Emissziós jogok közgazdasági relevanciája és számviteli leképezése (Economic relevancy and accounting mapping of emission rights)

A cikk bemutatja, hogy az emissziós jogok mérleg- és beszámoló-képességi kritériumai milyen leképezést tesznek lehetővé a jelenleg érvényes Nemzetközi Pénzügyi Beszámolási Standardokban (IFRS, International Financial Reporting Standards). A vizsgálat fókuszában az üzemeltető áll, aki az Európai Unió kibocsátás-kereskedelmi rendszerének hatálya alá tartozik, azaz ipari tevékenysége folytán szén-dioxiddal szennyezi a Föld légterét. Az üzemeltető mint az emissziós jog tulajdonosa jelenik meg. A cikk megvizsgálja mindazokat a folyamatokat, melynek eredményeképpen birtokolhatja ezeket az egységeket, valamint azt, hogy az IFRS-ek milyen lehetőséget nyújtanak a különböző forrásból származó jogosultságok értékelésére. / === / The author presents that accounting and report ability criteria of the emission rights what mapping allows in the current International Financial Standards. The study focuses on the operator, who is the subject of the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme, whose industrial activities pollute with carbon dioxide to the earth’s atmosphere. The operator, as the owner of emission rights is displayed. This article examines those processes, which resulted in these units may be owned, and that what possibility is provided by IFRSs to evaluate rights from different sources.

The Polluter Profits Principle: A Note on the Grandfathering of CO2 Emissions Rights in Lax-Cap Trading Regimes

Grandfathering is currently the main principle for the initial allocation of tradable CO2 emission rights under the European cap-and-trade scheme. Furthermore, political feasibility often requires non-restrictive emission caps. Grandfathering under lax cap is unjust, biased and brings polluters unintended windfall profits. Still, in any post-Kyoto international CO2 regime, lax caps may be critical in coaxing binding emission targets out of more countries, especially those in the less-developed world. This paper argues that there is a certain quantity of emission rights between the initial and the optimal emissions, the grandfathering of which brings polluters zero windfall profits or zero windfall losses. Our theoretical concept of zero-windfall grandfathering can be used to demonstrate the windfall profits that have emerged at company level during the first EU trading period. It might thus encourage governments to embrace auctioning, and to combine it with grandfathering as a legitimate tool in the initial allocation of emission rights in later trading regimes.