A közérdek védelmének intézményei Public-Private Partnership esetében = Institutional approaches to protecting public interest in Public-Private Partnership projects

A tanulmány a Public-Private Partnership (PPP) egyik nagy kérdésének megközelítéseit vizsgálja: miként védhető a közérdek e projektekben. Piaci és nem piaci megoldásokat tesz az elemzés mérlegre, valamint kitér arra, hogy miért különleges a PPP projektek esetében a közérdek védelmének kérdése. A szabályozott verseny körülményeinek kialakítása több megközelítésben is perdöntő kérdés a PPP értéknövelésének előmozdításához, bár a létező megoldások nem mentesek anomáliáktól. A képviseleti demokrácia intézményi működésének támogatására pedig a társadalmi részvétel megoldásait javasolja az irodalom. E megközelítés is több formájában, többféle céllal és szintén kihívásokkal segítheti az értéknövelő PPP projekteket. A tanulmány az elvi lehetőségek értékelő elemzését követően a megvalósítás realitásait is mérlegre teszi. = This study focuses on a key issue in Public-Private Partnership (PPP) projects: how may public interest be protected. It assesses market based and non market based approaches, and also explains why PPP projects are peculiar when addressing the protection of public interest. Setting up the conditions for simulated competition is of paramount importance for different reasons in order to enable value creating PPP projects. Existing solutions however are not without anomalies. To promote the institutions of democracy, participatory solutions are recommended in the literature. That approach may help value creating PPP projects in various forms, with a range of objectives and challenges. The study concludes the analytical assessment of options by highlighting the realistic conditions of implementation.

New Public Management Reforms: Institutions matter!

New Public Management (NPM) has played a decisive role and has had a radical effect on the productivity and efficiency of the public sector in the Anglo-Saxon countries. However, the effective introduction of the NPM reforms is not an easy task. The scientific community is zealously analyzing the experiences of the developing countries. The stories, they tell, are full of failures, and ineffective reforms. The goal of the current study is to uncover the factors that might influence the successful implementation of the NPM reforms. In our analysis, by relying on the theories of new institutional economics, we developed a model with which we wish to prove that in regards to the success of the reforms the informal and the formal institutions characteristic of the given country are the decisively determining factors. When answering the question, we introduced a new indicator based on public choice theory – the politicians’ interest index – by which we could measure the success of the NPM. We tested our hypothesis by a comparative statistical analysis using the data from 31 countries. Based on our results, we find that informal institutions, the culture shared by the members of society, fundamentally determine the probability of the successful implementation of the NPM reforms, these results having a significant practical relevance.

Introduction of soft budget constraint as an analyzing tool into public management. The case of the Hungarian public administration reform

Public management reforms are usually underpinned by arguments that they will make the public administration system more effective and efficient. In practice, however, it is very hard to determine whether a given reform will improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the public administration system in the long run. Here, I shall examine how the concept of the soft budget constraint (SBC) introduced by János Kornai (Kornai 1979, 1986; Kornai, Maskin & Roland 2003) can be applied to this problem. In the following, I shall describe the Hungarian public administration reforms implemented by the Orbán government from 2010 onward and analyze its reforms, focusing on which measures harden and which ones soften the budget constraint of the actors of the Hungarian public administration system. In the literature of economics, there is some evidence-based knowledge on how to harden/soften the budget constraint, which improves/reduces the effectiveness and hence the efficiency of the given system. By using the concept of SBC, I also hope to shed some light on the rationale behind the Hungarian government’s introduction of such a contradictory reform package. Previously, the concept of SBC was utilized narrowly in public management studies, mostly in the field of fiscal federalism. My goal is to apply the concept to a broader area of public management studies. My conclusion is that the concept of SBC can significantly contribute to public management studies by deepening our knowledge on the reasons behind the success and failure of public administration reforms.