The Shapley value for shortest path games

In this paper shortest path games are considered. The transportation of a good in a network has costs and benet too. The problem is to divide the prot of the transportation among the players. Fragnelli et al (2000) introduce the class of shortest path games, which coincides with the class of monotone games. They also give a characterization of the Shapley value on this class of games. In this paper we consider further four characterizations of the Shapley value (Shapley (1953)'s, Young (1985)'s, Chun (1989)'s, and van den Brink (2001)'s axiomatizations), and conclude that all the mentioned axiomatizations are valid for shortest path games. Fragnelli et al (2000)'s axioms are based on the graph behind the problem, in this paper we do not consider graph specic axioms, we take TU axioms only, that is, we consider all shortest path problems and we take the view of abstract decision maker who focuses rather on the abstract problem than on the concrete situations.

The Shapley value for airport and irrigation games

In this paper cost sharing problems are considered. We focus on problems given by rooted trees, we call these problems cost-tree problems, and on the induced transferable utility cooperative games, called irrigation games. A formal notion of irrigation games is introduced, and the characterization of the class of these games is provided. The well-known class of airport games Littlechild and Thompson (1977) is a subclass of irrigation games. The Shapley value Shapley (1953) is probably the most popular solution concept for transferable utility cooperative games. Dubey (1982) and Moulin and Shenker (1992) show respectively, that Shapley's Shapley (1953) and Young (1985)'s axiomatizations of the Shapley value are valid on the class of airport games. In this paper we show that Dubey (1982)'s and Moulin and Shenker (1992)'s results can be proved by applying Shapley (1953)'s and Young (1985)'s proofs, that is those results are direct consequences of Shapley (1953)'s and Young (1985)'s results. Furthermore, we extend Dubey (1982)'s and Moulin and Shenker (1992)'s results to the class of irrigation games, that is we provide two characterizations of the Shapley value for cost sharing problems given by rooted trees. We also note that for irrigation games the Shapley value is always stable, that is it is always in the core Gillies (1959).

The Shapley value for shortest path games

In this paper shortest path games are considered. The transportation of a good in a network has costs and benet too. The problem is to divide the prot of the transportation among the players. Fragnelli et al (2000) introduce the class of shortest path games, which coincides with the class of monotone games. They also give a characterization of the Shapley value on this class of games. In this paper we consider further four characterizations of the Shapley value (Shapley (1953)'s, Young (1985)'s, Chun (1989)'s, and van den Brink (2001)'s axiomatizations), and conclude that all the mentioned axiomatizations are valid for shortest path games. Fragnelli et al (2000)'s axioms are based on the graph behind the problem, in this paper we do not consider graph specic axioms, we take TU axioms only, that is, we consider all shortest path problems and we take the view of abstract decision maker who focuses rather on the abstract problem than on the concrete situations.

Agency theory problems behind the fall of shopping centers

The present article assesses agency theory related problems contributing to the fall of shopping centers. The negative effects of the financial and economic downturn started in 2008 were accentuated in emerging markets like Romania. Several shopping centers were closed or sold through bankruptcy proceedings or forced execution. These failed shopping centers, 10 in number, were selected in order to assess agency theory problems contributing to the failure of shopping centers; as research method qualitative multiple cases-studies is used. Results suggest, that in all of the cases the risk adverse behavior of the External Investor- Principal, lead to risk sharing problems and subsequently to the fall of the shopping centers. In some of the cases Moral Hazard (lack of Developer-Agent’s know-how and experience) as well as Adverse Selection problems could be identified. The novelty of the topic for the shopping center industry and the empirical evidences confer a significant academic and practical value to the present article.

Martingálmértékek és a várható diszkontált jelenérték szabály (Martingale measures and the law of the discounted present value)

A dolgozatban a legegyszerűbb kérdést feszegetjük: Hogyan kell az árakat meghatározni véletlen jövőbeli kifizetések esetén. A tárgyalás némiképpen absztrakt, de a funkcionálanalízis néhány közismert tételén kívül semmilyen más mélyebb matematikai területre nem kell hivatkozni. A dolgozat kérdése, hogy miként indokolható a várható jelenérték szabálya, vagyis hogy minden jövőbeli kifizetés jelen időpontban érvényes ára a jövőbeli kifizetés diszkontált várható értéke. A dologban az egyetlen csavar az, hogy a várható értékhez tartozó valószínűségi mértékről nem tudunk semmit. Csak annyit tudunk, hogy létezik a matematikai pénzügyek legtöbbet hivatkozott fogalma, a misztikus Q mérték. A dolgozat megírásának legfontosabb indoka az volt, hogy megpróbáltam kiiktatni a megengedett portfólió fogalmát a származtatott termékek árazásának elméletéből. Miként közismert, a származtatott termékek árazásának elmélete a fedezés fogalmára épül. (...) ____ In the article the author discusses some problems of the existence of the martingale measure. In continuous time models one should restrict the set of self financing portfolios and introduce the concept of the admissible portfolios. But to define the admissible portfolios one should either define them under the martingale measure or to turn the set of admissible portfolios to a cone which makes the interpretation of the pricing formula difficult.