What makes ISAF s/tick: An investigation of the politics of coalition burden-sharing

This paper is interested in conceptualising the often raised issue of over- and under-contributing in coalition operations; that of how and why members of complex coalitions2 may be punching above and below their weight, respectively. To this end, the first section presents a parsimonious baseline assumption regarding what variables may fundamentally inform coalition burden-sharing, to subsequently discuss how much each of these are found to play a role in the Afghanistan context. The second section elaborates on this by assessing the perception and the interpretation of threats by coalition member countries, related to Afghanistan, as this pertains to prioritising other variables within the scheme outlined in the previous section. The third and fourth sections then proceed to examine and further enrich the existing literature on coalition burden-sharing, and provide further insights regarding the operations of the International Security Assistance Force–Afghanistan, and regarding ISAF member-country decisionmaking; the objective here is to generate further refined assumptions, that can permit a preliminary assessment of the phenomenon of uneven burden-sharing in ISAF, complementing the initial baseline expectations.

Conceptualising the Events of 1956: The Elusive Quest for a Conveniently Simple Definition

The objective of the following article is to give the reader a perspective on the events of 1956 in Hungary – known commonly as the 1956 Hungarian Uprising or Revolution (or as it is sometimes called in Hungary: the 1956 Revolution and Freedom Fight) – from the point of view of counterinsurgency theory. The author intends to show that the current theory has many problems and shortcomings when it comes to the analysis of the events of 1956 because of the unique set of circumstances which prevailed at that time.