Existence of Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium in Bertrand-Edgeworth Oligopolies

This article is searching for necessary and sufficient conditions which are to be imposed on the demand curve to guarantee the existence of pure strategy Nash equilibrium in a Bertrand-Edgeworth game with capacity constraints.

A Two-stage Bertrand-Edgeworth Game

In our investigation we are expanding a Bertrand-Edgeworth duopoly into a two-stage game in which during the first stage the firms can select their rationing rule. We will show that under certain conditions the efficient rationing rule is an equilibrium action of the first stage.

A Bertrand-Edgeworth-oligopóliumok (Bertrand-Edgeworth oligopolies – a survey of the literature)

Az irodalomban az olyan oligopolmodellek, amelyekben mind az ár, mind a mennyiség döntési változó, Bertrand-Edgeworth-oligopóliumok néven ismertek. E tanulmányban a Bertrand-Edgeworth-oligopóliumokkal kapcsolatos érdekesebb eredményeket tekintjük át. Tárgyaljuk a Bertrand-Edgeworth-típusú oligopolmodellek specifikációját, a Nash-egyensúly létezését, a Nash-egyensúly meghatározását és a Bertrand-Edgeworth-oligopóliumok alkalmazásait. / === / Oligopoly models in which both price and quantity are decisive variables are known in the literature as Bertrand-Edgeworth oligopolies, the most interesting results with which are surveyed in this paper. The author assumes the existence of the Nash equilibrium, as the specification of Bertrand-Edgeworth-type oligopoly models, the determination of the Nash equilibrium, and the application of Bertrand-Edgeworth oligopolies.

Endogenous Timing of Moves in Bertrand-Edgeworth Triopolies

We determine the endogenous order of moves in which the firms set their prices in the framework of a capacity-constrained Bertrand-Edgeworth triopoly. A three-period timing game that determines the period in which the firms announce their prices precedes the price-setting stage. We show for the non-trivial case (in which the Bertrand-Edgeworth triopoly has only an equilibrium in non-degenerated mixed-strategies) that the firm with the largest capacity sets its price first, while the two other firms set their prices later. Our result extends a finding by Deneckere and Kovenock (1992) from duopolies to triopolies. This extension was made possible by Hirata's (2009) recent advancements on the mixed-strategy equilibria of Bertrand-Edgeworth games.

A Bertrand-Edgeworth oligopoly with a public firm

We determine conditions under which a pure-strategy equilibrium of a mixed Bertrand-Edgeworth oligopoly exists. In addition, we determine its pure-strategy equilibrium whenever it exists and compare the equilibrium outcome with that of the standard Bertrand-Edgeworth oligopoly with only private firms.

Foglalkoztatás-bővítési kilátások és akadályok az üzleti szférában(Employment expansion prospects and obstacles in the business sphere)

Empirikus vizsgálatok szerint a vállalatok fejlesztési törekvéseit Magyarországon is elsősorban a piaci kilátások határozzák meg, a finanszírozási körülmények szerepe jóval gyengébb. A beruházások és innovációk végrehajtása elsősorban a műszaki végzettségűek iránti keresletet növelheti, a szakképzetlen dolgozók körében viszont gyakran leépítésekre vezet. A vállalatok igénye és az állást keresők kompetenciái azonban nemcsak a szakmastruktúrában térnek el. A korábban megvalósított fejlesztéseknek a válság idején munkahelymegtartó szerepe volt. A jövőbeni fejlesztések munkaerőigényének kielégítésében mind az üzleti szektor szereplőinek, mind a szakpolitikáknak fontos tennivalói vannak. _______ According to recent empirical research development efforts of companies in Hungary are primarily determined by the market outlook, the role of financing conditions is much weaker. Implementation of investments and innovation can increase in first row the demand for technical professionals and often causes dismissals in unskilled labour. The demand of companies and competences of job seekers diverge not only in the professional structure. Earlier fulfilled development had workplace keeping role during the recession. Both actors of business sector and policies have important tasks to do in satisfying labour demand of future developments.