will be that although the mainstream of community economics succeeds in analysing many relevant economic and political factors, it fails at present to provide satisfactory criteria for decisionmakers. This is because a central role is played in it by a factor exogenous to the models and alien to economic theory: the premise of the measure of goodwill from governments. The study examines the fiscal federalist theory of tax competition. It tries to draw conclusions, on a more general level, about the present state of the economic theory of the public sector and future development of it. The way out of the theoretical blind alley could be to link the theories of government operation and decision-making and of desirable economic-policy decision-making. The first attempts to do so have been made, but a systematic and comprehensive analysis is still awaited.

A Public-Private Partnership Magyarországon– egy félreértés volt? (Public-Private Partnerships in Hungary – was it a mistake?)

Az elemzés a PPP (Public-Private Partnership) magyarországi felfutásának és visszaesésének izgalmas éveit tárja fel, amelynek alapján megállapítható, hogy a magyar gyakorlatban körvonalazódó PPP nem az a PPP, amely a nemzetközi tapasztalatok alapján a közfeladatok megvalósításának közgazdaságilag megalapozott eszköze lehetne. A szerző úgy gondolja, hogy nem a PPP-módszer elvetése a megfelelő válasz a létező hibákra, hanem alkalmazásának módján kell javítani, a fokozatosan halmozódó tapasztalatok értő felhasználásával. ______ Public-Private Partnership (PPP) has quickly become a well-known phenomenon in Hungary. Despite its proliferation in various areas of activities, and the fact that most of these projects are still running, interest for starting new PPP projects has ceased, and even the cancellation of the project has become an issue. My research objective was to understand better how the concept of PPP has been interpreted by the wider public, through the assessment of the projects appearance in the main economic newspapers. The analysis shows that what has been implemented as PPP projects in Hungary are conceptually different from what PPP as an economically justified concept substantiates. PPP seems to be a phenomenon grossly misunderstood in Hungary.

Public price of climate change

Aim of the paper: The purpose is to gather the practices and to model the impacts of climate change on fiscal spending and revenues, responsibilities and opportunities, balance and debt related to climate change (CC). Methodology of the paper: The methodology will distinguish fiscal cost of mitigation and adaptation, besides direct and indirect costs. It will also introduce cost benefit analyses to evaluate the propensity of policy makers for action or passivity. Several scenarios will be drafted to see the different outcomes. The scenarios shall contain the possible losses in the natural and artificial environment and resources. Impacts on public budget are based on damage of income opportunities and capital/wealth/natural assets. There will be a list of actions when the fiscal correction of market failures will be necessary. Findings: There will be a summary and synthesis of estimation models on CC impacts on public finances, and morals of existing/existed budgeting practices on mitigation. The model will be based on damages (and maybe benefits) from CC, adjusted with probabilities of sce-narios and policy making propensity for action. Findings will cover the way of funding of fiscal costs. Practical use, value added: From the synthesis of model, the fiscal cost of mitigation and adaptation can be estimated for any developed, emerging and developing countries. The paper will try to reply, also, for the challenge how to harmonize fiscal and developmental sustainability.

Schizophrenic Public Administration Reform in Hungary. Tension between anti-NPM systemic and pro-NPM organizational reforms

The aim of this paper is to shed the light on the relationship between New Public Management and Hungary’s Zoltán Magyary Public Administration Development Programme. As will be shown, the Magyary Programme has a dual structure. The systemic reforms run counter to the NPM philosophy because the main goal is the centralization of public administration, while NPM clearly advocates decentralization. At the same time, reform proposals on the organizational level conform to NPM. The inconsistencies in the Magyary Programme itself and the probable political and organizational resistance towards its proposals could delay the introduction of reforms on the organizational level.

A Bertrand-Edgeworth oligopoly with a public firm

We determine conditions under which a pure-strategy equilibrium of a mixed Bertrand-Edgeworth oligopoly exists. In addition, we determine its pure-strategy equilibrium whenever it exists and compare the equilibrium outcome with that of the standard Bertrand-Edgeworth oligopoly with only private firms.

New Public Management Reforms: Institutions matter!

New Public Management (NPM) has played a decisive role and has had a radical effect on the productivity and efficiency of the public sector in the Anglo-Saxon countries. However, the effective introduction of the NPM reforms is not an easy task. The scientific community is zealously analyzing the experiences of the developing countries. The stories, they tell, are full of failures, and ineffective reforms. The goal of the current study is to uncover the factors that might influence the successful implementation of the NPM reforms. In our analysis, by relying on the theories of new institutional economics, we developed a model with which we wish to prove that in regards to the success of the reforms the informal and the formal institutions characteristic of the given country are the decisively determining factors. When answering the question, we introduced a new indicator based on public choice theory – the politicians’ interest index – by which we could measure the success of the NPM. We tested our hypothesis by a comparative statistical analysis using the data from 31 countries. Based on our results, we find that informal institutions, the culture shared by the members of society, fundamentally determine the probability of the successful implementation of the NPM reforms, these results having a significant practical relevance.

Introduction of soft budget constraint as an analyzing tool into public management. The case of the Hungarian public administration reform

Public management reforms are usually underpinned by arguments that they will make the public administration system more effective and efficient. In practice, however, it is very hard to determine whether a given reform will improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the public administration system in the long run. Here, I shall examine how the concept of the soft budget constraint (SBC) introduced by János Kornai (Kornai 1979, 1986; Kornai, Maskin & Roland 2003) can be applied to this problem. In the following, I shall describe the Hungarian public administration reforms implemented by the Orbán government from 2010 onward and analyze its reforms, focusing on which measures harden and which ones soften the budget constraint of the actors of the Hungarian public administration system. In the literature of economics, there is some evidence-based knowledge on how to harden/soften the budget constraint, which improves/reduces the effectiveness and hence the efficiency of the given system. By using the concept of SBC, I also hope to shed some light on the rationale behind the Hungarian government’s introduction of such a contradictory reform package. Previously, the concept of SBC was utilized narrowly in public management studies, mostly in the field of fiscal federalism. My goal is to apply the concept to a broader area of public management studies. My conclusion is that the concept of SBC can significantly contribute to public management studies by deepening our knowledge on the reasons behind the success and failure of public administration reforms.