Safety culture during major organisational change

This research examines the effect of major changes, in the external context, on the safety culture of a UK generating company. It was focused on an organisation which was originally part of the state owned Central Electricity Generating Board and which, by the end of the research period, was a self-contained generating company, operating in a competitive market and a wholly owned subsidiary of a US utility. The research represents an attempt to identify the nature and culture of the original organisation and to identify, analyse and explain the effects of the forces of change in moulding the final organisation. The research framework employed a qualitative methodology to investigate the effects of change, supported by a safety culture questionnaire, based on factors identified in the third report of the ACSNI Human Factors Study Group; Organising for Safety, as being indicators of safety culture. An additional research objective was to assess the usefulness of the ACSNI factors as indicators of safety culture. Findings were that the original organisation was an engineering dominated technocracy with a technocentric safety culture. Values and beliefs were very strongly held and resistant to change and much of the original safety culture survived unchanged into the new organisation. The effects of very long periods of uncertainty about the future were damaging to management/worker relationships but several factors were identified which effectively insulated the organisation from any of the effects of change. The forces of change had introduced a beneficial appreciation of the crucial relationship between safety risk assessment and commercial risk assessment.Although the technical strength of the original safety culture survived, so did the essential weakness of a low level of appreciation of the human behavioural aspects of safety. This led to a limited, functionalist world view of safety culture, which assumed that cultural change was simpler to achieve than was the case and an inability to make progress in certain areas which were essentially behavioural problems.The factors identified by ACSNI provided a useful basis for the site research methodology and for identifying areas of relative strength and weakness in the site safety arrangements.

The interaction between the implementation of an occupational health and safety management system and safety culture:a case study in the rubber industry

A prominent theme emerging in Occupational Health and Safety (OSH) is the development of management systems. A range of interventions, according to a prescribed route detailed by one of the management systems, can be introduced into an organisation with some expectation of improved OSH performance. This thesis attempts to identify the key influencing factors that may impact upon the process of introducing interventions, (according to B88800: 1996, Guide to Implementing Occupational Health and Safety Management Systems) into an organisation. To help identify these influencing factors a review of possible models from the sphere of Total Quality Management (TQM) was undertaken and the most suitable TQM model selected for development and use in aSH. By anchoring the aSH model's development in the reviewed literature a range ofeare, medium and low level influencing factors were identified. This model was developed in conjunction with the research data generated within the case study organisation (rubber manufacturer) and applied to the organisation. The key finding was that the implementation of an OSH intervention was dependant upon three broad vectors of influence. These are the Incentive to introduce change within an organisation which refers to the drivers or motivators for OSH. Secondly the Ability within the management team to actually implement the changes refers to aspects, amongst others, such as leadership, commitment and perceptions of OSH. Ability is in turn itself influenced by the environment within which change is being introduced. TItis aspect of Receptivity refers to the history of the plant and characteristics of the workforce. Aspects within Receptivity include workforce profile and organisational policies amongst others. It was found that the TQM model selected and developed for an OSH management system intervention did explain the core influencing factors and their impact upon OSH performance. It was found that within the organisation the results that may have been expected from implementation of BS8800:1996 were not realised. The OSH model highlighted that given the organisation's starting point, a poor appreciation of the human factors of OSH, gave little reward for implementation of an OSH management system. In addition it was found that general organisational culture can effectively suffocate any attempts to generate a proactive safety culture.

Organisational change and safety culture: the impact of communication

This research examines and explains the links between safety culture and communication. Safety culture is a concept that in recent years has gained prominence but there has been little applied research conducted to investigate the meaning of the concept in 'real life' settings. This research focused on a Train Operating Company undergoing change in a move towards privatisation. These changes were evident in the management of safety, the organisation of the industry and internally in their management. The Train Operating Company's management took steps to improve their safety culture and communications through the development of a cascade communication structure. The research framework employed a qualitative methodology in order to investigate the effect of the new system on safety culture. Findings of the research were that communications in the organisation failed to be effective for a number of reasons, including both cultural and logistical problems. The cultural problems related to a lack of trust in the organisation by the management and the workforce, the perception of communications as management propaganda, and asyntonic communications between those involved, whilst logistical problems related to the inherent difficulties of communicating over a geographically distributed network. An organisational learning framework was used to explain the results. It is postulated that one of the principal reasons why change, either to the safety culture or to communications, did not occur was because of the organisation's inability to learn. The research has also shown the crucial importance of trust between the members of the organisation, as this was one of the fundamental reasons why the safety culture did not change, and why safety management systems were not fully implemented. This is consistent with the notion of mutual trust in the HSC (1993) definition of safety culture. This research has highlighted its relevance to safety culture and its importance for organisational change.

The role of risk assessment in supporting a positive organisational safety culture

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An analysis of the effectiveness of a behavioural based safety intervention in a UK paper mill

This research examines a behavioural based safety (BBS) intervention within a paper mill in the South East of England. Further to this intervention two other mills are examined for the purposes of comparison — one an established BBS programme and the other an improving safety management system through management ownership. BBS programmes have become popular within the UK, but most of the research about their efficacy is carried out by the BBS providers themselves. This thesis aims to evaluate a BBS intervention from a standpoint which is not commercially biased in favour of BBS schemes. The aim of a BBS scheme is to either change personnel behaviours or attitudes, which in turn will positively affect the organisation's safety culture. The research framework involved a qualitative methodology in order to examine the effects of the intervention on the paper mill's safety culture. The techniques used were questionnaires and semi structured interviews, in addition to observation and discussions which were possible because of the author's position as participant observer. The results demonstrated a failure to improve any aspect of the mill's safety culture, which worsened following the BBS intervention. Issues such as trust, morale, communication and support of management showed significant signs of negative workforce response. The paper mill where the safety management system approach was utilised demonstrated a significantly improved safety culture and achieved site ownership from middle managers and supervisors. Research has demonstrated that a solid foundation is required prior to successfully implementing a BBS programme. For a programme to work there must be middle management support in addition to senior management commitment. If a trade union actively distances itself from BBS, it is also unlikely to be effective. This thesis proposes that BBS observation programmes are not suitable for the papermaking industry, particularly when staffing levels are low due to challenging economic conditions. Observers are not available when there are high hazard situations and this suggests that BBS implementation is not the correct intervention for the paper industry.

Accountability, organisational learning and risks to patient safety in England: conflict or compromise?

This article examines the current risk regulation regime, within the English National Health Service (NHS), by investigating the two, sometimes conflicting, approaches to risk embodied within the field of policies towards patient safety. The first approach focuses on promoting accountability and is built on legal principles surrounding negligence and competence. The second approach focuses on promoting learning from previous mistakes and near-misses, and is built on the development of a ‘safety culture’. Previous work has drawn attention to problems associated with risk-based regulation when faced with the dual imperatives of accountability and organisational learning. The article develops this by considering whether the NHS patient safety regime demonstrates the coexistence of two different risk regulation regimes, or merely one regime with contradictory elements. It uses the heuristic device of ‘institutional logics’ to examine the coexistence of and interrelationship between ‘organisational learning’ and ‘accountability’ logics driving risk regulation in health care.

Large scale organisational intervention to improve patient safety in four UK hospitals:mixed method evaluation

Objectives: To conduct an independent evaluation of the first phase of the Health Foundation's Safer Patients Initiative (SPI), and to identify the net additional effect of SPI and any differences in changes in participating and non-participating NHS hospitals. Design: Mixed method evaluation involving five substudies, before and after design. Setting: NHS hospitals in United Kingdom. Participants: Four hospitals (one in each country in the UK) participating in the first phase of the SPI (SPI1); 18 control hospitals. Intervention: The SPI1 was a compound (multicomponent) organisational intervention delivered over 18 months that focused on improving the reliability of specific frontline care processes in designated clinical specialties and promoting organisational and cultural change. Results: Senior staff members were knowledgeable and enthusiastic about SPI1. There was a small (0.08 points on a 5 point scale) but significant (P<0.01) effect in favour of the SPI1 hospitals in one of 11 dimensions of the staff questionnaire (organisational climate). Qualitative evidence showed only modest penetration of SPI1 at medical ward level. Although SPI1 was designed to engage staff from the bottom up, it did not usually feel like this to those working on the wards, and questions about legitimacy of some aspects of SPI1 were raised. Of the five components to identify patients at risk of deterioration - monitoring of vital signs (14 items); routine tests (three items); evidence based standards specific to certain diseases (three items); prescribing errors (multiple items from the British National Formulary); and medical history taking (11 items) - there was little net difference between control and SPI1 hospitals, except in relation to quality of monitoring of acute medical patients, which improved on average over time across all hospitals. Recording of respiratory rate increased to a greater degree in SPI1 than in control hospitals; in the second six hours after admission recording increased from 40% (93) to 69% (165) in control hospitals and from 37% (141) to 78% (296) in SPI1 hospitals (odds ratio for "difference in difference" 2.1, 99% confidence interval 1.0 to 4.3; P=0.008). Use of a formal scoring system for patients with pneumonia also increased over time (from 2% (102) to 23% (111) in control hospitals and from 2% (170) to 9% (189) in SPI1 hospitals), which favoured controls and was not significant (0.3, 0.02 to 3.4; P=0.173). There were no improvements in the proportion of prescription errors and no effects that could be attributed to SPI1 in non-targeted generic areas (such as enhanced safety culture). On some measures, the lack of effect could be because compliance was already high at baseline (such as use of steroids in over 85% of cases where indicated), but even when there was more room for improvement (such as in quality of medical history taking), there was no significant additional net effect of SPI1. There were no changes over time or between control and SPI1 hospitals in errors or rates of adverse events in patients in medical wards. Mortality increased from 11% (27) to 16% (39) among controls and decreased from17%(63) to13%(49) among SPI1 hospitals, but the risk adjusted difference was not significant (0.5, 0.2 to 1.4; P=0.085). Poor care was a contributing factor in four of the 178 deaths identified by review of case notes. The survey of patients showed no significant differences apart from an increase in perception of cleanliness in favour of SPI1 hospitals. Conclusions The introduction of SPI1 was associated with improvements in one of the types of clinical process studied (monitoring of vital signs) and one measure of staff perceptions of organisational climate. There was no additional effect of SPI1 on other targeted issues nor on other measures of generic organisational strengthening.