Transferable Utility Games with Uncertainty

We introduce the concept of a TUU-game, a transferable utility game with uncertainty. In a TUU-game there is uncertainty regarding the payoffs of coalitions. One out of a finite number of states of nature materializes and conditional on the state, the players are involved in a particular transferable utility game. We consider the case without ex ante commitment possibilities and propose the Weak Sequential Core as a solution concept. We characterize the Weak Sequential Core and show that it is non-empty if all ex post TUgames are convex.

Transferable Utility Games with Uncertainty

We introduce the concept of a TUU-game, a transferableutilitygame with uncertainty. In a TUU-game there is uncertainty regarding the payoffs of coalitions. One out of a finite number of states of nature materializes and conditional on the state, the players are involved in a particular transferableutilitygame. We consider the case without ex ante commitment possibilities and propose the Weak Sequential Core as a solution concept. We characterize the Weak Sequential Core and show that it is non-empty if all ex post TU-games are convex.

An asymptotic test for the Conditional Value-at-Risk

Conditional Value-at-Risk (equivalent to the Expected Shortfall, Tail Value-at-Risk and Tail Conditional Expectation in the case of continuous probability distributions) is an increasingly popular risk measure in the fields of actuarial science, banking and finance, and arguably a more suitable alternative to the currently widespread Value-at-Risk. In my paper, I present a brief literature survey, and propose a statistical test of the location of the CVaR, which may be applied by practising actuaries to test whether CVaR-based capital levels are in line with observed data. Finally, I conclude with numerical experiments and some questions for future research.