The 3 per cent Barcelona Target: A Critical Appraisal of the Failure of the Lisbon Strategy’s Knowledgebased Economy and Society Project

Ten years after the unanimous approval of the Lisbon Strategy at a special meeting of the European Council on 23-24 March 2000 in Lisbon, it will be inevitable for the European Council, the European Commission and the majority of the EU member states to face with its fi asco and to account for the reasons of their fundamental policy, governance and economic failures in 2010. The recent turbulence of the global economy offers some excuses for the underperformance of the main objectives of the Lisbon Strategy in the essential social and economic domains, like job creation, economic growth, and environmental sustainability. Negative growth rates, macroeconomic and fi nancial instability, the contraction of the internal and external markets of the European economy, drop in demand for capital investment, goods and services, sinking corporate revenues, depreciation of corporate assets, increasing private and public indebtedness, falling rate of employment, weakening social cohesion, widening social inequality, and so forth not only deprive the majority of the EU member states of fulfi lling the main objectives of the Lisbon Strategy but also drive them into worse social and economic conditions in many policy domains than they were in 2000.

A New Role for Management of the Social Sciences in an Age of Complexity

A particular scientific world view has become dominant, influential and successful in modern sciences today. Science and technology have transformed the way we view ourselves, our societies and our place in the cosmos. However, just as science and technology seem to be at the peak of their power, unexpected problems are disrupting the sciences from within. This reflects a deeper and more serious problem regarding scientific inquiry. Science is being held back by old assumptions that have become dogmas, the biggest of which is that science already knows all the answers, and only the details need to be worked out. A transformational paradigm shift is required from a mechanistic world view to an organic world view to better address the challenges of the new millenium.

Tax morale and tax evasion: Social preferences and bounded rationality

We study a family of models of tax evasion, where a flat-rate tax finances only the provision of public goods, neglecting audits and wage differences. We focus on the comparison of two modeling approaches. The first is based on optimizing agents, who are endowed with social preferences, their utility being the sum of private consumption and moral utility. The second approach involves agents acting according to simple heuristics. We find that while we encounter the traditionally shaped Laffer-curve in the optimizing model, the heuristics models exhibit (linearly) increasing Laffercurves. This difference is related to a peculiar type of behavior emerging within the heuristics based approach: a number of agents lurk in a moral state of limbo, alternating between altruism and selfishness.

Adómorál és adócsalás - társadalmi preferenciák és korlátozott racionalitás = Tax morale and tax system: social preferences and bounded rationality

Az adócsalásnak egy olyan modellcsaládját vizsgáljuk, ahol az egykulcsos adó kizárólag a közjavakat finanszírozza. Két megközelítés összehasonlítására összpontosítunk. Az elsőben minden dolgozó jövedelme azonos, és ebből minden évben annyit vall be, amennyi maximalizálja a nála maradó jövedelemből fedezhető fogyasztás nyújtotta hasznosság és a jövedelembevallásból fakadó hasznosság összegét. A második hasznosság három tényező szorzata: a dolgozó exogén adómorálja, a környezetében előző évben megfigyelt átlagos jövedelembevallás és saját bevallásából fakadó endogén hasznossága. A második megközelítésben az ágensek egyszerű heurisztikus szabályok szerint cselekszenek. Míg az optimalizáló modellben hagyományos Laffer-görbékkel találkozunk, addig a heurisztikán alapuló modellekben (lineárisan) növekvő Laffer-görbék jönnek létre. E különbség oka, hogy a heurisztikán alapuló modellben egy sajátos viselkedésfajta jelentkezik: számos ágens ingatag helyzetbe kerül, amelyben altruizmus és önzés között ingadozik. ________ The authors study a family of models of tax evasion, where a flat-rate tax only finances the provision of public goods and audits and wage differences are ne-glected. The paper focuses on comparing two modelling approaches. The first is based on optimizing agents, endowed with social preferences, their utility being the sum of private consumption and moral utility. The second approach involves agents acting according to simple heuristics. While the traditionally shaped Laffer curves are encountered in the optimizing model, the heuristics models exhibit (linearly) increasing Laffer curves. This difference is related to a peculiar type of behaviour: within the agent-based approach lurk a number of agents in a moral state of limbo, alternating between altruism and selfishness.