Kormányközi szerződéssel a költségvetési stabilitásért? (Intergovernmental agreement for fiscal discipline?)

Az EU fiskális szabályai bevezetésük óta az akadémiai kutatások homlokterében állnak. A nemzeti szintű fiskális szabályok vizsgálata ugyanakkor egy jobbára negligált területe maradt a nemzetközi kutatásoknak. Az idén életbe lépett új költségvetési paktum éppen ezen nemzeti szintű, a költségvetés egyensúlyát előíró szabályok bevezetésétől várja a fiskális fegyelem meghonosítását az EU országaiban. A tanulmány megmutatja, hogy az olyan nemzeti szabályok, mint a német aranyszabály, nem tekinthetők a fiskális fegyelem egyedüli letéteményeseinek. Ezek ugyanis többnyire egy átfogó reformcsomag részei voltak csupán. Amire szükség van ezért, az egy átfogó és átgondolt államháztartási reform, valamint a szabályok nemzeti birtokbavétele. Az új paktumot is ezen pontokon volna szükséges erősíteni. ______ The scrutiny of EU fiscal rules such as the Maastricht criteria and the Stability and Growth Pact has become the focus of many scholarly works. The study of domestic fiscal rules, however, has remained a neglected part of research. The new Treaty on Stability, Cooperation and Governance (TSCG), however, makes the analysis of domestic fiscal rules highly relevant, since the treaty requires member states to adopt a balanced budget rule. The paper demonstrates that domestic rules such as the German golden rule were hardly the sole triggering factors of fiscal discipline; rather, they served as the key elements of a comprehensive reform package. Thus, the paper argues that without bold and comprehensive reforms of the general government on the one hand and national ownership on the other hand, no fiscal rule can be effective enough. The new TSCG should be strengthened, therefore, in this particular aspect.

Fiscal adjustment and economic growth in the European Union

The current world economic crisis induced countries to launch wide-scale spending programmes all over the world. Member states of the European Union have not been an exception to this trend. While deficit spending may increase the aggregate demand, it can also accelerate indebtedness and make the required spending cuts politically risky later on. However, deficit financing is not a new phenomenon in the EU; it has been widely practiced in the last couple of decades. As the crisis seems to come to an end, countries with huge deficits should adopt exit strategies now, thereby reducing deficit and debt and reintroducing fiscal discipline, a requirement laid down in the Stability and Growth Pact. Nevertheless, former adjustment processes can provide ample evidence for successful and politically viable fiscal consolidations. In certain cases, even economic activity started to accelerate as a response to the welldesigned adjustment measures. Based on the previous experiences of EU states, the aim of this paper is, therefore, to identify the conditions that may determine a fiscal consolidation to be successful in terms of a reduced debt ratio and a positive economic growth.

Fiscal Federalism in Crisis: Lessons for Europe from the US

The euro area is facing crisis, while the US is not, though the overall fiscal situation and outlook is better in the euro area than in the US, and though the US faces serious state-level fiscal crises. A higher level of fiscal federalism would strengthen the euro area, but is not inevitable. Current fiscal reform proposals (strengthening of current rules, more policy coordination and an emergency financing mechanism) will if implemented result in some improvements. But implementation might be deficient or lack credibility, and could lead to disputes and carry a significant political risk. Introduction of a Eurobond covering up to 60 percent of member states’ GDP would bring about much greater levels of fiscal discipline than any other proposal, would create an attractive Eurobond market, and would deliver a strong message about the irreversible nature of European integration.

Rules-based economic governance in the European Union: A reappraisal of national fiscal rules.

The economic and financial crisis of 2007/2009 has posed unexpected challenges on both the global and the regional level. Besides the US, the EU has been the most severely hit by the current economic crisis. The financial and banking crisis on the one hand and the sovereign debt crisis on the other hand have clearly shown that without a bold, constructive and systematic change of the economic governance structure of the Union, not just the sustainability of the monetary zone but also the viability of the whole European integration process can be seriously undermined. The current crisis is, however, only a symptom, which made all those contradictions overt that were already heavily embedded in the system. Right from the very beginning, the deficit and the debt rules of the Maastricht Treaty and the Stability and Growth Pact have proved to be controversial cornerstones in the fiscal governance framework of the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). Yet, member states of the EU (both within and outside of the EMU) have shown an immense interest in adopting numerical constraints on the domestic level without hesitation. The main argument for the introduction of national fiscal rules was mostly to strengthen the accountability and credibility of national fiscal policy-making. The paper, however, claims that a relatively large portion of national rules were adopted only after the start of deceleration of the debt-to-GDP ratios. Accordingly, national rules were hardly the sole triggering factors of maintaining fiscal discipline; rather, they served as the key elements of a comprehensive reform package of public budgeting. It can be safely argued, therefore, that countries decide to adopt fiscal rules because they want to explicitly signal their strong commitment to fiscal discipline. In other words, it is not fiscal rules per se what matter in delivering fiscal stability but a strong political commitment.

Fiscal and Monetary Institutions in Central, Eastern and South-Eastern European Countries

This paper studies the role of fiscal and monetary institutions in macroeconomic stability and budgetary control in central, eastern and south-eastern European countries (CESEE) in comparison with other OECD countries. CESEE countries tend to grow faster and have more volatile output than non-CESEE OECD countries, which has implications for macroeconomic management: better fiscal and monetary institutions are needed to avoid pro-cyclical policies. The paper develops a Budgetary Discipline Index to assess whether good fiscal institutions underpin good fiscal outcomes. Even though most CESEE countries have low scores, the debt/GDP ratios declined before the crisis. This was largely the consequence of a very favourable relationship between the economic growth rate and the interest rate, but such a favourable relationship is not expected in the future. Econometric estimations confirm that better monetary institutions reduce macroeconomic volatility and that countries with better budgetary procedures have better fiscal outcomes. All these factors call for improved monetary institutions, stronger fiscal rules and better budgetary procedures in CESEE countries.

Robert J. Barro és a költségvetési túlköltekezés (Robert J. Barro and fiscal overspending)

Robert J. Barro, a Harvard Egyetem professzora főként a gazdaságpolitika makroökonómiai modellezése területén elért eredményei alapján ismert a közgazdászok körében. Tevékenysége kiterjed mind az elméleti, mind pedig az empirikus kutatások területére. Jelen tanulmány Barro azon kutatásainak feltételezéseit és eredményeit összegzi, amelyek a ricardói ekvivalenciaelvből kiindulva a költségvetési politika elméletét magyarázó újszerű eredmények kibontakozását segítették elő. A 80-as években az Egyesült Államok magas költségvetési hiánya számos közgazdászt ösztönzött hasonló témájú elmélet kidolgozására. Mivel hazánkban szinte mindennapos vita forrása a költségvetési hiány túlzott mértéke, ami veszélyezteti a monetáris közösségben való részvételünket, különösen érdekes és időszerű annak áttekintése, hogy hogyan gondolkodik egy modern közgazdász a költségvetési hiány okairól és következményeiről. ________________ The question of budgetary discipline emerges in relation to the criteria of the Economic and Monetary Union in almost all European special journals today. There is much less attention paid to budgetary overspending, the adjustment of which caused a serious puzzle for the government and the economists of the United States in the 80's. The Lucasian world of new classical economics has questioned the effectiveness of government intervention, it confuted above all the efficiency of fiscal policy. The macroeconomic models of Barro (1979, 1986) introduced in the present study - building upon the theoretical approach of economic policy on similar foundations - examine the effect of budgetary spending principally from a long-run perspective. His empirical analysis, overarching almost seventy years (1916–1982), is based upon the time series of variables affecting the budgetary deficit of the United States, distinguishing the effect of the usual government expenses from the over average items within. On the basis of his investigation on the United States and the United Kingdom he, furthermore, did not reject the economic invigorating role of government spending, he opposed Lucas' conclusions and got a modest step closer to the Keynesian standpoint in this sense. Barro, however, irrefutably argues on classical grounds, he recalls and reevaluates the Ricardian equivalence principle, summarizes the critiques raised against it and unintentionally praises the Classical economists. According to Barro we cannot ignore the one-time theorem of Ricardo if we are endeavoring to model government spending - we have to count with it if not definitely as a positive, but at least as a normative economic relationship.