Corporate taxation, corporate power, and corporate harm

Globalisation has increased corporate tax competition amongst states and facilitated widespread corporate tax avoidance. Some of the largest businesses now pay little or no tax: in some cases with the active assistance of governments. This article examines contemporary corporation tax policies, outlines some of the key methods corporations use to minimise their tax liabilities, explores the interdependencies between the demand for reduced tax liabilities and the professional infrastructure of tax planning and avoidance, and examines how the contemporary political economy of corporate taxation enhances the bargaining power of transnational corporations in the implementation of tax policy.

Competition, agency and productivity

This article tests a set of hypotheses relating to agency and Schumpeterian views on how competition affects performance. A survey data set of Australian workplaces is used, with the change in labour productivity as the dependent variable. The results show strong support for the idea that intense competition raises productivity growth in managerial workplaces, but not in non-managerial workplaces (i.e. where the principal owner also works). Testing the agency theories in more detail, we find no evidence that the number of competitors, the price elasticity of demand or a proxy for bankruptcy (pre-tax losses) are the mechanisms behind the process. For non-managerial workplaces the results indicate support for the idea that greater demand uncertainty reduces productivity growth. In contrast, for managerial workplaces, greater demand uncertainty tends to raise productivity growth.