On the opportunism-independent theory of the firm

Previous developments in the opportunism-independent theory of the firm are either restricted to special cases or are derived from the capabilities or resource-based perspective. However, a more general opportunism-independent approach can be developed, based on the work of Demsetz and Coase, which is nevertheless contractual in nature. This depends on 'direction', that is, deriving economic value by permitting one set of actors to direct the activities of another, and of non-human factors of production. Direction helps to explain not only firm boundaries and organisation, but also the existence of firms, without appealing to opportunism or moral hazard. The paper also considers the extent to which it is meaningful to speak of 'contractual' theories in the absence of opportunism, and whether this analysis can be extended beyond the employment contract to encompass ownership of assets by the firm. © The Author 2005. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the Cambridge Political Economy Society. All rights reserved.

When do firms conform? The effect of regulatory control processes on compliance and opportunism

The authors use social control theory to develop a conceptual model that addresses the effectiveness of regulatory agencies’ (e.g., Food and Drug Administration, Occupational Safety and Health Administration) field-level efforts to obtain conformance with product safety laws. Central to the model are the control processes agencies use when monitoring organizations and enforcing the safety rules. These approaches can be labeled formal control (e.g., rigid enforcement) and informal control (e.g., social instruction). The theoretical framework identifies an important antecedent of control and the relative effectiveness of control’s alternative forms in gaining compliance and reducing opportunism. Furthermore, the model predicts that the regulated firms’ level of agreement with the safety rules moderates the relationships between control and firm responses. A local health department’s administration of state food safety regulations provides the empirical context for testing the hypotheses. The results from a survey of 173 restaurants largely support the proposed model. The study findings inform a discussion of effective methods of administering product safety laws. The authors use social control theory to develop a conceptual model that addresses the effectiveness of regulatory agencies’ (e.g., Food and Drug Administration, Occupational Safety and Health Administration) field-level efforts to obtain conformance with product safety laws. Central to the model are the control processes agencies use when monitoring organizations and enforcing the safety rules. These approaches can be labeled formal control (e.g., rigid enforcement) and informal control (e.g., social instruction). The theoretical framework identifies an important antecedent of control and the relative effectiveness of control’s alternative forms in gaining compliance and reducing opportunism. Furthermore, the model predicts that the regulated firms’ level of agreement with the safety rules moderates the relationships between control and firm responses. A local health department’s administration of state food safety regulations provides the empirical context for testing the hypotheses. The results from a survey of 173 restaurants largely support the proposed model. The study findings inform a discussion of effective methods of administering product safety laws.

Opportunism, hold-up and the (contractual) theory of the firm

This paper considers the role of opportunism in three contractual theories of the firm: rent-seeking theory, property rights theory, and agency theory. In each case I examine whether it is possible to have a functioning contractual theory of the firm without recourse to opportunism. Without opportunism firms may still exist as a result of issues arising from (incomplete) contracting. Far from posing a problem for the theory of the firm, questioning the role of opportunism and the ubiquity of the hold-up problem helps us understand more about the purpose and functions of contracts which go beyond mere incentive alignment.

The franchise dilemma:entrepreneurial characteristics, relational contracting, and opportunism in hybrid governance

Using franchise data, we identify that entrepreneurial characteristics of franchisees partially impact on their opportunistic tendencies. Further, relational contracting increases franchisee opportunism by strengthening the opportunism-enhancing impact of entrepreneurial characteristics. These findings point to a key dilemma franchisors need to be aware of: Entrepreneurially minded franchisees who might be better at exploiting market opportunities for their units may also behave more opportunistically, if given the chance through a more relational contracting regime. At the same time, if they perceive the contractual framework as being too rigid, they may be less able to leverage their capabilities, become dissatisfied, and exit the system.

Ownership structure and operating performance: evidence from the European maritime industry

In this paper we examine the relation between ownership structure and operating performance for European maritime firms. Using a sample of 266 firm-year observations, during the period 2002–2004, we provide evidence that operating performance is positively related with foreign held shares and investment corporation held shares, indicating better investor protection from managerial opportunism. We also find no relation between operating performance and employee held shares, suggesting no relation between employee commitment and firms’ economic performance. Furthermore, we find no relation between operating performance and government held shares, indicating that government may not adequately protect shareholders’ interests from managerial opportunism. Finally, we do find a positive relation between operating performance and portfolio held shares for code law maritime firms but not for common law maritime firms. Results are robust after adjusting for various firm and country risk characteristics. Overall, our results on the importance of the ownership structure are new to this setting and add to a large body of evidence linking ownership characteristics to corporate performance.

Exploring the dimensions and transactional outcomes of incomplete business contracts

With an increased emphasis on outsourcing and shortening business cycles, contracts between firms have become more important. Carefully written contracts contribute to the efficiency and longevity of inter-firm relationships as they may constrain opportunism and are often a less costly governance mechanism than maintaining complex social relationships (Larson 1992). This exploratory examination adds to our understanding of how incomplete contracts affect interorganizational exchange. First, we consider the multiple dimensions of contract constraints (safeguards). We also investigate the extent that constraints affect decisions to enforce the relationship by delaying payments, and whether the decision is efficient. Finally, we examine the extent the constraints are effective (and ineffective) at reducing transaction problems associated with enforcement. Based on 971 observations of transactions using explicit, written terms and other secondary data in the context of IT transaction in The Netherlands we test our research propositions.