What makes ISAF s/tick: An investigation of the politics of coalition burden-sharing

This paper is interested in conceptualising the often raised issue of over- and under-contributing in coalition operations; that of how and why members of complex coalitions2 may be punching above and below their weight, respectively. To this end, the first section presents a parsimonious baseline assumption regarding what variables may fundamentally inform coalition burden-sharing, to subsequently discuss how much each of these are found to play a role in the Afghanistan context. The second section elaborates on this by assessing the perception and the interpretation of threats by coalition member countries, related to Afghanistan, as this pertains to prioritising other variables within the scheme outlined in the previous section. The third and fourth sections then proceed to examine and further enrich the existing literature on coalition burden-sharing, and provide further insights regarding the operations of the International Security Assistance Force–Afghanistan, and regarding ISAF member-country decisionmaking; the objective here is to generate further refined assumptions, that can permit a preliminary assessment of the phenomenon of uneven burden-sharing in ISAF, complementing the initial baseline expectations.

On the implementation of the L-Nash bargaining solution in two-person bargaining games

The “Nash program” initiated by Nash (Econometrica 21:128–140, 1953) is a research agenda aiming at representing every axiomatically determined cooperative solution to a game as a Nash outcome of a reasonable noncooperative bargaining game. The L-Nash solution first defined by Forgó (Interactive Decisions. Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems, vol 229. Springer, Berlin, pp 1–15, 1983) is obtained as the limiting point of the Nash bargaining solution when the disagreement point goes to negative infinity in a fixed direction. In Forgó and Szidarovszky (Eur J Oper Res 147:108–116, 2003), the L-Nash solution was related to the solution of multiciteria decision making and two different axiomatizations of the L-Nash solution were also given in this context. In this paper, finite bounds are established for the penalty of disagreement in certain special two-person bargaining problems, making it possible to apply all the implementation models designed for Nash bargaining problems with a finite disagreement point to obtain the L-Nash solution as well. For another set of problems where this method does not work, a version of Rubinstein’s alternative offer game (Econometrica 50:97–109, 1982) is shown to asymptotically implement the L-Nash solution. If penalty is internalized as a decision variable of one of the players, then a modification of Howard’s game (J Econ Theory 56:142–159, 1992) also implements the L-Nash solution.

Pairwise comparison matrices and the error-free property of the decision maker

Pairwise comparison is a popular assessment method either for deriving criteria-weights or for evaluating alternatives according to a given criterion. In real-world applications consistency of the comparisons rarely happens: intransitivity can occur. The aim of the paper is to discuss the relationship between the consistency of the decision maker—described with the error-free property—and the consistency of the pairwise comparison matrix (PCM). The concept of error-free matrix is used to demonstrate that consistency of the PCM is not a sufficient condition of the error-free property of the decision maker. Informed and uninformed decision makers are defined. In the first stage of an assessment method a consistent or near-consistent matrix should be achieved: detecting, measuring and improving consistency are part of any procedure with both types of decision makers. In the second stage additional information are needed to reveal the decision maker’s real preferences. Interactive questioning procedures are recommended to reach that goal.

A simplified implementation of the least squares solution for pairwise comparisons matrices

This is a follow up to "Solution of the least squares method problem of pairwise comparisons matrix" by Bozóki published by this journal in 2008. Familiarity with this paper is essential and assumed. For lower inconsistency and decreased accuracy, our proposed solutions run in seconds instead of days. As such, they may be useful for researchers willing to use the least squares method (LSM) instead of the geometric means (GM) method.

Solution of the Least Squares Method problem of pairwise comparison matrices

The aim of the paper is to present a new global optimization method for determining all the optima of the Least Squares Method (LSM) problem of pairwise comparison matrices. Such matrices are used, e.g., in the Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP). Unlike some other distance minimizing methods, LSM is usually hard to solve because of the corresponding nonlinear and non-convex objective function. It is found that the optimization problem can be reduced to solve a system of polynomial equations. Homotopy method is applied which is an efficient technique for solving nonlinear systems. The paper ends by two numerical example having multiple global and local minima.

A gabonaszállítási piac színe és visszája Magyarországon (The pros and contras of the Hungarian cereals transportation market)

A tanulmány a szakirodalomban újszerű kezdeményezésként kísérletet tesz a gabonapiac ellátási láncának felrajzolására, majd annak egyik, a cikk alapkérdése szempontjából kiemelt vetületét, a gabonaszállítási és raktározási problémákat elemzi. Előbbit a piac szereplőitől kvalitatív módon begyűjtött információkkal, utóbbit a szakirodalom alapján mutatja be. A cikk az elemzés után javaslatokkal szolgál ahhoz, hogyan lehetne hazánkban egy integrált gabonapiaci szállítási-raktározási-átrakási rendszert kialakítani. __________ The aim of the article is to present the situation of the Hungarian cereals transport and storage-reloading market and by interconnection, to treat cereals market’s operations systemically. Under this process, the study trace to draw a possible supply chain of the national cereals market up, which is a new initiation in the Hungarian literature. The focus of the article is to analyse transport and storage processes in the cereals market using the framework mentioned above. Transport market is demonstrated on the grounds of a revealing qualitative research, while storage market is brought out by literature. After analysis, the article gives recommendations how to shape an integrated transport and storage-reload system in the Hungarian cereals market.