Maximizing the Efficiency of Greenhouse Gas Related Consumer Policy

Consumer policy approaches regarding green products and solutions can be differentiated by their main focus. “Green positioning” is basically targeted at environmentally aware consumers, while “efficiency-focused positioning” concentrates on the efficiency gain of the product or solution, targeting the whole society, regardless of consumers' environmental awareness. The paper argues that the scope and total environmental benefit can be increased if green products or solutions are promoted in different ways, not only as “green” but also based on other arguments (like cost-efficiency, return on investment, etc.). The paper suggests a model for improving the efficiency of greenhouse gas (GHG)-related consumer policy. Based on the marginal social cost curve and the marginal private cost curve, different (green, yellow, and red) zones of action are identified. GHG mitigation options chosen from those zones are then evaluated with the help of profiling method, addressing the barriers to implementation. Profiling may help design an implementation strategy for the selected options and make consumer policy more effective and acceptable for mass market. Case study results show three different ways of positioning of GHG-related consumer policy in Hungary from 2000 and give practical examples of profiling, based on the latest marginal social cost curve and the contemporary energy saving policy of the state regarding the residential sector.

Maximizing the Efficiency of Greenhouse Gas Related Consumer Policy

Consumer policy approaches regarding green products and solutions can be differentiated by their main focus. “Green positioning” is basically targeted at environmentally aware consumers, while “efficiency-focused positioning” concentrates on the efficiency gain of the product or solution, targeting the whole society, regardless of consumers' environmental awareness. The paper argues that the scope and total environmental benefit can be increased if green products or solutions are promoted in different ways, not only as “green” but also based on other arguments (like cost-efficiency, return on investment, etc.). The paper suggests a model for improving the efficiency of greenhouse gas (GHG)-related consumer policy. Based on the marginal social cost curve and the marginal private cost curve, different (green, yellow, and red) zones of action are identified. GHG mitigation options chosen from those zones are then evaluated with the help of profiling method, addressing the barriers to implementation. Profiling may help design an implementation strategy for the selected options and make consumer policy more effective and acceptable for mass market. Case study results show three different ways of positioning of GHG-related consumer policy in Hungary from 2000 and give practical examples of profiling, based on the latest marginal social cost curve and the contemporary energy saving policy of the state regarding the residential sector.

Which rationing rule does a single consumer follow?

We will investigate the amount of residual demand in a market consisting of only one consumer and two producers. Since there is only one consumer, we cannot really speak about a rationing rule, but we can ask ourselves whether a known rationing rule reflects the consumer’s utility maximizing behavior. We will show that, if the consumer has a Cobb-Douglas utility function, then the amount purchased by the consumer from the high-price firm lies between the values determined according to the efficient rationing rule and the random rationing rule. We will show further, that if the consumer has a quasilinear utility function, then in the economically interesting case his residual demand function will be equal to the residual demand function under efficient rationing.

Generalized correlated equilibrium for two-person games in extensive form with perfect information

A correlation scheme (leading to a special equilibrium called “soft” correlated equilibrium) is applied for two-person finite games in extensive form with perfect information. Randomization by an umpire takes place over the leaves of the game tree. At every decision point players have the choice either to follow the recommendation of the umpire blindly or freely choose any other action except the one suggested. This scheme can lead to Pareto-improved outcomes of other correlated equilibria. Computational issues of maximizing a linear function over the set of soft correlated equilibria are considered and a linear-time algorithm in terms of the number of edges in the game tree is given for a special procedure called “subgame perfect optimization”.

A kiskereskedelmi árrögzítés versenyfokozó hatása (The competition-enhancing effect of retail price maintenance)

A kiskereskedelmi árrögzítés évtizedek óta vitatott kérdés a közgazdasági elméletben. Az Egyesült Államok legfelsőbb bíróságának közelmúltbeli döntése - megszüntetve az ilyen típusú árkorlátozások önmagában törvénytelennek ítélését - ismételten felhívta a figyelmet az adott problémakörre. Cikkünkben az árrögzítés eddig mellőzött versenyfokozó hatásával foglalkozunk. A megszokott statikus modellek helyett dinamikus környezetet feltételezve, arra a következtetésre jutunk, hogy egy profitmaximalizáló termelőnek számos esetben célszerű kiskereskedelmi árrögzítést alkalmazni egy esetlegesen kialakuló forgalmazói kartell megelőzésére, amelynek egyértelműen pozitív hatása van nemcsak a termelő profitjára, hanem a kialakuló fogyasztói többletre nézve is. Amellett érvelünk, hogy indokolatlan a még mindig uralkodó, a legtöbb ország versenyszabályozásában tetten érhető, önmagában törvénytelennek minősített megítélés a vertikális árkorlátozásokkal kapcsolatban. / === / Retail price fixing has been a disputed issue in theoretical economics for decades, to which attention was drawn again by a recent decision by the US Supreme Court ending the illegality of such price restrictions as such. Assuming a dynamic environment instead of the customary static model leads to the conclusion that it is frequently advantageous to a profit-maximizing producer to use retail price maintenance to avert the possible appearance of a reseller cartel. This will have a clearly positive effect on producer profits, and also in terms of increasing consumption. It is also argued in the study that it is unjustified to qualify such vertical pricing restrictions as essentially illegal, after the manner of the competition rules in most countries.

A villamos erőművek szén-dioxid-kibocsátásának modellezése reálopciók segítségével = Modelling of the carbon dioxide emissions of a power plant, using real options

A szerző egy, a szennyezőanyag-kibocsátás európai kereskedelmi rendszerében megfelelésre kötelezett gázturbinás erőmű szén-dioxid-kibocsátását modellezi négy termékre (völgy- és csúcsidőszaki áramár, gázár, kibocsátási kvóta) vonatkozó reálopciós modell segítségével. A profitmaximalizáló erőmű csak abban az esetben termel és szennyez, ha a megtermelt áramon realizálható fedezete pozitív. A jövőbeli időszak összesített szén-dioxid-kibocsátása megfeleltethető európai típusú bináris különbözetopciók összegének. A modell keretein belül a szén-dioxid-kibocsátás várható értékét és sűrűségfüggvényét becsülhetjük, az utóbbi segítségével a szén-dioxid-kibocsátási pozíció kockáztatott értékét határozhatjuk meg, amely az erőmű számára előírt megfelelési kötelezettség teljesítésének adott konfidenciaszint melletti költségét jelenti. A sztochasztikus modellben az alaptermékek geometriai Ornstein-Uhlenbeck-folyamatot követnek. Ezt illesztette a szerző a német energiatőzsdéről származó publikus piaci adatokra. A szimulációs modellre támaszkodva megvizsgálta, hogy a különböző technológiai és piaci tényezők ceteris paribus megváltozása milyen hatással van a megfelelés költségére, a kockáztatott értékére. ______ The carbon-dioxide emissions of an EU Emissions Trading System participant, gas-fuelled power generator are modelled by using real options for four underlying instruments (peak and off-peak electricity, gas, emission quota). This profit-maximizing power plant operates and emits pollution only if its profit (spread) on energy produced is positive. The future emissions can be estimated by a sum of European binary-spread options. Based on the real-option model, the expected value of emissions and its probability-density function can be deducted. Also calculable is the Value at Risk of emission quota position, which gives the cost of compliance at a given confidence level. To model the prices of the four underlying instruments, the geometric Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process is supposed and matched to public available price data from EEX. Based on the simulation model, the effects of various technological and market factors are analysed for the emissions level and the cost of compliance.

The moral economic man

Economic behavior is multifaceted and context-dependent. However, the so-called Homo Oeconomicus model states that agents are perfectly rational, self-interest-maximizing beings. This model can be criticized on both empirical and normative grounds. Understanding economic behavior requires a more complex and dynamic framework. In the "I & We" paradigm developed by Amitai Etzioni, economic behavior is co-determined by utility calculations and moral considerations. Two major factors can explain the ethicality of economic behavior; namely, the moral character of the agents and the relative cost of ethical behavior. Economic agents are moral beings, but the ethical fabric of the economy determines which face of the Moral Economic Man predominates.