Stable sets in one-seller assignment games

We consider von Neumann -- Morgenstern stable sets in assignment games with one seller and many buyers. We prove that a set of imputations is a stable set if and only if it is the graph of a certain type of continuous and monotone function. This characterization enables us to interpret the standards of behavior encompassed by the various stable sets as possible outcomes of well-known auction procedures when groups of buyers may form bidder rings. We also show that the union of all stable sets can be described as the union of convex polytopes all of whose vertices are marginal contribution payoff vectors. Consequently, each stable set is contained in the Weber set. The Shapley value, however, typically falls outside the union of all stable sets.

Designing Choice Sets to Exploit Focusing Illusion

Focusing illusion describes how, when making choices, people may put disproportionate attention on certain attributes of the options and hence, causing those options to be overvalued. For instance, in deciding whether or not to take out a loan, people may focus more on getting the loan than on its small and dispersed costs. Building on recent literature on focusing illusion in economic choice, we theoretically propose and empirically test that focusing illusion can be advantageously exploited such that attention is put back on the ignored attributes. To demonstrate this, we use hypothetical loan decisions where people choose between loans with different repayment plans to finance a purchase. We show that when adding a steeply decreasing-installments plan to the original choice set of not borrowing or borrowing under a fixed-installments plan, the preference for the fixed-installments plan is lessened. This is because preference for the fixed-installments plan shifted towards not borrowing. We discuss potential applications of our results in designing choice sets of intertemporal sequences.