Common priors for generalized type spaces

The notion of common prior is well-understood and widely-used in the incomplete information games literature. For ordinary type spaces the common prior is de�fined. Pint�er and Udvari (2011) introduce the notion of generalized type space. Generalized type spaces are models for various bonded rationality issues, for �nite belief hierarchies, unawareness among others. In this paper we de�ne the notion of common prior for generalized types spaces. Our results are as follows: the generalization (1) suggests a new form of common prior for ordinary type spaces, (2) shows some quantum game theoretic results (Brandenburger and La Mura, 2011) in new light.

Every hierarchy of beliefs is a type

When modeling game situations of incomplete information one usually considers the players’ hierarchies of beliefs, a source of all sorts of complications. Harsányi (1967-68)’s idea henceforth referred to as the ”Harsányi program” is that hierarchies of beliefs can be replaced by ”types”. The types constitute the ”type space”. In the purely measurable framework Heifetz and Samet (1998) formalize the concept of type spaces and prove the existence and the uniqueness of a universal type space. Meier (2001) shows that the purely measurable universal type space is complete, i.e., it is a consistent object. With the aim of adding the finishing touch to these results, we will prove in this paper that in the purely measurable framework every hierarchy of beliefs can be represented by a unique element of the complete universal type space.

Generalized type spaces

Ordinary type spaces (Heifetz and Samet, 1998) are essential ingredients of incomplete information games. With ordinary type spaces one can grab the notions of beliefs, belief hierarchies and common prior etc. However, ordinary type spaces cannot handle the notions of finite belief hierarchy and unawareness among others. In this paper we consider a generalization of ordinary type spaces, and introduce the so called generalized type spaces which can grab all notions ordinary type spaces can and more, finite belief hierarchies and unawareness among others. We also demonstrate that the universal generalized type space exists.

Common priors for generalized type spaces

The notion of common prior is well-understood and widely-used in the incomplete information games literature. For ordinary type spaces the common prior is defined. Pinter and Udvari (2011) introduce the notion of generalized type space. Generalized type spaces are models for various bonded rationality issues, for nite belief hierarchies, unawareness among others. In this paper we dene the notion of common prior for generalized types spaces. Our results are as follows: the generalization (1) suggests a new form of common prior for ordinary type spaces, (2) shows some quantum game theoretic results (Brandenburger and La Mura, 2011) in new light.

A new epistemic model

Meier (2012) gave a "mathematical logic foundation" of the purely measurable universal type space (Heifetz and Samet, 1998). The mathematical logic foundation, however, discloses an inconsistency in the type space literature: a finitary language is used for the belief hierarchies and an infinitary language is used for the beliefs. In this paper we propose an epistemic model to fix the inconsistency above. We show that in this new model the universal knowledgebelief space exists, is complete and encompasses all belief hierarchies. Moreover, by examples we demonstrate that in this model the players can agree to disagree Aumann (1976)'s result does not hold, and Aumann and Brandenburger (1995)'s conditions are not sufficient for Nash equilibrium. However, we show that if we substitute selfevidence (Osborne and Rubinstein, 1994) for common knowledge, then we get at that both Aumann (1976)'s and Aumann and Brandenburger (1995)'s results hold.

Lexicographic allocations and extreme core payoffs: the case of assignment games

We consider various lexicographic allocation procedures for coalitional games with transferable utility where the payoffs are computed in an externally given order of the players. The common feature of the methods is that if the allocation is in the core, it is an extreme point of the core. We first investigate the general relationship between these allocations and obtain two hierarchies on the class of balanced games. Secondly, we focus on assignment games and sharpen some of these general relationship. Our main result is the coincidence of the sets of lemarals (vectors of lexicographic maxima over the set of dual coalitionally rational payoff vectors), lemacols (vectors of lexicographic maxima over the core) and extreme core points. As byproducts, we show that, similarly to the core and the coalitionally rational payoff set, also the dual coalitionally rational payoff set of an assignment game is determined by the individual and mixed-pair coalitions, and present an efficient and elementary way to compute these basic dual coalitional values. This provides a way to compute the Alexia value (the average of all lemacols) with no need to obtain the whole coalitional function of the dual assignment game.