Fiscal adjustment and economic growth in the European Union

The current world economic crisis induced countries to launch wide-scale spending programmes all over the world. Member states of the European Union have not been an exception to this trend. While deficit spending may increase the aggregate demand, it can also accelerate indebtedness and make the required spending cuts politically risky later on. However, deficit financing is not a new phenomenon in the EU; it has been widely practiced in the last couple of decades. As the crisis seems to come to an end, countries with huge deficits should adopt exit strategies now, thereby reducing deficit and debt and reintroducing fiscal discipline, a requirement laid down in the Stability and Growth Pact. Nevertheless, former adjustment processes can provide ample evidence for successful and politically viable fiscal consolidations. In certain cases, even economic activity started to accelerate as a response to the welldesigned adjustment measures. Based on the previous experiences of EU states, the aim of this paper is, therefore, to identify the conditions that may determine a fiscal consolidation to be successful in terms of a reduced debt ratio and a positive economic growth.

Trimming the sails. The comparative political economy of expansionary fiscal consolidations. A Hungarian perspective

Provides a multidisciplinary and systematic analysis of the concept of fiscal consolidations. This book discusses the concept, suggesting that fiscal adjustment can be in trade-off with economic growth if certain conditions are met. Fiscal consolidation has significant short term costs which dampen economic growth. This widely shared consensus in literature on political economy makes fiscal adjustment highly unpopular. Benczes conducts a systematic analysis to find out whether it is possible to have fiscal consolidation and experience economic growth even in the short run.The book provides a clear, multidisciplinary and systematic analysis of the relatively new concept of the so-called expansionary fiscal consolidations. This concept suggests that fiscal adjustment can be in trade-off with economic growth if certain conditions are met. But why do only a few countries and only at certain times experience the expansionary effects, while others not at all? The necessary conditions and circumstances have been totally neglected in the literature, or analyzed only partially at best.Having evolved a theoretical framework, it is tested on a difficult case: Hungary, which has had the highest deficit in the European Union. The main question was whether Hungary has a chance to experience short term growth effects in times of adjustment. ----- Contents: List of Figures List of Tables Acknowledgements 1. Introduction Part One: A critical Assessment of the Concept of Non-Keynesian Effects 2. Stylized Facts of EU Countries’ Major Fiscal Episodes 3. An Expectational View of Fiscal Policy: A Non-Linear Approach to Fiscal Consolidation 4. The Composition of Adjustment and the Structure of Labor Markets: A Linear Approach to Fiscal Consolidation Part Two: Testing the Institutional Conditions of Non-Keynesian Effects in Hungary 5. From Goulash Communism To Neo-Kadarism: An Overview 6. Financial Intermediation in Hungary—a Comparative Perspective 7. The Structure of the Hungarian General Budget—a Decompositional Analysis 8. The Labor Market and Wage Bargaining in Hungary—the (Ir)relevance of a Social Pact 9. Conclusion References Appendices Index

Market reform and state paternalism in Hungary: a path-dependent approach

Hungary is one of the worst-hit countries of the current financial crisis in Central and Eastern Europe. The deteriorating economic performance of the country is, however, not a recent phenomenon. A relatively high ratio of redistribution, a high and persistent public deficit and accelerated indebtedness characterised the country not just in the last couple of years but also well before the transformation, which also continued in the postsocialist years. The gradualist success of the country – which dates back to at least 1968 – in the field of liberalisation, marketisation and privatisation was accompanied by a constant overspending in the general government. The paper attempts to explore the reasons behind policymakers’ impotence to reform public finances. By providing a path-dependent explanation, it argues that both communist and postcommunist governments used the general budget as a buffer to compensate losers of economic reforms, especially microeconomic restructuring. The ever-widening circle of net benefiters of welfare provisions paid from the general budget, however, has made it simply unrealistic to implement sizeable fiscal adjustment, putting the country onto a deteriorating path of economic development.

A Tale of Three Countries: Recovery after Banking Crises

Highlights: • Iceland, Ireland and Latvia experienced similar developments before the crisis, such as sharp increases in banks’ balance sheets and the expansion of the construction sector. However the impact of the crisis was different: Latvia was hit harder than any other country in the world. Ireland also suffered heavily, while Iceland came out from the crisis with the smallest fall in employment, despite the greatest shock to the financial system. • There were marked differences in policy mix: currency collapse in Iceland but not in Latvia, letting banks fail in Iceland but not in Ireland, and the introduction of strict capital controls only in Iceland. The speed of fiscal consolidation was fastest in Latvia and slowest in Ireland. • Economic recovery has started in all three countries and there are several encouraging signals. The programme targets in terms of fiscal adjustment, structural reforms and financial reform are on track in all three countries. • Iceland seems to have the right policy mix. • Internal devaluation in Ireland and Latvia through wage cuts did not work, because privatesector wages hardly changed. The productivity increase was significant in Ireland and moderate in Latvia, yet was the result of a greater fall in employment than the fall in output, with harmful social consequences. • The experience with the collapse of the gigantic Icelandic banking system suggests that letting banks fail when they had a faulty business model is the right choice. • There is a strong case for a European banking federation.

The importance of institutions in expansionary fiscal consolidations. A critical assessment of non-Keynesian effects

The short-term effects of fiscal consolidation have attracted an increasing attention from both the academia and policy makers in the recent years. Authors in the literature on non- Keynesian effects usually put the emphasis on the need for the devaluation of the national currency, the accommodating reaction of the monetary authority and the favourable international economic conditions as the necessary accompanying tools of fiscal consolidation, in order to realise short-term expansionary effects. Some also add the necessity of large-scale adjustment; while others support the view that a high and increasing debt ratio or increasing government spending, by triggering an unavoidable adjustment, is the key to experiencing short-term expansionary effects. The composition of adjustment also became a crucial explanation for non-Keynesian effects. However, as the following critical assessment of the literature on expansionary fiscal consolidations will reveal, institutional conditions, such as the importance of the depth of financial intermediation and the influencing role of labour market structure, can prove to be crucial in the occurrence of the desired expansionary short-term effects.

Kiigazítás recesszió nélkül. Esettanulmány a magyar stabilizációról = Adjustment without recession: A Case Study of Hungarian Stabilization

1995. március 12-én a magyar kormány és a központi bank szigorú kiigazítási és stabilizációs programot hirdetett meg. A cikk az első eredmények számbavételére tesz kísérletet. A program meghirdetése előtt Magyarország két egymást követő év- ben hatalmas fizetésimérleg-hiányt mutatott fel, és nemzetközi megítélése romlani kezdett. A program radikális intézkedései nyomán elkerülhetővé vált a mexikói vál- sághoz hasonló pénzügyi katasztrófa. Sok makrogazdasági mutató jól érzékelhető javulást jelez: lényegesen csökkent a kereskedelmi mérleg és a folyó fizetési mérleg hiánya, a költségvetés elsődleges egyenlege pozitív lett. Az ilyesféle stabilizációs programokat rendszerint súlyos visszaesés és a munkanélküliség nagy növekedése kíséri. Magyarország elkerülte ezeket a mellékhatásokat: a GDP drasztikus vissza- esés helyett valamelyest tovább növekedett, és a munkanélküliség változatlan ma- radt. A javulásnak nagy ára volt: az életszínvonal erőteljes csökkenése, az infláció felgyorsulása, bár a magyarországi infláció még mindig a kézben tartott, mérsékelt infláció sávjában maradt. A cikk ismerteti a program heterodox módszereit: 1. nagy leértékelés, az előre meghirdetett csúszó árfolyam rezsimjének bevezetése, valamint ideiglenes import- vámpótlék kivetése; 2. határozott jövedelempolitika, amely 12 százalékos reálbércsök- kenést kényszerített ki; 3. fiskális intézkedések, köztük jóléti jogosultságok csök- kentése (a program meghirdetése előtt ezek a jogosultságok tabuk voltak); 4. a hitel- kínálat átcsoportosítása a vállalati szektor javára, a jövedelmezőség növekedése; 5. feszített (bár nem mértéktelenül feszített) monetáris politika, amely lehetővé tette a sikeres vállalatok expanzióját; 6. a privatizáció felgyorsítása, nagy és sikeres lépé- sek egyes kulcsszektorok (energia, telekommunikáció) privatizációjában. Végezetül a tanulmány óva int a túlzott magabiztosságtól és felhívja a figyelmet a potenciális veszélyekre. A makrogazdasági javulás még törékeny. A magyar fejlődés legbiztatóbb sajátossága a termelékenység erőteljes és folyamatos növekedése. / === / On March 12, 1995 Hungary s government and central bank announced a tough program of adjustment and stabilization. This study is an attempt to asses the first results. Before the announcement of the program Hungary had a huge current account deficit for two consecutive years, and her international reputation started to decline. The program s radical measures made it possible to avoid a Mexico-style financial catastrophe. Many macroeconomic indicators show tangible improvement: the trade deficit and the deficit on the current account have been reduced significantly, the primary budget shifted to surplus. These kinds of adjustment programs are usually associated with deep recession and a large increase of unemployment. Hungary avoided these adverse side-effects: GDP instead of a drastic decline, continued to grow somewhat, and unemployment remained unchanged. There was a high price for the improvement: a sharp decline in the standard of living, and an acceleration of inflation, although Hungary is still in the range of controlled, moderate inflation. The paper describes the heterodox instruments of the program: (1) large devaluation, followed by a new exchange rate regime of pre-announced crawling peg, and a temporary import surcharge, (2) energetic income policy, enforcing a 12% cut in real wages; (3) fiscal measures, including cuts in welfare entitlements. That happened for the first time: before the program entitlements had been regarded as taboo ; (4) reallocation of credit supply in favor of the enterprise sector; increase of profitability; (5) tight (but not excessively tight) monetary policy, allowing the expansion of successful private busi- ness; (6) acceleration of privatisation, including large and successful steps in the privatisation of some key sectors (energy, telecommunication). Finally the paper warns against excessive self- confidence and draws the attention to potential dangers. The macroeconomic improvement is still fragile. The most reassuring feature of Hungary s development is the impressive and persistent improvement of productivity.

Robert J. Barro és a költségvetési túlköltekezés (Robert J. Barro and fiscal overspending)

Robert J. Barro, a Harvard Egyetem professzora főként a gazdaságpolitika makroökonómiai modellezése területén elért eredményei alapján ismert a közgazdászok körében. Tevékenysége kiterjed mind az elméleti, mind pedig az empirikus kutatások területére. Jelen tanulmány Barro azon kutatásainak feltételezéseit és eredményeit összegzi, amelyek a ricardói ekvivalenciaelvből kiindulva a költségvetési politika elméletét magyarázó újszerű eredmények kibontakozását segítették elő. A 80-as években az Egyesült Államok magas költségvetési hiánya számos közgazdászt ösztönzött hasonló témájú elmélet kidolgozására. Mivel hazánkban szinte mindennapos vita forrása a költségvetési hiány túlzott mértéke, ami veszélyezteti a monetáris közösségben való részvételünket, különösen érdekes és időszerű annak áttekintése, hogy hogyan gondolkodik egy modern közgazdász a költségvetési hiány okairól és következményeiről. ________________ The question of budgetary discipline emerges in relation to the criteria of the Economic and Monetary Union in almost all European special journals today. There is much less attention paid to budgetary overspending, the adjustment of which caused a serious puzzle for the government and the economists of the United States in the 80's. The Lucasian world of new classical economics has questioned the effectiveness of government intervention, it confuted above all the efficiency of fiscal policy. The macroeconomic models of Barro (1979, 1986) introduced in the present study - building upon the theoretical approach of economic policy on similar foundations - examine the effect of budgetary spending principally from a long-run perspective. His empirical analysis, overarching almost seventy years (1916–1982), is based upon the time series of variables affecting the budgetary deficit of the United States, distinguishing the effect of the usual government expenses from the over average items within. On the basis of his investigation on the United States and the United Kingdom he, furthermore, did not reject the economic invigorating role of government spending, he opposed Lucas' conclusions and got a modest step closer to the Keynesian standpoint in this sense. Barro, however, irrefutably argues on classical grounds, he recalls and reevaluates the Ricardian equivalence principle, summarizes the critiques raised against it and unintentionally praises the Classical economists. According to Barro we cannot ignore the one-time theorem of Ricardo if we are endeavoring to model government spending - we have to count with it if not definitely as a positive, but at least as a normative economic relationship.