A hazai vállalatok pénzügyi teljesítményének alakulása 1994 és 2009 között = The financial performance of Hungarian firms between 1994 and 2009

Kutatásunkban Budapesti Corvinus Egyetem Vállalatgazdaságtan Intézete által az 1995 és 2010 között lebonyolított „Versenyben a világgal” kutatási program kérdőívei alapján a hazai vállalatok versenyképességét befolyásoló tényezőket vizsgáltuk. Eredményeink szerint a krízis hatására az adók versenyképességi jelentősége megnőtt, s – különösen a nagy visszaesést elszenvedőknél – gyakoribbak lettek a piac megőrzését célzó stratégiák. A válság hatását mélyítette, hogy a vállalatok devizakockázat-kezelése nem megfelelő, s a bankok sem tökéletesen szolgálják ki a vállalatok igényeit. Az utóbbi 10-15 esztendőben a késve fizetés egyre gyakoribb lett, s e trendet a válság csak erősítette. _____ Our paper investigates the factors influencing the competitiveness of the Hungarian enterprises based on the research questionnaires of the research program “Companies and competitiveness” of the Business Economics Department at Corvinus University of Budapest carried out between 1995 and 2010. Our results show that due to the crisis the role played by taxes in competitiveness has gained importance, and especially at firms suffering from heavy losses the strategies firstly aiming at keeping markets became more frequent. The effects of the global turndown have been amplified by the weak currency risk management of the Hungarian firms, and by the fact that the service provided by local banks is lagging behind expectations of the companies. During the last 10-15 years the late payment of receivables became more and more frequent in Hungary, a trend that has been even enforced by the depression.

Some fairytales about risk management

When I started writing this paper, I thought I would only be writing about the parallel between the mathematical theory of inventory and production – as a familiar model of operations research – and liquidity management. And then during the writing process, predictably enough I must say, the scandals surrounding the Buda-Cash and Quaestor brokerages erupted. Likewise in this period, the debate about foreign currency lending gained fresh impetus; about who made which mistakes when, or whether there was anyone who didn’t make mistakes. The most surprising twist revealed in the Buda-Cash and Quaestor cases – beyond alleged losses running into several hundreds of billions of forints – was that all this could be accumulated in 15 years of selfless effort. And even if this information proves to be comment born of initial over-excitement, it still demands an explanation one way or another. If it’s true, then how can this be? And if it isn’t, then what made it appear as if this is what happened? The questions and contradictions are obvious. But the main questions are these: What do risk managers actually do? What do we pay them for? And how far can we trust them?