Mitigation and adaptation to climate change

Climate change produces significant social and economic impacts in most parts of the world, thus global action is needed to address climate change. In this chapter, the different possibilities of mitigation are explored from different points of view, and analyse the possibilities of adaptation to climate change. First, substantial reduction of GHG emission is needed, on the other hand adaptation action must deal with the inevitable impacts. According to the assessment of the chapter, it is essential that coordinated actions be taken at an EU level. In our argumentation, a macroeconomic model is used for the cost- benefit analysis of GHG gas emissions reduction. The GHG emission structure is analysed on European and global level. Even in the case of a successful mitigation strategy there rest the long-term effects of climate change which will need a coherent adaptation strategy to be dealt with. Although certain adaptation measures already have been taken, these initiatives are still very modest, and insufficient to deal with the economic effects of climate change properly.

Mitigation and Adaptation to Climate Change

Climate change affects both economy and society in several ways throughout the world. Therefore, well-targeted global and regional actions must be taken. In this paper I assess the different options for climate change mitigation policies and analyse the possibilities of adaptation methods. I will focus on three aspects: cost-efficiency, innovation and flexibility.

State subsidy and moral hazard in corporate financing

This paper investigates the impact of state subsidy on the behavior of the entrepreneur under asymmetric information. Several authors formulated concerns about state intervention as it can aggravate moral hazard in corporate financing. In the seminal paper of Holmström and Tirole (1997) a two-player moral hazard model is presented with an entrepreneur initiating a risky scalable project and a private investor (e.g. bank or venture capitalist) providing outside financing. The novelty of our research is that this basic moral hazard model is extended to the case of positive externalities and to three players by introducing the state subsidizing the project. It is shown that in the optimum, state subsidy does not harm, but improves the incentives of the entrepreneur to make efforts for the success of the project; hence in effect state intervention reduces moral hazard. Consequently, state subsidy increases social welfare which is defined as the sum of private and public net benefits. Also, the exact form of the state subsidy (ex-ante/ex-post, conditional/unconditional, refundable/nonrefundable) is irrelevant in respect of the optimal size and the total welfare effect of the project. Moreover, in case of nonrefundable subsidies state does not crowd out private investors; but on the contrary, by providing additional capital it boosts private financing. In case of refundable subsidies some crowding effects may occur depending on the subsidy form and the parameters.