Kontraszelekció és erkölcsi kockázat a politikában. Vázlat az információs aszimmetria közgazdaságtani fogalmainak politikatudományi alkalmazhatóságáról (Negative selection and moral risk in politics. An outline of the usefulness to political science of the economic concept of information asymmetry)

Az írás a kontraszelekció és az erkölcsi kockázat információ-gazdaságtani fogalmának politikatudományi alkalmazhatósága mellett érvel. Azt kívánja bemutatni, hogy a politikai piac szereplői közti információs aszimmetria mechanizmusainak éppúgy lehetnek súlyos negatív hatásai a demokratikus politikai rendszer működésére nézve, mint ahogy a gazdasági szereplők közti információs aszimmetria - Nobel-díjas közgazdászok érvei szerint - alááshatja a piaci verseny hatékonyságát. Az írás új megvilágításba helyezi a - már Platón óta ismert - politikai kontraszelekció jelenségét, továbbá részletesen foglalkozik az erkölcsi kockázat és a megbízó-megbízott relációk megjelenésével a politikában. Érinti tovább azoknak a mechanizmusoknak - a jelzésnek és a szűrésnek - a megjelenését a politikában, melyeket a közgazdászok az információs aszimmetria csökkentésére ajánlanak. / === / The paper argues in favour of employing in political science the economic concept of information asymmetry, seeking to show that the mechanisms of information asymmetry among the players on the political market may have negative effects on the operation of a democratic political system as information asymmetry among economic actors – according to arguments of Nobel prize-winning economists – has on the efficiency of market competition. The paper sheds new light on the phenomenon of negative political selection (known since Plato's time), and goes on to deal in detail with the appearance of moral risk and client/agent relations in politics. The author touches also on the appearance in politics of mechanisms – signals and filters – that economists suggest for reducing information asymmetry.

Measuring and managing liquidity risk in the Hungarian practice

The crisis that unfolded in 2007/2008 turned the attention of the financial world toward liquidity, the lack of which caused substantial losses. As a result, the need arose for the traditional financial models to be extended with liquidity. Our goal is to discover how Hungarian market players relate to liquidity. Our results are obtained through a series of semi-structured interviews, and are hoped to be a starting point for extending the existing models in an appropriate way. Our main results show that different investor groups can be identified along their approaches to liquidity, and they rarely use sophisticated models to measure and manage liquidity. We conclude that although market players would have access to complex liquidity measurement and management tools, there is a limited need for these, because the currently available models are unable to use complex liquidity information effectively.

Measuring and managing liquidity risk in the Hungarian practice

The crisis that unfolded in 2007/2008 turned the attention of the financial world toward liquidity, the lack of which caused substantial losses. As a result, the need arose for the traditional financial models to be extended with liquidity. Our goal is to discover how Hungarian market players relate to liquidity. Our results are obtained through a series of semistructured interviews, and are hoped to be a starting point for extending the existing models in an appropriate way. Our main results show that different investor groups can be identified along their approaches to liquidity, and they rarely use sophisticated models to measure and manage liquidity. We conclude that although market players would have access to complex liquidity measurement and management tools, there is a limited need for these, because the currently available models are unable to use complex liquidity information effectively.

Speciális kockázatok és kockázatkezelés a kockázatitőke-finanszírozásban (The special risks and risk management of venture capital)

A tanulmányban a szerzők arra a kérdésre keresik a választ, hogy az aszimmetrikus információk hatására a vállalkozók és a befektetők között kialakuló megbízó-ügynök viszonynak melyek a speciális vetületei a kockázatitőke-finanszírozás vonatkozásában. A szerzők arra a következtetésre jutottak, hogy a hiányos információk, a megbízó-ügynök viszony, illetve az ügyletek speciális jellege miatt fokozottan jelentkező ügynökprobléma kezelésére a kockázatitőke-finanszírozás szereplői speciális kockázatkezelési technikákat alkalmaznak. Ilyenek a magas elvárt hozamok, a szigorú kiválasztási kritériumok, a speciális befektetési vagy szindikátusi szerződések, a befektetést követő monitoring tevékenység, a több lépcsőben történő finanszírozás és a portfólióvállalatok hálózatba szervezése. A speciális kockázati megközelítés következtében a befektetéseket opciós szemlélet is áthatja. _____ This paper focuses on the special aspects of imperfect information in case of venture capital financing including principal-agent relationship between entrepreneurs and investors as well as adverse selection that evolves as a result of information asymmetries. The authors’ finding is that venture capital is able to manage the problems caused by imperfect information via applying divers risk management techniques such as high profit expectations, scrutiny of portfolio-companies, the use of special contracting stipulations and syndicate agreements, the monitoring of investments, multi-staged financing of companies and the integration of portfolio-companies into networks. In addition to the risk management techniques the authors also give the interpretation of the unique attitude of venture capital toward uncertainty and its special real option-like risk valuation approach that makes venture capitalists capable of handling high uncertainty under imperfect information.

Some fairytales about risk management

When I started writing this paper, I thought I would only be writing about the parallel between the mathematical theory of inventory and production – as a familiar model of operations research – and liquidity management. And then during the writing process, predictably enough I must say, the scandals surrounding the Buda-Cash and Quaestor brokerages erupted. Likewise in this period, the debate about foreign currency lending gained fresh impetus; about who made which mistakes when, or whether there was anyone who didn’t make mistakes. The most surprising twist revealed in the Buda-Cash and Quaestor cases – beyond alleged losses running into several hundreds of billions of forints – was that all this could be accumulated in 15 years of selfless effort. And even if this information proves to be comment born of initial over-excitement, it still demands an explanation one way or another. If it’s true, then how can this be? And if it isn’t, then what made it appear as if this is what happened? The questions and contradictions are obvious. But the main questions are these: What do risk managers actually do? What do we pay them for? And how far can we trust them?

The risk of adverse selection and its management in the process of venture capital investment (The experience of Hungarian investors)

Venture capitalists can be regarded as financers of young, high-risk enterprises, seeking investments with a high growth potential and offering professional support above and beyond their capital investment. The aim of this study is to analyse the occurrence of information asymmetry between venture capital investors and entrepreneurs, with special regard to the problem of adverse selection. In the course of my empirical research, I conducted in-depth interviews with 10 venture capital investors. The aim of the research was to elicit their opinions about the situation regarding information asymmetry, how they deal with problems arising from adverse selection, and what measures they take to manage these within the investment process. In the interviews we also touched upon how investors evaluate state intervention, and how much they believe company managers are influenced by state support.