Rules-based economic governance in the European Union: A reappraisal of national fiscal rules.

The economic and financial crisis of 2007/2009 has posed unexpected challenges on both the global and the regional level. Besides the US, the EU has been the most severely hit by the current economic crisis. The financial and banking crisis on the one hand and the sovereign debt crisis on the other hand have clearly shown that without a bold, constructive and systematic change of the economic governance structure of the Union, not just the sustainability of the monetary zone but also the viability of the whole European integration process can be seriously undermined. The current crisis is, however, only a symptom, which made all those contradictions overt that were already heavily embedded in the system. Right from the very beginning, the deficit and the debt rules of the Maastricht Treaty and the Stability and Growth Pact have proved to be controversial cornerstones in the fiscal governance framework of the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). Yet, member states of the EU (both within and outside of the EMU) have shown an immense interest in adopting numerical constraints on the domestic level without hesitation. The main argument for the introduction of national fiscal rules was mostly to strengthen the accountability and credibility of national fiscal policy-making. The paper, however, claims that a relatively large portion of national rules were adopted only after the start of deceleration of the debt-to-GDP ratios. Accordingly, national rules were hardly the sole triggering factors of maintaining fiscal discipline; rather, they served as the key elements of a comprehensive reform package of public budgeting. It can be safely argued, therefore, that countries decide to adopt fiscal rules because they want to explicitly signal their strong commitment to fiscal discipline. In other words, it is not fiscal rules per se what matter in delivering fiscal stability but a strong political commitment.

Többéves pénzügyi keret vitája középről és a sor végéről – Magyarország és Lettország harcban a mezőgazdasági és kohéziós támogatásokért (Debate on the eu multiannual financial framework from the view of Hungary and Latvia)

Az Európai Bizottság 2011. júniusban nyilvánosságra hozott, a következő hétéves időszakot meghatározó pénzügyi keretéről szóló javaslatával elindult a tagállamok, illetve az intézmények közötti szakmai és politikai érvelés, az alkudozások sora. A két legfontosabb költségvetési tétel, a mezőgazdasági támogatások és a kohéziós források előnyös allokációja Magyarország és Lettország számára is kiemelt prioritás. A tárgyalások során Lettország érdeke az alacsony közvetlen mezőgazdasági támogatások emelése, míg Magyarország kedvező pozíciójának megtartásáért harcol. A kohéziós politikára tett Bizottsági javaslat mindkét ország számára hátrányos, így közös érdek a források összegének szinten tartása és a kedvezőtlen támogatási felső határ emelése. ______ Following the European Commission’s proposal on the next Multiannual Financial Framework was published in June 2011, tense debate started to defend national priorities. The proper allocation of the agricultural and cohesion founds is essential for both, Hungary and Latvia as well. Latvia’s objectives is to introduce fair direct payments to farmers, stipulating that the lowest payments must constitute at least 80 per cent of the average amount of the EU direct payments, while Hungary tries to defend its relatively favourable position by receiving almost the amount of the EU average. Common interest for Hungary and for Latvia in the EU budget talks is to retain cohesion financing at least at the current level and to change the unfavourable proposal on capping.