Measuring and managing liquidity risk in the Hungarian practice

The crisis that unfolded in 2007/2008 turned the attention of the financial world toward liquidity, the lack of which caused substantial losses. As a result, the need arose for the traditional financial models to be extended with liquidity. Our goal is to discover how Hungarian market players relate to liquidity. Our results are obtained through a series of semi-structured interviews, and are hoped to be a starting point for extending the existing models in an appropriate way. Our main results show that different investor groups can be identified along their approaches to liquidity, and they rarely use sophisticated models to measure and manage liquidity. We conclude that although market players would have access to complex liquidity measurement and management tools, there is a limited need for these, because the currently available models are unable to use complex liquidity information effectively.

Measuring and managing liquidity risk in the Hungarian practice

The crisis that unfolded in 2007/2008 turned the attention of the financial world toward liquidity, the lack of which caused substantial losses. As a result, the need arose for the traditional financial models to be extended with liquidity. Our goal is to discover how Hungarian market players relate to liquidity. Our results are obtained through a series of semistructured interviews, and are hoped to be a starting point for extending the existing models in an appropriate way. Our main results show that different investor groups can be identified along their approaches to liquidity, and they rarely use sophisticated models to measure and manage liquidity. We conclude that although market players would have access to complex liquidity measurement and management tools, there is a limited need for these, because the currently available models are unable to use complex liquidity information effectively.

A piaci likviditás hatása a vállalatokra (The effect of market liquidity for companies)

A 2007-ben kezdődő pénzügyi eredetű világgazdasági válság nyilvánvalóvá tette a kapcsolatot a likviditás két fajtája, a finanszírozási és a piaci likviditás között. A cikk megismertet a piaci likviditással kapcsolatos olyan alapvető fogalmakkal, mint order flow, ajánlati könyv, piaci struktúrák, bemutatja a piaci likviditás dimenzióit, a likviditás néhány mutatószámát és a piaci likviditás stilizált tényeit. A banki likviditáskezelés rövid összefoglalásán túl bevezetést nyújt a portfóliók likviditáskockázat melletti értékelésébe, végezetül összefoglalja, hogy az alapvetően finanszírozási likviditási kockázatnak kitett nem pénzügyi vállalatok hogyan vehetik figyelembe döntéseik meghozatalakor a piaci likviditást. _____________________ The global financial crisis starting in 2007 has showed that the connection between market liquidity and funding liquidity is apparent. This paper introduces the basic notions regarding market liquidity such as order flow, order book, and market structures. The article also presents the various dimensions of market liquidity, several measures of liquidity and the stylized facts of market liquidity. Besides a short description of liquidity management of banks it briefly introduces portfolio valuation in the presence of liquidity risk. Finally, the paper gives insight to non-financial companies, fundamentally exposed to funding liquidity risk, on how to consider market liquidity in their decisions.

Hedging under liquidity constraints

Although risk management can be justified by financial distress, the theoretical models usually contain hedging instruments free of funding risk. In practice, management of the counterparty risk in derivative transactions is of enhanced importance, consequently not only is trading on exchanges subject to the presence of a margin account, but also in bilateral (OTC) agreements parties will require margins or collateral from their partners in order to hedge the mark-tomarket loss of the transaction. The aim of this paper is to present and compare two models where the financing need of the hedging instrument also appears, influencing the hedging strategy and the optimal hedging ratio. Both models contain the same source of risk and optimisation criterion, but the liquidity risk is modelled in different ways. In the first model, there is no additional financing resource that can be used to finance the margin account in case of a margin call, which entails the risk of liquidation of the hedging position. In the second model, the financing is available but a given credit spread is to be paid for this, so hedging can become costly.

A fedezetlen bankközi forintpiac hálózati dinamikájának vizsgálata a likviditási válság előtt és után (Examination of the network dynamics of the uncovered interbank forint markel before the liquidity crisis and after)

A cikkben a magyar fedezetlen bankközi forintpiac hálózatának időbeli alakulását vizsgáljuk 2002 decemberétől 2009 márciusáig. Bemutatjuk a piac általános jellemzőit (forgalom, kamatláb, koncentráció stb.) és az alapvető hálózati mutatókat. Azt tapasztaljuk, hogy az időszak első felében ezek a jellemzők lényegében stabilak voltak. 2006-2007-től kezdve azonban a mutatók egy része kezdett jelentősen megváltozni: a hitelfelvevők koncentrációja nőtt, az átlagos közelség és az átlagos fokszám csökkent, továbbá a hálózat magjának mérete is csökkent. Ezek a jelek arra utalhatnak, hogy a bankok már a válság kitörése előtt érzékelték a növekvő hitelkockázatot, és egyre inkább megválogatták, hogy kinek adnak hitelt. Figyelemre méltó, hogy mindeközben az általános piaci mutatók (forgalom, kamatláb, illetve ezek volatilitása) semmiféle változásra utaló jelet nem tükröztek egészen 2008 októberéig, de ekkor hirtelen minden mutatóban egyértelművé vált a rezsimváltás. Végül részletesen elemezzük az egyes szereplők viselkedését, és megmutatjuk, hogy válságban az egyes szerepek drasztikusan megváltoztak (például forrásokból nyelők lettek, és fordítva). / === / The article examines the changes in the network of Hungary's uncovered interbank forint market over the period Decembcr 2000 to March 2009. It presents the general features of the market (volume, interest rates, concentration etc.) and its basic network. It is found that the features were largely stable in the first half of the period, but some of the indicators began to change significantly in 2006-7: the concentration of borrowers incrcased, average distance and average degree declined, as did the size of the core of the network. These signs pointed to the fact that the banks had sensed an increase in credit risk even before the crisis broke and were becoming increasingly choosy selective in their lending. Meanwhile, however. there aerc no indications of change in the general market indicators (volume, interest rates, or volatility of these) right up to October 2008, when the change of regime was clear in all indicators. Finally, the authors analyse in detail the behaviour of each participant and show that thc roles of some altered drastically with the crisis (e.g. sources became consumers and vice versa).

Some fairytales about risk management

When I started writing this paper, I thought I would only be writing about the parallel between the mathematical theory of inventory and production – as a familiar model of operations research – and liquidity management. And then during the writing process, predictably enough I must say, the scandals surrounding the Buda-Cash and Quaestor brokerages erupted. Likewise in this period, the debate about foreign currency lending gained fresh impetus; about who made which mistakes when, or whether there was anyone who didn’t make mistakes. The most surprising twist revealed in the Buda-Cash and Quaestor cases – beyond alleged losses running into several hundreds of billions of forints – was that all this could be accumulated in 15 years of selfless effort. And even if this information proves to be comment born of initial over-excitement, it still demands an explanation one way or another. If it’s true, then how can this be? And if it isn’t, then what made it appear as if this is what happened? The questions and contradictions are obvious. But the main questions are these: What do risk managers actually do? What do we pay them for? And how far can we trust them?