Kontraszelekció és erkölcsi kockázat a politikában. Vázlat az információs aszimmetria közgazdaságtani fogalmainak politikatudományi alkalmazhatóságáról (Negative selection and moral risk in politics. An outline of the usefulness to political science of the economic concept of information asymmetry)

Az írás a kontraszelekció és az erkölcsi kockázat információ-gazdaságtani fogalmának politikatudományi alkalmazhatósága mellett érvel. Azt kívánja bemutatni, hogy a politikai piac szereplői közti információs aszimmetria mechanizmusainak éppúgy lehetnek súlyos negatív hatásai a demokratikus politikai rendszer működésére nézve, mint ahogy a gazdasági szereplők közti információs aszimmetria - Nobel-díjas közgazdászok érvei szerint - alááshatja a piaci verseny hatékonyságát. Az írás új megvilágításba helyezi a - már Platón óta ismert - politikai kontraszelekció jelenségét, továbbá részletesen foglalkozik az erkölcsi kockázat és a megbízó-megbízott relációk megjelenésével a politikában. Érinti tovább azoknak a mechanizmusoknak - a jelzésnek és a szűrésnek - a megjelenését a politikában, melyeket a közgazdászok az információs aszimmetria csökkentésére ajánlanak. / === / The paper argues in favour of employing in political science the economic concept of information asymmetry, seeking to show that the mechanisms of information asymmetry among the players on the political market may have negative effects on the operation of a democratic political system as information asymmetry among economic actors – according to arguments of Nobel prize-winning economists – has on the efficiency of market competition. The paper sheds new light on the phenomenon of negative political selection (known since Plato's time), and goes on to deal in detail with the appearance of moral risk and client/agent relations in politics. The author touches also on the appearance in politics of mechanisms – signals and filters – that economists suggest for reducing information asymmetry.

The European Patterns of "Homo Academicus“ and The Chances of Its Evolution In Current Hungarian Higher Education

In the recent four or five years, there have been abrupt and radical changes in the governance of Hungarian higher education. It can then be interesting to assess the state of “homo academicus“ as it looks currently in Hungary. The notion of “homo academicus“ is obvious: it concerns participants in the system of a country’s higher education. The paper as follows still comes back to the definition of “homo academicus“ by referring first to it as occupation, or rather as a profession that can be interpreted in terms of sociology. Secondly, some historic patterns can also be mobilised, based on the assumption that university is a very European institutions that is even rooted in the tradition of the Middle Ages. The elbow-room of seeking for identity and the role to be filled by academics are limited by the effective system of the governance of higher education. It is a key to the chances of academics of meeting the historically corroborated professional standards that they exercise academic freedom. As it cannot be done individually, but in cooperation (through a collegial system), academic freedom is always combined with collective action. The field where this freedom can be exercised can be specified through university autonomy, the lack of which makes a serious barrier to the full development of a character of “homo academicus“. This is now the case in Hungary, the paper suggests. The paper seeks to gain deeper understanding of the character of academics, their vocation and professional roles, and the governance of higher education, serving as the environment for academic activity, by creating a conceptual framework. The paper is established on the results of sociological research and the experience of legal management, although it remains to be of theoretical nature. It criticises the current Hungarian situation of the governance of higher education, arguing for the reconstruction of university autonomy and financial stability. It also emphasises the importance of predictable regulations.