Informatika, telekommunikáció és gazdasági stabilitás (Information technology, telecommunications and economic stability)

Fizikai példákon és matematikai modelleken bemutatjuk, hogy a rendszerek működésének hatékonyságnövekedése instabilitást eredményezhet. Megvizsgáljuk, hogy az informatika és a telekommunikáció fejlődése okozhat-e rendszerszintű instabilitást, illetve milyen gazdasági eszközök vannak a stabilitás fenntartására. / === / Using examples from physics and mathematical modeling, the paper shows that increasing efficiency in systems can lead to instability. The question thus arises whether the development of information and telecommunication technology can lead to instability in the economic system. The policy tools used to maintain stability are also discussed.

Post-Crisis Lessons for Open Economies

In a systemic perspective, what are the primary transmitters of global competitiveness with the proper coordination mechanism? What are the systemic impacts of the U.S. economy on world markets? Will the United States stay the main engine of world economic growth for quite some time to come, or at least in the current decade? Will and should the United States, as the single largest open economy of the world, be in some way responsible for the provision of global economic stability as a valuable public good? Was the recent crisis predictable? These are the main questions addressed, all of which are answered in a new global context, and the responses are based on some known principles of international economics and economic history.

Fiscal adjustment and economic growth in the European Union

The current world economic crisis induced countries to launch wide-scale spending programmes all over the world. Member states of the European Union have not been an exception to this trend. While deficit spending may increase the aggregate demand, it can also accelerate indebtedness and make the required spending cuts politically risky later on. However, deficit financing is not a new phenomenon in the EU; it has been widely practiced in the last couple of decades. As the crisis seems to come to an end, countries with huge deficits should adopt exit strategies now, thereby reducing deficit and debt and reintroducing fiscal discipline, a requirement laid down in the Stability and Growth Pact. Nevertheless, former adjustment processes can provide ample evidence for successful and politically viable fiscal consolidations. In certain cases, even economic activity started to accelerate as a response to the welldesigned adjustment measures. Based on the previous experiences of EU states, the aim of this paper is, therefore, to identify the conditions that may determine a fiscal consolidation to be successful in terms of a reduced debt ratio and a positive economic growth.

A Harrod modell strukturális stabilitása (Structural stability of the Harrod model)

In this study it is shown that the nontrivial hyperbolic fixed point of a nonlinear dynamical system, which is formulated by means of the adaptive expectations, corresponds to the unstable equilibrium of Harrod. We prove that this nonlinear dynamical (in the sense of Harrod) model is structurally stable under suitable economic conditions. In the case of structural stability, small changes of the functions (C1-perturbations of the vector field) describing the expected and the true time variation of the capital coefficients do not influence the qualitative properties of the endogenous variables, that is, although the trajectories may slightly change, their structure is the same as that of the unperturbed one, and therefore these models are suitable for long-time predictions. In this situation the critique of Lucas or Engel is not valid. There is no topological conjugacy between the perturbed and unperturbed models; the change of the growth rate between two levels may require different times for the perturbed and unperturbed models.

Rules-based economic governance in the European Union: A reappraisal of national fiscal rules.

The economic and financial crisis of 2007/2009 has posed unexpected challenges on both the global and the regional level. Besides the US, the EU has been the most severely hit by the current economic crisis. The financial and banking crisis on the one hand and the sovereign debt crisis on the other hand have clearly shown that without a bold, constructive and systematic change of the economic governance structure of the Union, not just the sustainability of the monetary zone but also the viability of the whole European integration process can be seriously undermined. The current crisis is, however, only a symptom, which made all those contradictions overt that were already heavily embedded in the system. Right from the very beginning, the deficit and the debt rules of the Maastricht Treaty and the Stability and Growth Pact have proved to be controversial cornerstones in the fiscal governance framework of the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). Yet, member states of the EU (both within and outside of the EMU) have shown an immense interest in adopting numerical constraints on the domestic level without hesitation. The main argument for the introduction of national fiscal rules was mostly to strengthen the accountability and credibility of national fiscal policy-making. The paper, however, claims that a relatively large portion of national rules were adopted only after the start of deceleration of the debt-to-GDP ratios. Accordingly, national rules were hardly the sole triggering factors of maintaining fiscal discipline; rather, they served as the key elements of a comprehensive reform package of public budgeting. It can be safely argued, therefore, that countries decide to adopt fiscal rules because they want to explicitly signal their strong commitment to fiscal discipline. In other words, it is not fiscal rules per se what matter in delivering fiscal stability but a strong political commitment.

"Rentier States" or the Relationship between Regime Stability and Exercising Power in Post-Soviet Central Asia

The paper intends to give an insight into the relations of the economic and political systems of the Central Asian republics using the theoretical framework of the "rentier economy" and "rentier state" approach. The main findings of the paper are that two (Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan) of the five states examined are commodity export dependent “full-scale” rentier states. The two political systems are of a stable neo-patrimonial regime character, while the Kyrgyz Republic and Tajikistan, poor in natural resources but dependent on external rents, may be described as "semi-rentier" states or "rentier economies". They are politically more instable, but have an altogether authoritarian, oligarchical “clan-based” character. Uzbekistan with its closed economy, showing tendencies of economic autarchy, is also a potentially politically unstable clan-based regime. Thus, in the Central Asian context, the rentier state or rentier economy character affects the political stability of the actual regimes rather than having a direct impact on whether power is exercised in an autocratic or democratic way.