The 3 per cent Barcelona Target: A Critical Appraisal of the Failure of the Lisbon Strategy’s Knowledgebased Economy and Society Project

Ten years after the unanimous approval of the Lisbon Strategy at a special meeting of the European Council on 23-24 March 2000 in Lisbon, it will be inevitable for the European Council, the European Commission and the majority of the EU member states to face with its fi asco and to account for the reasons of their fundamental policy, governance and economic failures in 2010. The recent turbulence of the global economy offers some excuses for the underperformance of the main objectives of the Lisbon Strategy in the essential social and economic domains, like job creation, economic growth, and environmental sustainability. Negative growth rates, macroeconomic and fi nancial instability, the contraction of the internal and external markets of the European economy, drop in demand for capital investment, goods and services, sinking corporate revenues, depreciation of corporate assets, increasing private and public indebtedness, falling rate of employment, weakening social cohesion, widening social inequality, and so forth not only deprive the majority of the EU member states of fulfi lling the main objectives of the Lisbon Strategy but also drive them into worse social and economic conditions in many policy domains than they were in 2000.

Az egyéni teljesítményértékelési rendszer működésének tapasztalatai a magyar közigazgatásban (Operating experiences of the individual performance appraisal system in the Hungarian public sector)

A tanulmány – egy 2005 végén lefolytatott, országosan reprezentatív kérdőíves felmérés empirikus bázisán – a magyar közigazgatási dolgozók körében 2002-től bevezetett egyéni teljesítményértékelési rendszert vizsgálja. A rendszer egészét tekintve a vizsgálat végkövetkeztetései nem túl rózsásak: az eredmények arra utalnak, hogy a rendszer mint egész nem képes kitűzött fő célját, a munkateljesítmények javítását elérni. Az egyes részrendszerek, szervezettípusok szintjén differenciáltabb eredményeket kapunk, míg a minisztériumokban a rendszer egésze a szándékolttól alapvetően különböző célokat látszik szolgálni, addig a többi szervezettípusnál inkább „csak” a rendszer tökéletlen működéséről beszélhetünk. ____ On the basis of a questionnaire survey of a nationally representative sample of Hungarian civil servants, the study attempts to give a preliminary evaluation of the individual performance assessment system introduced in 2002 throughout the Hungarian civil service. The general conclusion of the analysis is that the performance assessment system is unlikely to reach its goals: its central element, the performance related pay incentives are overly dispersed and, on the average, insignificant in size, meanwhile the objectivity of performance assessments is also questionable. Moreover, comparative analysis of responses from different administrative branches reveals an interesting idiosyncrasy characteristic for central government ministries. Here, the main function of the incentive system seems to be ensuring the labor market competitiveness of the ministries as employers by enabling them to pay higher-than-usual salaries for employees having certain types of expertise.