Konjunktúraingadozások az Egyesült Államokban 1970-2010 - Értelmezési nehézségek = Business cycles and recession patterns in the US economy and in the G7

Lehet-e beszélni a 2011-ig felgyülemlett empirikus tapasztalatok tükrében egy egységes válságlefolyásról, amely a fejlett ipari országok egészére általában jellemző, és a meghatározó országok esetében is megragadható? Megállapíthatók-e olyan univerzális változások a kibocsátás, a munkapiacok, a fogyasztás, valamint a beruházás tekintetében, amelyek jól illeszkednek a korábbi tapasztalatokhoz, nem kevésbé az ismert makromodellek predikcióihoz? A válasz – legalábbis jelen sorok írásakor – nemleges: sem a válság lefolyásának jellegzetességeiben és a makrogazdasági teljesítmények romlásának ütemében, sem a visszacsúszás mértékében és időbeli kiterjedésében sincsenek jól azonosítható közös jegyek, olyanok, amelyek a meglévő elméleti keretekbe jól beilleszthetők. A tanulmány áttekinti a válsággal és a makrogazdasági sokkokkal foglalkozó empirikus irodalom – a pénzügyi globalizáció értelmezései nyomán – relevánsnak tartott munkáit. Ezt követően egy 60 év távlatát átfogó vizsgálatban próbáljuk megítélni a recessziós időszakokban az amerikai gazdaság teljesítményét azzal a célkitűzéssel, hogy az elmúlt válság súlyosságának megítélése kellően objektív lehessen, legalább a fontosabb makrováltozók elmozdulásának nagyságrendje tekintetében. / === / Based on the empirical evidence accumulated until 2011, using official statistics from the OECD data bank and the US Commerce Department, the article addresses the question whether one can, or cannot, speak about generally observable recession/crisis patterns, such that were to be universally recognized in all major industrial countries (the G7). The answer to this question is a firm no. Changes and volatility in most major macroeconomic indicators such as output-gap, labor market distortions and large deviations from trend in consumption and in investment did all, respectively, exhibit wide differences in depth and width across the G7 countries. The large deviations in output-gaps and especially strong distortions in labor market inputs and hours per capita worked over the crisis months can hardly be explained by the existing model classes of DSGE and those of the real business cycle. Especially bothering are the difficulties in fitting the data into any established model whether business cycle or some other types, in which financial distress reduces economic activity. It is argued that standard business cycle models with financial market imperfections have no mechanism for generating deviation from standard theory, thus they do not shed light on the key factors underlying the 2007–2009 recession. That does not imply that the financial crisis is unimportant in understanding the recession, but it does indicate however, that we do not fully understand the channels through which financial distress reduced labor input. Long historical trends on the privately held portion of the federal debt in the US economy indicate that the standard macro proposition of public debt crowding out private investment and thus inhibiting growth, can be strongly challenged in so far as this ratio is neither a direct indicator of growth slowing down, nor for recession.

State subsidy and moral hazard in corporate financing

This paper investigates the impact of state subsidy on the behavior of the entrepreneur under asymmetric information. Several authors formulated concerns about state intervention as it can aggravate moral hazard in corporate financing. In the seminal paper of Holmström and Tirole (1997) a two-player moral hazard model is presented with an entrepreneur initiating a risky scalable project and a private investor (e.g. bank or venture capitalist) providing outside financing. The novelty of our research is that this basic moral hazard model is extended to the case of positive externalities and to three players by introducing the state subsidizing the project. It is shown that in the optimum, state subsidy does not harm, but improves the incentives of the entrepreneur to make efforts for the success of the project; hence in effect state intervention reduces moral hazard. Consequently, state subsidy increases social welfare which is defined as the sum of private and public net benefits. Also, the exact form of the state subsidy (ex-ante/ex-post, conditional/unconditional, refundable/nonrefundable) is irrelevant in respect of the optimal size and the total welfare effect of the project. Moreover, in case of nonrefundable subsidies state does not crowd out private investors; but on the contrary, by providing additional capital it boosts private financing. In case of refundable subsidies some crowding effects may occur depending on the subsidy form and the parameters.