A projektfinanszírozás egyedi jellegzetességei (The individual characteristics of project finance)

A szerző cikkében a projektfinanszírozás különleges ismertetőjegyeit kívánja bemutatni – úgymint a projektfinanszírozás fejlődését, a projektfinanszírozás és a vállalatfinanszírozás fontosabb különbségeit, valamint a sikeres projektfinanszírozás előfeltételeit. Ezen kívül foglalkozik még a projektfinanszírozás során alkalmazott pénzügyi mutatószámrendszer, e finanszírozási forma lehetséges hitel- és tőkeforrásai, továbbá a projektfinanszírozás során alkalmazott biztosítékok köre. Végezetül pedig a kivitelezési és üzemeltetési kockázatot elemzi, mint a projektfinanszírozás egyik legfontosabb kockázati tényezőjét. _____ In this article the author presents the special features of project finance, such as the development of project financing, important differences of project finance and corporate finance, as well as the preconditions for successful project financing. The author demonstrates the financial scorecards which are used in project finance, possible debt and equity sources of this financial form, and the securities which are used in the project finance. Finally, he analyzes the construction and operational risk, as one of the major risk factors for project finance.

A vállalati likviditáskezelés szerepe eszközfedezettel rendelkező hitelszerződésekben. Az alkun alapuló megközelítés eredményei (The role of corporate liquidity management under secured debt financing Results of the bargaining approach)

A szerző azt a kérdést vizsgálja, hogy a vállalat működése során a likvid eszközök mekkora arányát tartsa fenn. A kérdést a finanszírozás szemszögéből veti fel, mivel a hitelezés okozta korlátok jelentősen befolyásolják a likvid eszköz tartalékolásának motivációit. A cikk a vállalkozói-hitelezői információs kapcsolat háromféle esetében mutatja be az eszközfedezettel rendelkező hitelek adósságszolgálatát meghatározó tényezőket. Elsőként a teljes információs viszony melletti stratégiákkal meghatározott adósságszolgálatot vizsgálja, majd a második típusú információs kapcsolatban a nem megfigyelhető vállalkozói erőfeszítéseket feltételezve adja meg az adósságszolgálat fizetésének ex ante és ex post egyensúlyát. Harmadikként, a nem igazolható vállalati adatok feltevése mellett teljes és részleges eszközfedezetre is meghatározza az optimális vállalkozói likviditási politikát, és tárgyalja az itt fennálló ellentéteket. Megmutatja, hogy részleges eszközfedezet mellett 1. újratárgyalható a hitelszerződés, és a stratégiai adósságszolgálatot nem lehet elkerülni, 2. a likviditásoptimalizálásnak nincs ex post Pareto-egyensúlyi megoldása, ugyanis a hitelszerződésben részt vevő felek alkuereje határozza meg a vállalat likviditásának szintjét. / === / This paper investigates what the liquid asset ratio for firms should be. Financing constraints significantly influence motivations for liquidity hoarding. The article shows the determinants of secured debt services for three different information cases of a lender-borrower relationship. First, it examines the strategic debt service under full information, and then, assuming non-observable entrepreneurial efforts, it gives the ex ante and ex post equilibria of the strategic debt service. The third case supposes non-verifiable firm information; this provides the optimal corporate liquidity policy and explains the contrary propositions. It shows that under not fully secured collateral, 1. the debt contract is renegotiable; the lender cannot avoid the strategic debt service, 2. there is no ex post optimal Pareto efficient solution to liquidity policy, because the corporate liquidity ratio is determined by the bargaining power of the partners in the debt contract.

State subsidy and moral hazard in corporate financing

This paper investigates the impact of state subsidy on the behavior of the entrepreneur under asymmetric information. Several authors formulated concerns about state intervention as it can aggravate moral hazard in corporate financing. In the seminal paper of Holmström and Tirole (1997) a two-player moral hazard model is presented with an entrepreneur initiating a risky scalable project and a private investor (e.g. bank or venture capitalist) providing outside financing. The novelty of our research is that this basic moral hazard model is extended to the case of positive externalities and to three players by introducing the state subsidizing the project. It is shown that in the optimum, state subsidy does not harm, but improves the incentives of the entrepreneur to make efforts for the success of the project; hence in effect state intervention reduces moral hazard. Consequently, state subsidy increases social welfare which is defined as the sum of private and public net benefits. Also, the exact form of the state subsidy (ex-ante/ex-post, conditional/unconditional, refundable/nonrefundable) is irrelevant in respect of the optimal size and the total welfare effect of the project. Moreover, in case of nonrefundable subsidies state does not crowd out private investors; but on the contrary, by providing additional capital it boosts private financing. In case of refundable subsidies some crowding effects may occur depending on the subsidy form and the parameters.

How much is corporate cash-pooling worth? Modelling and simulation

The paper analyzes a special corporate banking product, the so called cash-pool, which gained remarkable popularity in the recent years as firms try to centralize and manage their liquidity more efficiently. The novelty of this paper is the formalization of a valuation model which can serve as a basis for a Monte Carlo simulation to assess the most important benefits of the firms arising from the pooling of their cash holdings. The literature emphasizes several benefits of cash-pooling such as interest rate savings, economy of scale and reduced cash-flow volatility. The presented model focuses on the interest rate savings complemented with a new aspect: the reduced counterparty risk toward the bank. The main conclusion of the analysis is that the value of a cash-pool is higher in case of firms with large, diverse and volatile cash-flows having less access to the capital markets especially if the partner bank is risky and offers a high interest spread. It is also shown that cash-pooling is not the privilege of large multinational firms any more as the initial direct costs can be easily regained within a year even in the case of SMEs.

Corporate cash-pool valuation in a multi-firm context: a closed formula

Following our earlier paper on the subject, we present a general closed formula to value the interest savings due to a multi-firm cash-pool system. Assuming normal distribution of the accounts the total savings can be expressed as the product of three independent factors representing the interest spread, the number and the correlation of the firms, and the time-dependent distribution of the cash accounts. We derive analytic results for two special processes one characterizing the initial build-up period and the other describing the mature period. The value gained in the stationary system can be thought of as the interest, paid at the net interest spread rate on the standard deviation of the account. We show that pooling has substantial value already in the transient period. In order to increase the practical relevance of our analysis we discuss possible extensions of our model and we show how real option pricing technics can be applied here.

Lessons learned from the effect of tight monetary conditions and crises on corporate capital structure

The study reviews the theoretical and empirical literature on the effect of tight monetary conditions, crisis on corporate capital structure, further creates a framework for analyzing their relation, as well as sheds light on the lessons learned and open research areas. The results highlight that the supply side of capital has an effect on corporate capital structure, though the analysis of this relation is scarce. However, the impact of tight monetary conditions on capital structure is analyzed by several studies, there is limited evidence on the financial policy and the development of financing mix during a crisis period. The impact of the 2007/08 crisis on the corporate capital structure and especially in case of firms with impaired access to external financing is scarce. The study also highlights our lack in understanding of the relation of crisis and capital structure in case of the CEE region.