"Minimálbér-paradoxon" versenyzői munkaerőpiacon? ("Minimum-wage paradox" in a competitive labour market? Lessons from an experimental line of thought)

A versenyzői munkaerőpiac hagyományos kereslet-kínálati modellje az egyensúlyi bérszintet meghaladó minimálbér következményeként az egyensúlyi bérszint mellettinél alacsonyabb foglalkoztatást jósol; minél magasabb a minimálbér, annál alacsonyabbat. Empirikus vizsgálatok szerint ugyanakkor a minimálbér-emelés nem feltétlenül csökkenti a foglalkoztatást - ezt nevezik minimálbér-paradoxonnak -, ami legkézenfekvőbben a munkáltatók munkaerő-piaci monopszonerejével látszik magyarázhatónak. Ezzel szemben az a gondolatkísérlet, amelyről ez a cikk beszámol, általánosabb érvényű, versenyzői munkaerőpiacot feltételező magyarázat kidolgozására irányul. / === / In the conventional textbook demand/supply model of competitive labour markets, the introduction of a minimum wage above market-clearing level must reduce employment. Empirical findings suggest, however, that this may not always be the case, a finding most readily explained by monopsonistic competition in the labour market. The experimental line of thought reported here explores an alternative root, interpreting the "minimum-wage paradox" as the outcome of a competitive labour market that displays friction.

A production/recycling model with quality consideration

An integrated production–recycling system is investigated. A constant demand can be satisfied by production and recycling. The used items might be bought back and then recycled. The not recycled products are disposed off. Two types of models are analyzed. The first model examines and minimizes the EOQ related cost. The second model generalizes the first one by introducing additionally linear waste disposal, recycling, production and buyback costs. This basic model was examined by the authors in a previous paper. The main results are that a pure strategy (either production or recycling) is optimal. This paper extends the model for the case of quality consideration: it is asked for the quality of the bought back products. In the former model we have assumed that all returned items are serviceable. One can put the following question: Who should control the quality of the returned items? If the suppliers examine the quality of the reusable products, then the buyback rate is strongly smaller than one, α<1. If the user does it, then not all returned items are recyclable, i.e. the use rate is smaller than one, δ<1. Which one of the control systems are more cost advantageous in this case?