Tőkeallokáció nem likvid portfóliók esetén (Risk capital allocation in case of illiquid portfolios)

A kockázat jó mérése és elosztása elengedhetetlen a bankok, biztosítók, befektetési alapok és egyéb pénzügyi vállalkozások belső tőkeallokációjához vagy teljesítményértékeléséhez. A cikkben bemutatjuk, hogy a koherens kockázati mértékek axiómáit nem likvid portfóliók esetén is el lehet várni. Így mérve a kockázatot, ismertetünk a kockázatelosztásra vonatkozó két kooperatív játékelméleti cikket. Az első optimista, eszerint mindig létezik stabil, az alegységek minden koalíciója által elfogadható, általános módszer a kockázat (tőke) elosztására. A második cikk pesszimista, mert azt mondja ki, hogy ha a stabilitás mellett igazságosak is szeretnénk lenni, akkor egy lehetetlenségi tételbe ütközünk. / === / Measuring and allocating risk properly are crucial for performance evaluation and internal capital allocation of portfolios held by banks, insurance companies, investment funds and other entities subject to fi nancial risk. We argue that the axioms of coherent measures of risk are valid for illiquid portfolios as well. Then, we present the results of two papers on allocating risk measured by a coherent measure of risk. Assume a bank has some divisions. According to the fi rst paper there is always a stable allocation of risk capital, which is not blocked by any coalition of the divisions, that is there is a core compatible allocation rule (we present some examples for risk allocation rules). The second paper considers two more natural requirements, Equal Treatment Property and Strong Monotonicity. Equal Treatment Property makes sure that similar divisions are treated symmetrically, that is if two divisions make the same marginal risk contribution to all the coalition of divisions not containing them, then the rule should allocate them the very same risk capital. Strong Monotonicity requires that if the risk environment changes in such a way that the marginal contribution of a division is not decreasing, then its allocated risk capital should not decrease either. However, if risk is evaluated by any coherent measure of risk, then there is no risk allocation rule satisfying Core Compatibility, Equal Treatment Property and Strong Monotonicity, we encounter an impossibility result.

Formalization of the informal venture capital market - Business angel networks and syndicates

Business angels are natural persons who provide equity financing for young enterprises and gain ownership in them. They are usually anonym investors and they operate in the background of the companies. Their important feature is that over the funding of the enterprises based on their business experiences they can contribute to the success of the companies with their special expertise and with strategic support. As a result of the asymmetric information between the angels and the companies their matching is difficult (Becsky-Nagy – Fazekas 2015), and the fact, that angel investors prefer anonymity makes it harder for entrepreneurs to obtain informal venture capital. The primary aim of the different type of business angel organizations and networks is to alleviate this matching process with intermediation between the two parties. The role of these organizations is increasing in the informal venture capital market compared to the individually operating angels. The recognition of their economic importance led many governments to support them. There were also public initiations that aimed the establishment of these intermediary organizations that led to the institutionalization of business angels. This study via the characterization of business angels focuses on the progress of these informational intermediaries and their ways of development with regards to the international trends and the current situation of Hungarian business angels and angel networks.