Informatika, telekommunikáció és gazdasági stabilitás (Information technology, telecommunications and economic stability)

Fizikai példákon és matematikai modelleken bemutatjuk, hogy a rendszerek működésének hatékonyságnövekedése instabilitást eredményezhet. Megvizsgáljuk, hogy az informatika és a telekommunikáció fejlődése okozhat-e rendszerszintű instabilitást, illetve milyen gazdasági eszközök vannak a stabilitás fenntartására. / === / Using examples from physics and mathematical modeling, the paper shows that increasing efficiency in systems can lead to instability. The question thus arises whether the development of information and telecommunication technology can lead to instability in the economic system. The policy tools used to maintain stability are also discussed.

On the implementation of the L-Nash bargaining solution in two-person bargaining games

The “Nash program” initiated by Nash (Econometrica 21:128–140, 1953) is a research agenda aiming at representing every axiomatically determined cooperative solution to a game as a Nash outcome of a reasonable noncooperative bargaining game. The L-Nash solution first defined by Forgó (Interactive Decisions. Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems, vol 229. Springer, Berlin, pp 1–15, 1983) is obtained as the limiting point of the Nash bargaining solution when the disagreement point goes to negative infinity in a fixed direction. In Forgó and Szidarovszky (Eur J Oper Res 147:108–116, 2003), the L-Nash solution was related to the solution of multiciteria decision making and two different axiomatizations of the L-Nash solution were also given in this context. In this paper, finite bounds are established for the penalty of disagreement in certain special two-person bargaining problems, making it possible to apply all the implementation models designed for Nash bargaining problems with a finite disagreement point to obtain the L-Nash solution as well. For another set of problems where this method does not work, a version of Rubinstein’s alternative offer game (Econometrica 50:97–109, 1982) is shown to asymptotically implement the L-Nash solution. If penalty is internalized as a decision variable of one of the players, then a modification of Howard’s game (J Econ Theory 56:142–159, 1992) also implements the L-Nash solution.