The impact of perceived corporate environmental performance on the behavior of capital market decision makers : analysis of food industry companies

Environmental protectionism and sustainable development has been gaining increased attention among governments, investors and consumers alike. As a result, firms are facing growing pressure from the various stakeholders to improve their environmental performance. This study is focusing on the food industry, which in recent years has been a subject of increased scrutiny due to their role in resource consumption, waste generation and unsustainable production practices. Our research is aiming to examine how the financial community evaluates the environmental stewardship of food industry companies as proxied by market reactions in response to environmental news. Are all company related environmental news items evaluated equally, and which financial and non-financial firm-specific attributes can influence market responses? Have there been changes in reactions on the stock exchange in the past two decades?

State subsidy and moral hazard in corporate financing

This paper investigates the impact of state subsidy on the behavior of the entrepreneur under asymmetric information. Several authors formulated concerns about state intervention as it can aggravate moral hazard in corporate financing. In the seminal paper of Holmström and Tirole (1997) a two-player moral hazard model is presented with an entrepreneur initiating a risky scalable project and a private investor (e.g. bank or venture capitalist) providing outside financing. The novelty of our research is that this basic moral hazard model is extended to the case of positive externalities and to three players by introducing the state subsidizing the project. It is shown that in the optimum, state subsidy does not harm, but improves the incentives of the entrepreneur to make efforts for the success of the project; hence in effect state intervention reduces moral hazard. Consequently, state subsidy increases social welfare which is defined as the sum of private and public net benefits. Also, the exact form of the state subsidy (ex-ante/ex-post, conditional/unconditional, refundable/nonrefundable) is irrelevant in respect of the optimal size and the total welfare effect of the project. Moreover, in case of nonrefundable subsidies state does not crowd out private investors; but on the contrary, by providing additional capital it boosts private financing. In case of refundable subsidies some crowding effects may occur depending on the subsidy form and the parameters.