State subsidy and moral hazard in corporate financing

This paper investigates the impact of state subsidy on the behavior of the entrepreneur under asymmetric information. Several authors formulated concerns about state intervention as it can aggravate moral hazard in corporate financing. In the seminal paper of Holmström and Tirole (1997) a two-player moral hazard model is presented with an entrepreneur initiating a risky scalable project and a private investor (e.g. bank or venture capitalist) providing outside financing. The novelty of our research is that this basic moral hazard model is extended to the case of positive externalities and to three players by introducing the state subsidizing the project. It is shown that in the optimum, state subsidy does not harm, but improves the incentives of the entrepreneur to make efforts for the success of the project; hence in effect state intervention reduces moral hazard. Consequently, state subsidy increases social welfare which is defined as the sum of private and public net benefits. Also, the exact form of the state subsidy (ex-ante/ex-post, conditional/unconditional, refundable/nonrefundable) is irrelevant in respect of the optimal size and the total welfare effect of the project. Moreover, in case of nonrefundable subsidies state does not crowd out private investors; but on the contrary, by providing additional capital it boosts private financing. In case of refundable subsidies some crowding effects may occur depending on the subsidy form and the parameters.

Carbon emissions locked - in trade

In recent years there has been a growing concern about the emission trade balance of countries. It is due to the fact that countries with an open economy are active players in the international trade, though trade is not only a major factor in forging a country’s economic structure anymore, but it does contribute to the movement of embodied emissions beyond the country borders. This issue is especially relevant from the carbon accounting policy’s point of view, as it is known that the production-based principle is in effect now in the Kyoto agreement. The study aims at revealing the interdependence of countries on international trade and its environmental impacts, and how the carbon accounting method plays a crucial role in evaluating a country’s environmental performance and its role in the climate mitigation processes. The input-output models are used in the methodology, as they provide an appropriate framework for this kind of environmental accounting; the analysis shows an international comparison of four European countries (Germany, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and Hungary) with extended trading activities and carbon emissions. Moving from the production-based approach in the climate policy, to the consumptionperspective principle and allocation [15], it would also help increasing the efficiency of emission reduction targets and the evaluation of the sustainability dimension and its impacts of international trade. The results of the study have shown that there is an importance of distinction between the two emission allocation approaches, both from global and local level point of view.

A magyar minimálbér-szabályozás és hatása a foglalkoztatásra, különösen 2000-től napjainkig (Minimum-wage regulation in Hungary and its impact on employment, with particular respect to the 2000’s)

Noha az 1990-es évek első felében felbomlott az akadémiai közgazdászok sok évtizeden át örök érvényűnek hitt közmegegyezése a minimálbér szükségképpen negatív foglalkoztatási hatásáról, a túlságosan magas minimálbért minden közgazdász foglalkoztatáscsökkentő hatásúnak jósolja. Tanulmányunkban a magyar minimálbér-szabályozást e hatás szempontjából vizsgáljuk és értékeljük. / === / Although the long-held view of an unambiguously negative employment effect of a binding minimum wage was challenged by empirical findings in the early 1990’s, it is unanimously predicted that if the minimum wage is set too high it will bring about adverse employment effects. Accordingly, our study starts from an evaluation of the magnitude of the Hungarian minimum wage, i.e., of how it relates to minimum wage rates elsewhere, and of how it has developed through time. Next we inspect the main features that characterize the Hungarian system of minimum wage regulation. Theoretical views on the potential employment effect of minimum wage regulation are then surveyed and contrasted to empirical findings. The study concludes by policy recommendations. To sum up the main strand of arguments, we try to demonstrate that even though Hungary’s minimum wage, if assessed by its ratio to average and/or median full-time earnings, does not appear particularly high by international standards, it might rightly be regarded as unreasonably high in light of Hungary’s excessively low relative rate of employment among the least schooled. This diagnose should become particularly evident once one takes into account that, in sharp contrast to established rules elsewhere, a significantly higher wage floor is in effect for those with lower secondary schooling. Abolition of this legally guaranteed premium over the minimum wage as well as more moderation in minimum wage adjustments are thus highly recommended.