European studies: Taking stock and looking ahead

This essay is an attempt to generalize experiences of Central and Eastern European universities in the field of European Studies over the past 20 years. The paper follows the logic of business analysis in order to come up with proposals for future action.

Kelet-közép-európai devizaárfolyamok előrejelzése határidős árfolyamok segítségével (Forecasting the exchange rates of three Central-Eastern European currencies with forward exchange rates)

Írásunkban azt vizsgáljuk, hogy a hosszú lejáratú határidős árfolyamok stacionaritását feltételező hibakorrekciós modellek, amelyeknek korábbi számítások szerint - a világ devizapiaci forgalmának mintegy 75 százalékát kitevő fejlett ipari országokra alkalmazva - kitűnő a mintán kívüli előrejelző erejük, hogyan képesek három keletközép- európai ország devizaárfolyamát előrejelezni. A három vizsgálat alá vont deviza (cseh, magyar, lengyel) esetében az eredmények relációnként nagyon eltérnek, és összességében kedvezőtlenebbek, mint a fejlett ipari országokra kapott eredmények, amit a nem teljesen rugalmas árfolyamrezsim, a rendelkezésre álló adatsor rövidsége, az eurózóna-csatlakozáshoz kapcsolódó bizonytalanságok, a devizakockázati és a határidős kamatprémium létezése, továbbá a Balassa-Samuelson-hatás együttes befolyásaként tudunk értelmezni. JEL kód: E43, F31, F47. /===/ This paper studies whether models that assume long-maturity forward exchange rates are stationary (which proved in earlier studies to provide superior forecasting ability when applied to exchange rates of major currencies) are capable of forecasting the Euro exchange rates of three Central-East European currencies (the Czech koruna, Hungarian forint and Polish zloty). The results for the three currencies differ from each other and are generally much worse than those obtained earlier for major currencies. These unfavourable results are attributed to the consequences of managed exchange-rate systems, to the short time series available, to uncertainties related to future Euro-zone entry, to the existence of a foreign exchange and term premium, and to the Balassa–Samuelson effect.

Fiscal and Monetary Institutions in Central, Eastern and South-Eastern European Countries

This paper studies the role of fiscal and monetary institutions in macroeconomic stability and budgetary control in central, eastern and south-eastern European countries (CESEE) in comparison with other OECD countries. CESEE countries tend to grow faster and have more volatile output than non-CESEE OECD countries, which has implications for macroeconomic management: better fiscal and monetary institutions are needed to avoid pro-cyclical policies. The paper develops a Budgetary Discipline Index to assess whether good fiscal institutions underpin good fiscal outcomes. Even though most CESEE countries have low scores, the debt/GDP ratios declined before the crisis. This was largely the consequence of a very favourable relationship between the economic growth rate and the interest rate, but such a favourable relationship is not expected in the future. Econometric estimations confirm that better monetary institutions reduce macroeconomic volatility and that countries with better budgetary procedures have better fiscal outcomes. All these factors call for improved monetary institutions, stronger fiscal rules and better budgetary procedures in CESEE countries.

Central European Higher Education Cooperation Conference Proceedings

This volume comprises of selected papers that were originally presented at the first Central European Higher Education Cooperation (CEHEC) conference held in Budapest from 28-29 January 2015. The CEHEC was the first of a series of conferences organized at the initiative of the Center of International Higher Education Studies (CIHES) at Corvinus University of Budapest and Central European University (CEU), in collaboration with partners from the Czech Republic, Poland and Slovakia.

The Multilateralisation of Soviet Bloc Security: The Hungarian Revolution from an Eastern European Perspective

The Hungarian Revolution is often analysed in a national context or from the angle of Hungarian-Soviet relations. From this perspective, the Eastern European satellites seem mere puppets and the Soviet bloc a monolith. Archival evidence nevertheless shows that the Kremlin actually attempted to build a new kind of international relations after Stalin’s death in 1953, in which the Eastern European leaders would gain more scope for manoeuvre. This attempt at liberalisation even facilitated the uprisings in Hungary in 1956. Avoiding a teleological approach to the Hungarian Revolution, this article argues that the Soviet invasion was neither inevitable, nor wholly unilateral. Khrushchev even sought to legitimise the invasion in bilateral and multilateral consultations. There was a mutual interest in sacrificing Hungary’s sovereignty to safeguard the communist monopoly on power. This multilateralisation of Soviet bloc security is an important explanatory factor in an analysis of the Revolution and its repercussions in Eastern Europe.