An illustration of variable precision rough sets model:an analysis of the findings of the UK Monopolies and Mergers Commission

This paper introduces a new technique in the investigation of limited-dependent variable models. This paper illustrates that variable precision rough set theory (VPRS), allied with the use of a modern method of classification, or discretisation of data, can out-perform the more standard approaches that are employed in economics, such as a probit model. These approaches and certain inductive decision tree methods are compared (through a Monte Carlo simulation approach) in the analysis of the decisions reached by the UK Monopolies and Mergers Committee. We show that, particularly in small samples, the VPRS model can improve on more traditional models, both in-sample, and particularly in out-of-sample prediction. A similar improvement in out-of-sample prediction over the decision tree methods is also shown.

Wealth effects of mergers and acquisitions for US firms: using alternative pricing models

This empirical study employs a different methodology to examine the change in wealth associated with mergers and acquisitions (M&As) for US firms. Specifically, we employ the standard CAPM, the Fama-French three-factor model and the Carhart four-factor models within the OLS and GJR-GARCH estimation methods to test the behaviour of the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs). Whilst the standard CAPM captures the variability of stock returns with the overall market, the Fama-French factors capture the risk factors that are important to investors. Additionally, augmenting the Fama-French three-factor model with the Carhart momentum factor to generate the four-factor captures additional pricing elements that may affect stock returns. Traditionally, estimates of abnormal returns (ARs) in M&As situations rely on the standard OLS estimation method. However, the standard OLS will provide inefficient estimates of the ARs if the data contain ARCH and asymmetric effects. To minimise this problem of estimation efficiency we re-estimated the ARs using GJR-GARCH estimation method. We find that there is variation in the results both as regards the choice models and estimation methods. Besides these variations in the estimated models and the choice of estimation methods, we also tested whether the ARs are affected by the degree of liquidity of the stocks and the size of the firm. We document significant positive post-announcement cumulative ARs (CARs) for target firm shareholders under both the OLS and GJR-GARCH methods across all three methodologies. However, post-event CARs for acquiring firm shareholders were insignificant for both sets of estimation methods under the three methodologies. The GJR-GARCH method seems to generate larger CARs than those of the OLS method. Using both market capitalization and trading volume as a measure of liquidity and the size of the firm, we observed strong return continuations in the medium firms relative to small and large firms for target shareholders. We consistently observed market efficiency in small and large firm. This implies that target firms for small and large firms overreact to new information resulting in a more efficient market. For acquirer firms, our measure of liquidity captures strong return continuations for small firms under the OLS estimates for both CAPM and Fama-French three-factor models, whilst under the GJR-GARCH estimates only for Carhart model. Post-announcement bootstrapping simulated CARs confirmed our earlier results.

The role of HR in cross-border mergers and acquisitions:the case of Indian pharmaceutical firms

Mergers and acquisitions (M&) are increasingly becoming a strategy of choice for companies attempting to achieve and sustain competitive advantage. However, not all M&As are a success. In this paper, we examine the three main reasons highlighted in the literature as major causes of M&A failure (clashing corporate cultures, absence of clear communication, and employee involvement) in three Indian pharmaceutical companies, and we analyze the role played by the HR function in addressing them. Also, we discuss the importance of gaining the commitment and focus of the workforce during the acquisition process through employee involvement.

An empirical investigation on firm-level performance of cross border mergers and acquisitions

This empirical study investigates the performance of cross border M&A. The first stage is to identify the determinants of making cross border M&A complete. One focus here is to extend the existing empirical evidence in the field of cross border M&A and exploit the likelihood of M&A from a different perspective. Given the determinants of cross border M&A completions, the second stage is to investigate the effects of cross border M&A on post-acquisition firm performance for both targets and acquirers. The thesis exploits a hitherto unused data base, which consists of those firms that are rumoured to be undertaking M&A, and then follow the deal to completion or abandonment. This approach highlights a number of limitations to the previous literature, which relies on statistical methodology to identify potential but non-existent mergers. This thesis changes some conventional understanding for M&A activity. Cross border M&A activity is underpinned by various motives such as synergy, management discipline, and acquisition of complementary resources. Traditionally, it is believed that these motives will boost the international M&A activity and improve firm performance after takeovers. However, this thesis shows that such factors based on these motives as acquirer’s profitability and liquidity and target’s intangible resource actually deter the completion of cross border M&A in the period of 2002-2011. The overall finding suggests that the cross border M&A is the efficiency-seeking activity rather than the resource-seeking activity. Furthermore, compared with firms in takeover rumours, the completion of M&A lowers firm performance. More specifically, the difficulties in transfer of competitive advantages and integration of strategic assets lead to low firm performance in terms of productivity. Besides, firms cannot realise the synergistic effect and managerial disciplinary effect once a cross border M&A is completed, which suggests a low post-acquisition profitability level.

Effectiveness and effects of attempts to regulate the UK petrol industry

This paper evaluates the impact that investigation and regulation of the UK petrol industry has had on the profitability of the companies. Using a gross margin for petrol, we estimate a series of variable parameter autoregressive processes. The results demonstrate that the 1979 Monopolies and Mergers Commission investigation into the industry, caused a long term decline in profit margins in the industry, despite the fact that no recommendations or undertakings were made. This cannot however be said for subsequent investigations.

Regulation of the petrol industry in the UK: issues and evidence

The petrol industry has been investigated twice by the Monopolies and Mergers Commission in the last 20 years. On both occasions the MMC found that the conduct of the companies was not against the public interest. These findings were based on the perceived stable relationship between oil and petrol prices. This paper develops a model of petrol price using a co-integration approach, concluding that one must question the findings of the MMC.

Monopoly in the UK:what determines whether the MMC finds against the investigated firms?

This paper draws on data from 73 UK Monopolies and Mergers Commission reports on monopoly between 1973 and 1995. It shows that there is a roughly two in three chance that the Commission will come to an adverse conclusion against the investigated firms in a given case. 75–80% of decisions can be explained purely in terms of the market share of the leading firm and knowledge of the broad nature of the alleged anti-competitive practice. An adverse finding is most likely in cases involving exclusive dealing, and least likely where other vertical restraints are involved.

The impact of organizational change on the perceptions of UK managers change

Redundancy, delayering, downsizing, and various other forms of organizational change have become increasingly prevalent. This article focuses on the impact of different forms of organizational change on managers' perceptions of the organizations they work within and the comparison between changes that involve redundancy and/or delayering and those that do not involve such changes. The literature has many accounts of the negative effects associated with redundancy and delayering, but are these effects unique to these types of change or are they a consequence of negative experiences of a range of organizational changes? Hypotheses were tested to assess, first, whether there are differences between different levels of management, notably between directors and nondirectors in the way they perceive organizational change, second, to assess how change has affected managers' perceptions of their organizations and their working lives, and third, to explore if different forms of change are associated with differences in managers' perceptions of their organizations “as a place to work”. Hypotheses were tested with data from a cross-sectional survey with 830 managers from the UK. Organizational changes include cost reduction and culture change programmes, delayering, mergers/demergers, outsourcing, redundancy programmes, and contract/ temporary workers. The analyses reported here indicate clearly that specific forms of change are associated with managers' reports of their experiences at work; some forms of change (notably redundancy and delayering) seem to have particularly damaging implications for managers' experiences in the workplace. The analyses also show that there is a difference in the way directors and nondirectors perceive the changes. Finally, the article considers strategies for ameliorating the effects of change including the role of HR.

Working under a black cloud:how to sustain organizational identification after a merger

This article argues against the merger folklore that maintains that a merger negatively affects well-being and work attitudes primarily through the threat of job insecurity. We hold that the workplace is not only a resource for fulfilling a person's financial needs, but that it is an important component of the self-concept in terms of identification with the organization, as explained by social identity theory. We unravel the key concepts of the social identity approach relevant to the analysis of mergers and review evidence from previous studies. Then, we present a study conducted during a merger to substantiate our ideas about the effects of post-merger organizational identification above and beyond the effects of perceived job insecurity. We recommend that managers should account for these psychological effects through the provision of continuity and specific types of communication. © 2006 British Academy of Management.

The impact of Islamic banking on the cost efficiency and productivity change of Malaysian commercial banks

This study employs stochastic frontier analysis to analyze Malaysian commercial banks during 1996-2002, and particularly focuses on determining the impact of Islamic banking on performance. We derive both net and gross efficiency estimates, thereby demonstrating that differences in operating characteristics explain much of the difference in costs between Malaysian banks. We also decompose productivity change into efficiency, technical, and scale change using a generalised Malmquist productivity index. On average, Malaysian banks experience moderate scale economies and annual productivity change of 2.68 percent, with the latter driven primarily by technical change, which has declined over time. Our gross efficiency estimates suggest that Islamic banking is associated with higher input requirements. However, our productivity estimates indicate that full-fledged Islamic banks have overcome some of these cost disadvantages with rapid technical change, although this is not the case for conventional banks operating Islamic windows. Merged banks are found to have higher input usage and lower productivity change, suggesting that bank mergers have not contributed positively to bank performance. Finally, our results suggest that while the East Asian financial crisis had a short-term cost-reducing effect in 1998, the crisis triggered a more lasting negative impact by increasing the volume of non-performing loans.

Retail competition and consumer choice:contextualising the “food deserts” debate

The “food deserts” debate can be enriched by setting the particular circumstances of food deserts – areas of very limited consumer choice – within a wider context of changing retail provision in other areas. This paper’s combined focus on retail competition and consumer choice shifts the emphasis from changing patterns of retail provision towards a more qualitative understanding of how “choice” is actually experienced by consumers at the local level “on the ground”. This argument has critical implications for current policy debates where the emphasis on monopolies and mergers at the national level needs to be brought together with the planning and regulation of retail provision at the local, neighbourhood level.

Tacit collusion, firm asymmetries and numbers:evidence from EC merger cases

This paper estimates the implicit model, especially the roles of size asymmetries and firm numbers, used by the European Commission to identify mergers with coordinated effects. This subset of cases offers an opportunity to shed empirical light on the conditions where a Competition Authority believes tacit collusion is most likely to arise. We find that, for the Commission, tacit collusion is a rare phenomenon, largely confined to markets of two, more or less symmetric, players. This is consistent with recent experimental literature, but contrasts with the facts on ‘hard-core’ collusion in which firm numbers and asymmetries are often much larger.

Assessing the efficacy of structural merger remedies:choosing between theories of harm?

Previous empirical assessments of the effectiveness of structural merger remedies have focused mainly on the subsequent viability of the divested assets. Here, we take a different approach by examining how competitive are the market structures which result from the divestments. We employ a tightly specified sample of markets in which the European Commission (EC) has imposed structural merger remedies. It has two key features: (i) it includes all mergers in which the EC appears to have seriously considered, simultaneously, the possibility of collective dominance, as well as single dominance; (ii) in a previous paper, for the same sample, we estimated a model which proved very successful in predicting the Commission’s merger decisions, in terms of the market shares of the leading firms. The former allows us to explore the choices between alternative theories of harm, and the latter provides a yardstick for evaluating whether markets are competitive or not – at least in the eyes of the Commission. Running the hypothetical post-remedy market shares through the model, we can predict whether the EC would have judged the markets concerned to be competitive, had they been the result of a merger rather than a remedy. We find that a significant proportion were not competitive in this sense. One explanation is that the EC has simply been inconsistent – using different criteria for assessing remedies from those for assessing the mergers in the first place. However, a more sympathetic – and in our opinion, more likely – explanation is that the Commission is severely constrained by the pre-merger market structures in many markets. We show that, typically, divestment remedies return the market to the same structure as existed before the proposed merger. Indeed, one can argue that any competition authority should never do more than this. Crucially, however, we find that this pre-merger structure is often itself not competitive. We also observe an analogous picture in a number of markets where the Commission chose not to intervene: while the post-merger structure was not competitive, nor was the pre-merger structure. In those cases, however, the Commission preferred the former to the latter. In effect, in both scenarios, the EC was faced with a no-win decision. This immediately raises a follow-up question: why did the EC intervene for some, but not for others – given that in all these cases, some sort of anticompetitive structure would prevail? We show that, in this sample at least, the answer is often tied to the prospective rank of the merged firm post-merger. In particular, in those markets where the merged firm would not be the largest post-merger, we find a reluctance to intervene even where the resulting market structure is likely to be conducive to collective dominance. We explain this by a willingness to tolerate an outcome which may be conducive to tacit collusion if the alternative is the possibility of an enhanced position of single dominance by the market leader. Finally, because the sample is confined to cases brought under the ‘old’ EC Merger Regulation, we go on to consider how, if at all, these conclusions require qualification following the 2004 revisions, which, amongst other things, made interventions for non-coordinated behaviour possible without requiring that the merged firm be a dominant market leader. Our main conclusions here are that the Commission appears to have been less inclined to intervene in general, but particularly for Collective Dominance (or ‘coordinated effects’ as it is now known in Europe as well as the US.) Moreover, perhaps contrary to expectation, where the merged firm is #2, the Commission has to date rarely made a unilateral effects decision and never made a coordinated effects decision.