What makes ISAF s/tick: An investigation of the politics of coalition burden-sharing

This paper is interested in conceptualising the often raised issue of over- and under-contributing in coalition operations; that of how and why members of complex coalitions2 may be punching above and below their weight, respectively. To this end, the first section presents a parsimonious baseline assumption regarding what variables may fundamentally inform coalition burden-sharing, to subsequently discuss how much each of these are found to play a role in the Afghanistan context. The second section elaborates on this by assessing the perception and the interpretation of threats by coalition member countries, related to Afghanistan, as this pertains to prioritising other variables within the scheme outlined in the previous section. The third and fourth sections then proceed to examine and further enrich the existing literature on coalition burden-sharing, and provide further insights regarding the operations of the International Security Assistance Force–Afghanistan, and regarding ISAF member-country decisionmaking; the objective here is to generate further refined assumptions, that can permit a preliminary assessment of the phenomenon of uneven burden-sharing in ISAF, complementing the initial baseline expectations.

The Multilateralisation of Soviet Bloc Security: The Hungarian Revolution from an Eastern European Perspective

The Hungarian Revolution is often analysed in a national context or from the angle of Hungarian-Soviet relations. From this perspective, the Eastern European satellites seem mere puppets and the Soviet bloc a monolith. Archival evidence nevertheless shows that the Kremlin actually attempted to build a new kind of international relations after Stalin’s death in 1953, in which the Eastern European leaders would gain more scope for manoeuvre. This attempt at liberalisation even facilitated the uprisings in Hungary in 1956. Avoiding a teleological approach to the Hungarian Revolution, this article argues that the Soviet invasion was neither inevitable, nor wholly unilateral. Khrushchev even sought to legitimise the invasion in bilateral and multilateral consultations. There was a mutual interest in sacrificing Hungary’s sovereignty to safeguard the communist monopoly on power. This multilateralisation of Soviet bloc security is an important explanatory factor in an analysis of the Revolution and its repercussions in Eastern Europe.