Out of credit: Evaluating the impact of the EU structural funds on Hungarian small business growth and access to finance

Totaling EUR 29 billion, Hungary is in the midst of implementing its largest economic development program in its young democratic history. At the center of the European Union led development program is an effort to revitalize and reequip Hungary’s languishing small and medium sized enterprises (SME), long the country's heart of employment. This paper examines the efficiency and impact of two Structural Fund's instruments to enhance SME development – ECOP 2.1.1 and JEREMIE. A survey of 1275 SME and interviews with dozens of top policy-makers paint a flawed development program in dire need of reform. Despite this, empirical analysis suggests JEREMIE funds may have dampened the effects of the financial crisis and are crucial for the continued liquidity of SME, who have been particularly hit hard by the world financial crisis.

Európai Unió: túlélés vagy távlati tervezés – az állam változó szerepei (European Union – survival or long term planning?)

Az EU-ban, a mai állapotok szerint, csak „transzferunióról” beszélhetünk és nem egységes piacról. Az eurós pénzfolyamatok eltorzítva közvetítik a versenyképességet is: mind az árukban és vagyontárgyakban, mind – főleg – a pénzügyi eszközökben megtestesült munkákat/teljesítményeket rosszul árazzák. Egy ilyen keretben különösen könnyen alakul ki az, amit potyautas-problémának nevezünk, vagyis ahol tényleges vagy mérhető teljesítményleadás, vagy éppen fizetés nélkül lehet fogyasztani, és túl olcsón lehet szabad forrásokhoz jutni. Az eurózóna számos közvetítő mechanizmusában is tökéletlen. A sok, szuverénadósság-présbe került tagország között van kicsi, közepes és nagy is. Ez a tény, valamint az általános növekedési és munkapiaci problémák, egyértelműen „rendszerszintű zavarokat” jeleznek, amelyeket ebben a dolgozatban teljesítmény közvetítési-átviteli problémának hívunk, és ezért egy szokatlan, ám annál beszédesebb, elektromosenergia-átviteli rendszeranalógiával segítünk értelmezni. Megmutatjuk, hogy egy jó nagyvállalat miért jobb pénzügyi tervező, mint egy azonos méretű állam. _____ Why are ill-defined transfer mechanisms diverting valuable assets and resources to the wrong destination within the EU? Why do we witness ongoing pressure in the EU banking sector and in government finances? We offer an unusual answer to these questions: we apply an analogy from physics (from an electric generation and distribution network) to show the transmission inefficiency and waste, respectively, of the EU distribution mechanisms. We demonstrate that there are inherent flaws in both the measurement and in the distribution of assets and resources amongst the key EU markets: goods, money and factor markets. In addition, we find that when international equalizer mechanism is at work (cohesion funds allocated), many of these equity functions are at risk with respect to their reliable measurement. Especially are at risk the metered load factors, likewise the loss/waste factors. The map of desired outcomes does not match the real outcome, since EUtransfers in general are put to work with low efficiency.

The corruption risks of EU funds in Hungary

In corruption, a group of players gain an economic advantage without providing any socially beneficial services in return, therefore corruption is considered to be a form of rent-seeking. Similar to other forms of rent-seeking, corruption causes losses on a societal level, due to the less efficient allocation of resources, as well as the costs of operation and prosecution. Fighting corruption is important not just because of ethical but also economic considerations. Contributions from the European Union are making possible the use of more funds than ever, and spending the full amount of this money is a priority preference of the government. The abundance of funds and the pressure on absorption increase corruption, by the managers of the funds overplanning the amount of money to be allocated to individual tender invitations, setting generous rules on eligible costs, and specifying low rates of own contribution wherever possible. As a result, the opportunities for rent-seeking are increased, as it is worth it for beneficiaries to carry out the project even after relinquishing part of the funds they have been awarded. Thus, the abundance of funds generates a sphere of corruption in which rent-seekers may appear on various levels of the system, often even without the knowledge or approval of those on higher decisionmaking levels.