Az európai gazdasági kormányzás előtt álló kihívások. A hármas tagadás lehetetlensége (Challenges of European economic governance. The impossible trinity of denial.)

Az európai gazdasági integráció folyamata olyan kényszerhelyzetekben formálódott a múltban, amelyek a közgazdaságtudományban jól ismert lehetetlen háromság alapján is leírhatók. Az Európai Monetáris Rendszer a rögzített árfolyam-mechanizmusra és önálló jegybanki politikára épített, korlátozva a tőkemozgásokat. A Gazdasági és Monetáris Unió ugyanakkor a tőke szabad áramlásával és az árfolyamok visszavonhatatlan rögzítésével felszámolta a tagállami szintű jegybanki autonómiát. Az euróövezet működése egyszersmind arra a háromszoros tagadásra épül(t), hogy 1. nem lehetséges az euróövezetből való kilépés, 2. nem engedélyezett a kimentés és 3. nem kerülhet sor államcsődre. A 2008-ban Európát is elérő pénzügyi és gazdasági válság azonban elemi erővel mutatott rá e hármas tiltás tarthatatlanságára. A gazdasági kormányzás körül kibontakozott viták így jól közelíthetők a három tiltó szabály egyidejű érvényesülése lehetetlenségének bemutatásával, számba véve az egyes opciók költségeit és lehetséges hasznait. / === / The process of economic integration in the EU has been shaped by the well-known theorem of the impossible trinity. Accordingly, the European Monetary System was built upon a mix of a fixed exchange-rate regime and an autonomous monetary policy, thereby constraining capital mobility. In launching the EMU project, the EU countries decided to fix national currencies irrevocably and maintain full capital mobility, in exchange for delegating their monetary policy upwards to a supranational level. The introduction of the Euro zone, however, has simultaneously meant denial of the following three elements: (1) exit, (2) bail-out, and (3) default. Nevertheless, the 2008–9 financial and economic crisis has demonstrated mercilessly that these three pillars are incompatible with each other. So the current debates on reshaping economic governance in the EU can be modelled by introducing the “impossible trinity of denial”, concentrating on the benefits and the costs of each option.

Rules-based economic governance in the European Union: A reappraisal of national fiscal rules.

The economic and financial crisis of 2007/2009 has posed unexpected challenges on both the global and the regional level. Besides the US, the EU has been the most severely hit by the current economic crisis. The financial and banking crisis on the one hand and the sovereign debt crisis on the other hand have clearly shown that without a bold, constructive and systematic change of the economic governance structure of the Union, not just the sustainability of the monetary zone but also the viability of the whole European integration process can be seriously undermined. The current crisis is, however, only a symptom, which made all those contradictions overt that were already heavily embedded in the system. Right from the very beginning, the deficit and the debt rules of the Maastricht Treaty and the Stability and Growth Pact have proved to be controversial cornerstones in the fiscal governance framework of the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). Yet, member states of the EU (both within and outside of the EMU) have shown an immense interest in adopting numerical constraints on the domestic level without hesitation. The main argument for the introduction of national fiscal rules was mostly to strengthen the accountability and credibility of national fiscal policy-making. The paper, however, claims that a relatively large portion of national rules were adopted only after the start of deceleration of the debt-to-GDP ratios. Accordingly, national rules were hardly the sole triggering factors of maintaining fiscal discipline; rather, they served as the key elements of a comprehensive reform package of public budgeting. It can be safely argued, therefore, that countries decide to adopt fiscal rules because they want to explicitly signal their strong commitment to fiscal discipline. In other words, it is not fiscal rules per se what matter in delivering fiscal stability but a strong political commitment.

An examination of the relationship of governance structure and performance: Evidence from banking companies in Bangladesh

Corporate governance has become increasingly important in developed and developing countries just after a series of corporate scandals and failures in a number of countries. Corporate governance structure is often viewed as a means of corporate success despite prior studies reveal mixed, somewhere conflicting and ambiguous, and somewhere no relationship between governance structure and performance. This study empirically investigates the relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and financial performance of listed banking companies in Bangladesh by using two multiple regression models. The study reveals that a good number of companies do not comply with the regulatory requirements indicating remarkable shortfall in corporate governance practice. The companies are run by the professional managers having no duality and no ownership interest for which they are compensated by high remuneration to curb agency conflict. Apart from some inconsistent relationship between some corporate variables, the corporate governance mechanisms do not appear to have significant relationship with financial performances. The findings reveal an insignificant negative impact or somewhere no impact of independent directors and non-independent non-executive directors on the level of performance that strongly support the concept that the managers are essentially worthy of trust and earn returns for the owners as claimed by stewardship theory. The study provides support for the view that while much emphasis on corporate governance mechanisms is necessary to safeguard the interest of stakeholders; corporate governance on its own, as a set of codes or standards for corporate conformance, cannot make a company successful. Companies need to balance corporate governance mechanisms with performance by adopting strategic decision and risk management with the efficient utilization of the organization’s resources.

Global crises: Is the Keynesian recipe relevant if applied under a global governance?

Keynesian policy was quite successful in the post-war decades in Western Europe, but by the late 1960s lost its efficiency due to changes in conditions rather than its mistaken logic. The lesson from the first global crisis erupting in early 1970s and also from the subsequent several crises since then is that the increasing crisis propensity of the world economy is rooted in its inherent disequilibria stemming from deep inequalities, asymmetrical interdependencies and disintegrated socio-economic structures. In view of the failure of the prevailing methods of crisis management, particularly those undifferentiated, antisocial austerity measures corresponding to a neo-liberal monetarist concept which neglects this lesson, many economists prefer the Keynesian recipe. However, since global crises need global solution, and the spread of conspicuous consumption modify the demand constraint, its application must be adjusted to reality, and requires some global governance which may pave the way for a global oeco-social market economy.

Recent Developments in the Autonomy and Governance of Higher Education Institutions in Hungary: the Introduction of the Chancellor System

After the change of regime in 1989, Hungarian higher education started to return to its Humboldtian tradition. It was widely accepted that academic freedom could be guaranteed by high degree of institutional autonomy manifested especially in structures of self-governance and avoidance of direct state supervision/interventions. Attempts to introduce boards and other supervising bodies were successfully resisted until 2011. The new government coming into power in 2010, however, introduced new mechanisms of supervision and changed institutional governance and reduced institutional autonomy considerably. Changes in the selection of rectors, the appearance of state-appointed financial inspectors and the newly appointed Chancellors responsible for the finance, maintenance and administration of institutions are important milestones in this process. In the paper I review these developments focusing especially on the analysis of the Chancellor system.