Trade marks, registered designs and the monopolisation of functional shapes:a consideration of Lego and Dyson

Legislation: Regulation 6/2002 on Community designs art.3(3)(e) Directive 98/71 on the legal protection of designs art.7(1) Cases: Dyson Ltd v Vax Ltd [2010] EWHC 1923 (Pat); [2011] Bus. L.R. 232 (Ch D (Patents Ct)) Lego Juris A/S v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) (OHIM) (C-48/09 P) Unreported September 14, 2010 (ECJ) *E.I.P.R. 60 In Lego, the Court of Justice of the European Union denied registration for an exclusively functional shape mark despite the availability of other shapes capable of fulfilling the same function and in Dyson v Vax Mr Justice Arnold established that a design can not be registered for a purely functional shape even though another shape could fulfil the same required function.

International trade law, plain packaging and tobacco industry political activity:the Trans-Pacific Partnership

Tobacco companies are increasingly turning to trade and investment agreements to challenge measures aimed at reducing tobacco use. This study examines their efforts to influence the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), a major trade and investment agreement which may eventually cover 40% of the world's population; focusing on how these efforts might enhance the industry's power to challenge the introduction of plain packaging. Specifically, the paper discusses the implications for public health regulation of Philip Morris International's interest in using the TPP to: shape the bureaucratic structures and decision-making processes of business regulation at the national level; introduce a higher standard of protection for trademarks than is currently provided under the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights; and expand the coverage of Investor-State Dispute Settlement which empowers corporations to litigate directly against governments where they are deemed to be in breach of investment agreements. The large number of countries involved in the TPP underlines its risk to the development of tobacco regulation globally.

Macroeconomic determinants of contingent protection:the case of the European Union

Contingent Protection has grown to become an important trade restricting device. In the European Union, protection instruments like antidumping are used extensively. This paper analyses whether macroeconomic pressures may contribute to explain the variations in the intensity of antidumping protectionism in the EU. The empirical analysis uses count data models, applying various specification tests to derive the most appropriate specification. Our results suggest that the filing activity is inversely related to the macroeconomic conditions. Moreover, they confirm existing evidence for the US suggesting that domestic macroeconomic pressures are a more important determinant of contingent protection policy than external pressures.