Anatomy and lessons of the global financial crisis. Is US consumption financed by Chinese savings?

Savings and investments in the American money market by emerging countries, primarily China, financed the excessive consumption of the United States in the early 2000s, which indirectly led to a global financial crisis. The crisis started from the real estate mortgage market. Such balance disrupting processes began on the American financial market which contradicted all previously known equilibrium theories of every school of economics. Economics has yet to come up with models or empirical theories for this new disequilibrium. This is why the outbreak of the crisis could not be prevented or at least predicted. The question is, to what extent can existing market theories, calculation methods and the latest financial products be held responsible for the new situation. This paper studies the influence of the efficient market and modern portfolio theory, as well as Li’s copula function on the American investment market. Naturally, the issues of moral risks and greed, credit ratings and shareholder control, limited liability and market regulations are aspects, which cannot be ignored. In summary, the author outlines the potential alternative measures that could be applied to prevent a new crisis, defines the new directions of economic research and draws the conclusion for the Hungarian economic policy.

Can Europe recover without credit?

Data from 135 countries covering five decades suggests that creditless recoveries, in which the stock of real credit does not return to the pre-crisis level for three years after the GDP trough, are not rare and are characterised by remarkable real GDP growth rates: 4.7 percent per year in middle-income countries and 3.2 percent per year in high-income countries. However, the implications of these historical episodes for the current European situation are limited, for two main reasons. First, creditless recoveries are much less common in high-income countries, than in low-income countries which are financially undeveloped. European economies heavily depend on bank loans and research suggests that loan supply played a major role in the recent weak credit performance of Europe. There are reasons to believe that, despite various efforts, normal lending has not yet been restored. Limited loan supply could be disruptive for the European economic recovery and there has been only a minor substitution of bank loans with debt securities. Second, creditless recoveries were associated with significant real exchange rate depreciation, which has hardly occurred so far in most of Europe. This stylised fact suggests that it might be difficult to re-establish economic growth in the absence of sizeable real exchange rate depreciation, if credit growth does not return.

Can Europe recover without credit?

Data from 135 countries covering five decades suggests that creditless recoveries, in which the stock of real credit does not return to the pre-crisis level for three years after the GDP trough, are not rare and are characterised by remarkable real GDP growth rates: 4.7 percent per year in middle-income countries and 3.2 percent per year in high-income countries. However, the implications of these historical episodes for the current European situation are limited, for two main reasons. First, creditless recoveries are much less common in high-income countries, than in low-income countries which are financially undeveloped. European economies heavily depend on bank loans and research suggests that loan supply played a major role in the recent weak credit performance of Europe. There are reasons to believe that, despite various efforts, normal lending has not yet been restored. Limited loan supply could be disruptive for the European economic recovery and there has been only a minor substitution of bank loans with debt securities. Second, creditless recoveries were associated with significant real exchange rate depreciation, which has hardly occurred so far in most of Europe. This stylised fact suggests that it might be difficult to re-establish economic growth in the absence of sizeable real exchange rate depreciation, if credit growth does not return.

Bank financing of Hungarian SMEs: Getting over to credit crisis by state interventions

In this article we aimed to present and analyse the 21st century history of bank financing in the Hungarian small and medium enterprise (SME) sector in the period ranging from 2000 to 2012. The credit products offered by banks and credit unions are the most fundamental means of external financing capable of fulfilling the financing needs of a wide array of SMEs. The conditions of accessing credits and their prices exert a decisive influence on the profitability and business opportunities of SMEs. As a result of economic slowdown SMEs had to face higher interest rates, decreasing credit limits, and bank financing options that became increasingly slowly accessible alongside stricter conditions. Due to this process SMEs business performance had been falling continuously which has a destructive contribution to the national economy. In the first chapter of the article we present the dynamic development of credit financing in the Hungarian SME sector, along with the causes that triggered it, then we will continue with the negative tendencies dating from the onset of the 2008 debt crisis. In the second chapter we discuss the vicious circle, due to which the business performance of the SMEs, as well as the conditions of access to credits and their prices, have entered into a negative spiral. In the third and final chapter we make suggestions regarding the direction and means of necessary government intervention, in order to stop and reverse the negative tendencies observed in SME credit financing.

SME Policy and Competitiveness in Hungary

Small and medium-sized (SMEs) enterprises in Hungary account for 99.9% of all enterprises and for more than two thirds of employment. Since transformation started in 1989 they have been the only net makers of employment. In spite of such remarkable importance, results have been modest compared to the amount of Hungarian and foreign, mostly EU resources poured into the sector. Less than a sixth of SMEs are fast-growing and only a tiny minority of SMEs make use of bank credit. According to various indicators and in spite of bright spots, the SMEs context is problematic and SMEs features are often unfavourable and hardly competitive. In recent years the goal of upgrading SMEs and strengthening their contribution to the economy has acquired central position among policy goals and activity. Although progress has been made, the results are weak and in some cases drawbacks have happened. The paper starts from analysing the SMEs situation, reviews the main features of the recently implemented policy strategies, assesses whether these strategies are appropriate to address the situation, including the effects of the domestic and international crises, and considers whether the targets pursued are realistic and important, and the instruments considered in line with the targets