Concentration of the UK stock market

During 1999 and 2000 a large number of articles appeared in the financial press which argued that the concentration of the FTSE 100 had increased. Many of these reports suggested that stock market volatility in the UK had risen, because the concentration of its stock markets had increased. This study undertakes a comprehensive measurement of stock market concentration using the FTSE 100 index. We find that during 1999, 2000 and 2001 stock market concentration was noticeably higher than at any other time since the index was introduced. When we measure the volatility of the FTSE 100 index we do not find an association between concentration and its volatility. When we examine the variances and covariance’s of the FTSE 100 constituents we find that security volatility appears to be positively related to concentration changes but concentration and the size of security covariances appear to be negatively related. We simulate the variance of four versions of the FTSE 100 index; in each version of the index the weighting structure reflects either an equally weighted index, or one with levels of low, intermediate or high concentration. We find that moving from low to high concentration has very little impact on the volatility of the index. To complete the study we estimate the minimum variance portfolio for the FTSE 100, we then compare concentration levels of this index to those formed on the basis of market weighting. We find that realised FTSE index weightings are higher than for the minimum variance index.

Inward investment, industry concentration and the speed of adjustment

T his paper seeks to examine the relationship between foreign direct investment (FDI) and industry concentration. Previous work in the area is somewhat contradictory in terms of the effect that FDI may be expected to have on host-country market structure. In addition, work which seeks to use concentration as a determinant of FDI (or indeed entry in a more generic sense) is rather ambiguous. This paper seeks to resolve these issues, and argues that inward FDI is more likely to reduce concentration by increasing competition than it is to increase monopoly power. In addition, the paper will show that the role of concentration in explaining FDI is more complex than has previously been understood. This paper is constructed as follows: Section II discusses the hypothesized relationship between market concentration and FDI, while Sections III, IV and V develop the models employed and discuss the econometric issues. Finally Sections VI and VII discuss the results and present some conclusions.

The intra-firm diffusion of complementary innovations: Evidence from the adoption of management practices by British establishments

This paper presents a simple profitability-based decision model to show how synergistic gains generated by the joint adoption of complementary innovations may influence the firm's adoption decision. For this purpose a weighted index of intra-firm diffusion is built to investigate empirically the drivers of the intensity of joint use of a set of complementary innovations. The findings indicate that establishment size, ownership structure and product market concentration are important determinants of the intensity of use. Interestingly, the factors that affect the extent of use of technological innovations do also affect that of clusters of management practices. However, they can explain only part of the heterogeneity of the benefits from joint use.

Inward investment and host country market structure:the case of the U.K.

Multinational enterprises are seen as vehicles for the international transfer of investment capital, protecting and increasing profits by transferring ownership advantages across national boundaries. As such, the argument often follows that foreign direct investment then exacerbates the monopoly problem in host countries, by increasing concentration and facilitating collusion. This paper however reveals the reverse, that inward investment into the U.K. acts to reduce concentration at the industry level, by increasing competitive pressures on domestic industry.

Ownership concentration:'Private benefits of control' and debt financing

Building on the ‘law and economics’ literature, this paper analyses corporate governance implications of debt financing in an environment where a dominant owner is able to extract ex ante ‘private benefits of control’. Ownership concentration may result in lower efficiency, measured as a ratio of a firm’s debt to investment, and this effect depends on the identity of the largest shareholder. Moreover, entrenched dominant shareholder(s) may be colluding with fixed-claim holders in extracting ‘control premium’. One of possible outcomes is a ‘crowding out’ of entrepreneurial firms from the debt market, and this is supported by evidence from the transition economies.

Does ownership concentration improve M&A outcomes in emerging markets?: Evidence from India

Using firm level data from India, we examine the impact of ownership concentration on post-M&A performance of firms. Our analysis has implications for both the M&A literature, which emphasises the role of agency conflict between managers and owners of widely held companies as a key reason for M&A failures, and the corporate governance literature, especially in the context of emerging market economies. A cautious interpretation of our results suggests that while ownership concentration may reduce the manager–owner agency conflict, it may nevertheless precipitate other forms of agency conflict such that ownership concentration may not necessarily improve post-M&A performance. In particular, our results have implications for the literature on the agency conflict between large (or majority) shareholders and small (or minority) shareholders of a company, especially in contexts such as emerging market economies where corporate governance quality is weak.