Auctions with Untrustworthy Bidders

The paper analyzes auctions which are not completely enforceable. In such auctions, economic agents may fail to carry out their obligations, and parties involved cannot rely on external enforcement or control mechanisms for backing up a transaction. We propose two mechanisms that make bidders directly or indirectly reveal their trustworthiness. The first mechanism is based on discriminating bidding schedules that separate trustworthy from untrustworthy bidders. The second mechanism is a generalization of the Vickrey auction to the case of untrustworthy bidders. We prove that, if the winner is considered to have the trustworthiness of the second-highest bidder, truthfully declaring one's trustworthiness becomes a dominant strategy. We expect the proposed mechanisms to reduce the cost of trust management and to help agent designers avoid many market failures caused by lack of trust.

A New Charging and Billing Model and Architecture for the Ubiquitous Consumer Wireless World

In a Ubiquitous Consumer Wireless World (UCWW) environment the provision, administration and management of the authentication, authorization and accounting (AAA) policies and business services are provided by third-party AAA service providers (3P-AAA-SPs) who are independent of the wireless access network providers (ANPs). In this environment the consumer can freely choose any suitable ANP, based on his/her own preferences. This new AAA infrastructural arrangement necessitates assessing the impact and re-thinking the design, structure and location of ‘charging and billing’ (C&B) functions and services. This paper addresses C&B issues in UCWW, proposing potential architectural solutions for C&B realization. Implementation approaches of these novel solutions together with a software testbed for validation and performance evaluation are addressed.