Post-Bretton Woods evidence on PPP under different exchange rate regimes

This article investigates the behaviour of exchange rates across different regimes for a post-Bretton Woods period. The exchange rate regime classification is based on the classification of Frankel et al. (2004) who condensed the 10 categories of exchange rate regimes reported by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) into three categories. Panel unitroot tests and panel cointegration are used to examine the Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) hypothesis. The latter test is used to check for both the weak and strong forms of PPP. The panel unit-root tests show no evidence of PPP and suggest there is no difference in the behaviour of exchange rates across different regimes. However, failure to detect PPP across any of the regimes could be due to structural breaks. This assumption is reinforced by the results of cointegration tests, which suggest that there exists at least a weak form of PPP for the different regimes. The evidence for strong PPP decreases as the exchange rate regime moves away from a flexible exchange rate regime.

Implications of bank ownership for the credit channel of monetary policy transmission:evidence from India

Using bank-level data from India, we examine the impact of ownership on the reaction of banks to monetary policy, and also test whether the reaction of different types of banks to monetary policy changes is different in easy and tight policy regimes. Our results suggest that there are considerable differences in the reactions of different types of banks to monetary policy initiatives of the central bank, and that the bank lending channel of monetary policy is likely to be much more effective in a tight money period than in an easy money period. We also find differences in impact of monetary policy changes on less risky short-term and more risky medium-term lending. We discuss the policy implications of the findings.

Monetary policy preferences of the EMU and the UK

We estimate the central bank policy preferences for the European Monetary Union and for the UK. In doing so, we extend the theoretical framework suggested by Cecchetti etal. (TheManchesterSchool, Vol. 70 (2002), pp. 596-618), by assuming that policy preferences change across different regimes. Our empirical results suggest that the weight that policy makers put on inflation is typically profound. Furthermore, it appears that volatility shifts of the economic disturbances are the main factor, which generates variation in policy preferences.