Cost of illness in benign prostatic hyperplasia: A review

The paper provides a systematic review on the cost-of-illness studies in an age-associated condition with high prevalence, benign prostatic hyperplasia (BPH), published in Medline between 2005 and 2015. Overall 11 studies were included, which were conducted in 8 countries. In the US, the annual direct medical costs per patient ranged from $255 to $5,729, while in Europe from €253 to €1,251. In 2008, in the UK total annual direct medical costs of BPH were £180.8 million at national level. In the US, overall costs of BPH management in the private sector were estimated at $3.9 billion annually, of which $500 million was attributable to productivity loss (year 1999). Due to demographic factors and possible surgical innovations in the field of urology, the costs of BPH are likely to increase in the future. Over the next decade the age of retirement is projected to rise, consequently, the indirect costs related to aging-associated conditions such as BPH are expected to soar. To promote the transparent and cost-effective management of BPH, development of rational clinical guidelines would be essential that may lead to significant improvement in quality of care as well as reduction in healthcare expenditure.

Cost-Benefit Analysis of Climate Change (a Methodological Overview of Recent Studies)

This paper examines the methodological aspect of climate change, particularly the aggregation of costs and benefits induced by climate change on individuals, societies, economies and on the whole ecosystem. Assessing the total and/or marginal costs of environmental change is difficult because of wide range of factors that have to be involved. The subsequent study tries to capture the complexity of cost assessment on climate change therefore includes several critical factors such as scenarios and modeling, valuation and estimation, equity and discounting.

Tőkeallokáció nem likvid portfóliók esetén (Risk capital allocation in case of illiquid portfolios)

A kockázat jó mérése és elosztása elengedhetetlen a bankok, biztosítók, befektetési alapok és egyéb pénzügyi vállalkozások belső tőkeallokációjához vagy teljesítményértékeléséhez. A cikkben bemutatjuk, hogy a koherens kockázati mértékek axiómáit nem likvid portfóliók esetén is el lehet várni. Így mérve a kockázatot, ismertetünk a kockázatelosztásra vonatkozó két kooperatív játékelméleti cikket. Az első optimista, eszerint mindig létezik stabil, az alegységek minden koalíciója által elfogadható, általános módszer a kockázat (tőke) elosztására. A második cikk pesszimista, mert azt mondja ki, hogy ha a stabilitás mellett igazságosak is szeretnénk lenni, akkor egy lehetetlenségi tételbe ütközünk. / === / Measuring and allocating risk properly are crucial for performance evaluation and internal capital allocation of portfolios held by banks, insurance companies, investment funds and other entities subject to fi nancial risk. We argue that the axioms of coherent measures of risk are valid for illiquid portfolios as well. Then, we present the results of two papers on allocating risk measured by a coherent measure of risk. Assume a bank has some divisions. According to the fi rst paper there is always a stable allocation of risk capital, which is not blocked by any coalition of the divisions, that is there is a core compatible allocation rule (we present some examples for risk allocation rules). The second paper considers two more natural requirements, Equal Treatment Property and Strong Monotonicity. Equal Treatment Property makes sure that similar divisions are treated symmetrically, that is if two divisions make the same marginal risk contribution to all the coalition of divisions not containing them, then the rule should allocate them the very same risk capital. Strong Monotonicity requires that if the risk environment changes in such a way that the marginal contribution of a division is not decreasing, then its allocated risk capital should not decrease either. However, if risk is evaluated by any coherent measure of risk, then there is no risk allocation rule satisfying Core Compatibility, Equal Treatment Property and Strong Monotonicity, we encounter an impossibility result.

The corruption risks of EU funds in Hungary

In corruption, a group of players gain an economic advantage without providing any socially beneficial services in return, therefore corruption is considered to be a form of rent-seeking. Similar to other forms of rent-seeking, corruption causes losses on a societal level, due to the less efficient allocation of resources, as well as the costs of operation and prosecution. Fighting corruption is important not just because of ethical but also economic considerations. Contributions from the European Union are making possible the use of more funds than ever, and spending the full amount of this money is a priority preference of the government. The abundance of funds and the pressure on absorption increase corruption, by the managers of the funds overplanning the amount of money to be allocated to individual tender invitations, setting generous rules on eligible costs, and specifying low rates of own contribution wherever possible. As a result, the opportunities for rent-seeking are increased, as it is worth it for beneficiaries to carry out the project even after relinquishing part of the funds they have been awarded. Thus, the abundance of funds generates a sphere of corruption in which rent-seekers may appear on various levels of the system, often even without the knowledge or approval of those on higher decisionmaking levels.