Kontraszelekció és erkölcsi kockázat a politikában. Vázlat az információs aszimmetria közgazdaságtani fogalmainak politikatudományi alkalmazhatóságáról (Negative selection and moral risk in politics. An outline of the usefulness to political science of the economic concept of information asymmetry)

Az írás a kontraszelekció és az erkölcsi kockázat információ-gazdaságtani fogalmának politikatudományi alkalmazhatósága mellett érvel. Azt kívánja bemutatni, hogy a politikai piac szereplői közti információs aszimmetria mechanizmusainak éppúgy lehetnek súlyos negatív hatásai a demokratikus politikai rendszer működésére nézve, mint ahogy a gazdasági szereplők közti információs aszimmetria - Nobel-díjas közgazdászok érvei szerint - alááshatja a piaci verseny hatékonyságát. Az írás új megvilágításba helyezi a - már Platón óta ismert - politikai kontraszelekció jelenségét, továbbá részletesen foglalkozik az erkölcsi kockázat és a megbízó-megbízott relációk megjelenésével a politikában. Érinti tovább azoknak a mechanizmusoknak - a jelzésnek és a szűrésnek - a megjelenését a politikában, melyeket a közgazdászok az információs aszimmetria csökkentésére ajánlanak. / === / The paper argues in favour of employing in political science the economic concept of information asymmetry, seeking to show that the mechanisms of information asymmetry among the players on the political market may have negative effects on the operation of a democratic political system as information asymmetry among economic actors – according to arguments of Nobel prize-winning economists – has on the efficiency of market competition. The paper sheds new light on the phenomenon of negative political selection (known since Plato's time), and goes on to deal in detail with the appearance of moral risk and client/agent relations in politics. The author touches also on the appearance in politics of mechanisms – signals and filters – that economists suggest for reducing information asymmetry.

Designed for Patience. The Significance of International Factors in the Ukrainian and Belarusian Transitions

This paper focuses on Belarus in order to find explanation as to why could Lukashenko remain the authoritarian leader of Belarus, while in Ukraine the position of the political elite had proved less stable and collapsed in 2004. We seek to determine whether the internal factors (macroeconomic conditions, standard of living, the oppressive nature of the political system) play a significant role in the operation of the domino effect. This article emphasises the determining role of immanent internal factors, thus the political stability in Belarus can be explained by the role of the suppressing political regime, the hindrance of democratic rights and the relatively good living conditions that followed the transformational recession. Whilst in Ukraine, the markedly different circumstances brought forth the success of the Orange Revolution.

A mérsékelt iszlamista mozgalmak szerepe az "arab tavaszt" követő politikai átmenetben (The Role of Moderate Islamist Movements in the Political Transition Following the Arab Spring)

Up to January 2011 authoritarian political regimes in the Middle East had widely been considered stable due to the armed forces, the underdeveloped political institutions, the economic embeddedness of the regimes, the neo-patrimonial structure of the Arab societies and, eventually the characteristics of Islam. Middle Eastern political systems are often considered to belong to a special sub-group of non-democratic regimes called “liberalized autocracies”. The 2011 events show that there is a new, as yet non-defined political structure emerging. Although there are different interpretations of the developments, there is a consensus on the determinant role of the Islamist organizations in the development of the new political structure. The results of the Egyptian and Tunisian parliamentary elections show that the secular political parties could not attract the public, while in Tunisia the long forbidden Hizb an-Nahda could form a government. In Egypt Hizb al-Hurriya established by the Muslim Brotherhood in 2011 won almost half of the parliamentary mandates, and to a great surprise, the Salafi Hizb an-Nour also received 24.3% of the votes. On the basis of the above developments the thesis of the Islamist re-organization of the Middle East, i.e. of a new wave of Islamism was elaborated, according to which the main political winners of the revolts in the Arab countries are the Islamist organizations, which could step in and fill in the political vacuum. While some speak of an Islamist autumn or Islamist winter as the result of the Arab Spring, others prefer the term Islamic revolutions.

Spheres of Influence: A Few Reflections on the Concept

In the frame of the Ukrainian crisis the question of spheres of influence has returned to political discourse. This may be an awkward subject, but what if we only deny the existence of such power constellations as spheres of influence? Do spheres of influence exist, or are they relics of history, and mere rhetoric? And if they exist, where can we find them? The hypothesis in this article is that instead of being a tangible reality, spheres of influence are obscure and contested political constructions, which nevertheless can have an impact on political behaviour. To demonstrate this, the article will first introduce a few examples of the current use of the concept. Secondly, a few remarks follow concerning the different IR schools of thought, and conceptual history as a method. Next, the article turns to discussing a few dictionaries and the empirical material for the present inquiry, which consists of recent textbooks, i.e. the current political science curriculum in one particular university, at the University of Tampere, Finland. More empirical cases deal with the division of Africa, the post-WWII situation, and the Hungarian revolution of 1956.