A villamos energia áralakulásának egy új modellje (A new model for price movement in electric power)

A tanulmány az aukciós villamosenergia-tőzsdéken kialakuló óránkénti árak statisztikai jellemzőivel foglalkozik. Célja, hogy egyes legújabb kutatási eredmények alapján új megvilágításban mutassa be a villamos energia óránkénti árára jellemző főbb megállapításokat, amelyek a későbbiekben az ár modellezésének alapjául szolgálhatnak. A jelenségeket az EEX és Nord Pool áramtőzsdén kereskedett termékek árainak adatain szemlélteti. Látni fogjuk, hogy át kell értékelnünk több, a villamosenergia-árak statisztikai viselkedéséről alkotott meggondolást. / === / The article concerns the statistical features of the hourly prices on auction-based markets for electric power. The purpose is to use the latest research findings to present the main statements about the hourly price for electric power in a new light, so that they can serve later as a basis for price modelling. The phenomena are viewed through the price data of products traded on the EEX and Nord Pool power exchanges. It emerges that several ideas about the statistical behaviour of electric power prices have to be reviewed.

Stable sets in one-seller assignment games

We consider von Neumann -- Morgenstern stable sets in assignment games with one seller and many buyers. We prove that a set of imputations is a stable set if and only if it is the graph of a certain type of continuous and monotone function. This characterization enables us to interpret the standards of behavior encompassed by the various stable sets as possible outcomes of well-known auction procedures when groups of buyers may form bidder rings. We also show that the union of all stable sets can be described as the union of convex polytopes all of whose vertices are marginal contribution payoff vectors. Consequently, each stable set is contained in the Weber set. The Shapley value, however, typically falls outside the union of all stable sets.