A mérsékelt iszlamista mozgalmak szerepe az "arab tavaszt" követő politikai átmenetben (The Role of Moderate Islamist Movements in the Political Transition Following the Arab Spring)

Up to January 2011 authoritarian political regimes in the Middle East had widely been considered stable due to the armed forces, the underdeveloped political institutions, the economic embeddedness of the regimes, the neo-patrimonial structure of the Arab societies and, eventually the characteristics of Islam. Middle Eastern political systems are often considered to belong to a special sub-group of non-democratic regimes called “liberalized autocracies”. The 2011 events show that there is a new, as yet non-defined political structure emerging. Although there are different interpretations of the developments, there is a consensus on the determinant role of the Islamist organizations in the development of the new political structure. The results of the Egyptian and Tunisian parliamentary elections show that the secular political parties could not attract the public, while in Tunisia the long forbidden Hizb an-Nahda could form a government. In Egypt Hizb al-Hurriya established by the Muslim Brotherhood in 2011 won almost half of the parliamentary mandates, and to a great surprise, the Salafi Hizb an-Nour also received 24.3% of the votes. On the basis of the above developments the thesis of the Islamist re-organization of the Middle East, i.e. of a new wave of Islamism was elaborated, according to which the main political winners of the revolts in the Arab countries are the Islamist organizations, which could step in and fill in the political vacuum. While some speak of an Islamist autumn or Islamist winter as the result of the Arab Spring, others prefer the term Islamic revolutions.

Islamist movements at crossroads: the choice between ideology and context-driven approach to politics. Case study on the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan

The aim of the paper is to analyse the ongoing transformation process within the Islamist movements using the example of the moderate Islamic Action Front party in Jordan. The dilemma of participation in the 2010 general elections raised tensions between the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan and its political wing, the Islamic Action Front, and between doves and hawks of the same organizations. Internal debate on the future has started recently among different groups within the Islamist movement in Jordan. The research is based on the author‘s recent field experience in Jordan (April–July 2010, Andrew W. Mellon Fellowship at the American Centre of Oriental Research, Amman, Jordan). The author also conducted research in Syria, Lebanon, Palestine and Egypt, where several interviews were carried out with leading and lower level Islamist politicians. The dynamic changes within Islamic Action Front Party in Jordan and its relation with the regime has been used as reference point. The main question of the research was aa how the changing political and regional context shapes decisions of the Islamist with special attention to the acceptance of democratic values and human rights, political participation, and the meanings of Islamic values in the 21st century, possible cooperation with secular parties/movements/the regime.

Are parliaments with more parties cheaper to bribe?

We collect data about 172 countries: their parliaments, level of corruption, perceptions of corruption of parliament and political parties. We find weak empirical evidence supporting the conclusion that corruption increases as the number of parties increases. To provide a theoretical explanation of this finding we present a simple theoretical model of parliaments formed by parties, which must decide whether to accept or reject a proposal in the presence of a briber, who is interested in having the bill passed. We compute the number of deputies the briber needs to persuade on average in parliaments with different structures described by the number of parties, the voting quota, and the allocation of seats among parties. We find that the average number of seats needed to be bribed decreases as the number of parties increases. Restricting the minimal number of seats a party may have, we show that the average number of seats to be bribed is smaller in parliaments without small parties. Restricting the maximum number of seats a party may have, we find that under simple majority the average number of seats needed to be bribed is smaller for parliaments in which one party has majority, but under qualified majority it hardly changes.