A vállalkozói hajlandóság vizsgálata a női hallgatók körében Magyarországon (Research of entrepreneurial intentions of the Hungarian female students)

Köztudott, hogy a nők lényeges szerepet töltenek be a gazdasági életben, ezért fontos megvizsgálni azt, hogy melyek az ösztönző és az akadályozó tényezők a vállalkozásindításuk során. Egy 2011-es nemzetközi kutatás többek között a magyar női hallgatók vállalkozói hajlandóságát befolyásoló tényezőket vizsgálta. A kutatás többek között a motivációs tényezőkre, a személyiségjegyekre, valamint a korlátozó tényezőkre irányult. A vizsgálat eredményei azt igazolták, hogy a női vállalkozói létet nemcsak a pénzügyi indítékok vezérelték, hanem a belső tényezők is. Elsősorban az egyéni tényezők jelentették az akadályokat számukra, a szervezeti-környezeti korlátok szerepe kisebb jelentőséggel bírt. A vizsgálat eredményei többnyire a szakirodalmi adatokat igazolták. _____ It is widely known, that women play an important role in the economy, which makes the determination of motives and obstacles during business start-ups inevitable. Hungarian female students were surveyed during an international study in 2011 to determine the factors of entrepreneurial intentions. The survey included among other factors the motives for self‐employment, the personal characteristics and the barriers they faced. Results revealed that primary motivations for females during business start-ups were not only monetary motives, but also intrinsic factors. Problems faced by Hungarian female students were mainly individual; the organizationalenvironmental ones had lower importance. Results on motives and barriers were mostly consistent with the authors’ literature findings.

Breaking promises. The Hungarian experience

My main aim is to present the phenomena related to fulfilment and breach of promises and the economic, political and ethical problems arising from these. I discuss questions that we all meet with in daily life and see mentioned in the press, other forums of public discourse, gatherings of friends, or sessions of Parliament. There are some who complain that a building contractor has not done a renovation job properly according to contract. Economists argue over the outcome of late repayments on loans advanced for purchasing real estate. Opposition meetings chide the governing party over unfulfilled campaign promises. I am seeking what is common among these seemingly different cases. Can we see identical or similar behavior patterns and social mechanisms in them? Do they lead to similar decision-making dilemmas and reactions?

An enhanced Servqual approach to measure service quality in higher education

This paper explores the factors of service quality in higher education and how they contribute to the overall satisfaction and behavioral intentions of students. Our research has three facets. The first is a conceptual issue: using different instrument for the measurement of academic and administrative quality as opposed to an overall assessment of quality. The second is a measurement issue: measuring directly disconfirmation instead of separately measuring perception and expectation. The third issue concerns the concept of minimum service quality level versus an ideal one (zone of tolerance), and their inferences with the disconfirmation concept.

Are parliaments with more parties cheaper to bribe?

We collect data about 172 countries: their parliaments, level of corruption, perceptions of corruption of parliament and political parties. We find weak empirical evidence supporting the conclusion that corruption increases as the number of parties increases. To provide a theoretical explanation of this finding we present a simple theoretical model of parliaments formed by parties, which must decide whether to accept or reject a proposal in the presence of a briber, who is interested in having the bill passed. We compute the number of deputies the briber needs to persuade on average in parliaments with different structures described by the number of parties, the voting quota, and the allocation of seats among parties. We find that the average number of seats needed to be bribed decreases as the number of parties increases. Restricting the minimal number of seats a party may have, we show that the average number of seats to be bribed is smaller in parliaments without small parties. Restricting the maximum number of seats a party may have, we find that under simple majority the average number of seats needed to be bribed is smaller for parliaments in which one party has majority, but under qualified majority it hardly changes.