Changing treaty and changing economic context:the dynamic relationship of the legislature and the judiciary in the pursuit of capital liberalisation

Introduction For a significant period of time (the late 1950s--1980s), a lack of capital freedom was a major obstacle to the progress of the internal market project. The free movements of goods, persons and services were achieved, and developed, primarily through the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). On the other hand, the Court played a (self-imposed) limited role in the development of the free movement of capital. It was through a progressive series of legislation that the freedom was finally achieved. John Usher has noted that the consequence of this is that ‘free movement of capital thus became the only Treaty “freedom” to be achieved in the manner envisaged in the Treaty’. For this reason, the relationship of the Court and legislature in this area is of particular importance in the broader context of the internal market. The rest of this chapter is split into four sections and will attempt to describe (and account for) the differing relationships between the legislature and the judiciary during the different stages of capital liberalisation. Section 2 will deal with the situation under the original Treaty of Rome. Section 3 will examine a single legislative intervention: Directive 88/361. It was this intervention that contained the obligation for Member States to fully liberalise capital movements. It is therefore the most important contribution to the completion of the internal market in the capital sphere. An examination will be made of whether the interpretation of the Directive demonstrates a changed (or changing attitude) of the Court towards the EU legislature. Section 4 will examine the changes brought about by the Treaty on European Union in 1993. It was at Maastricht that the Member States finally introduced into the Treaty framework an absolute obligation to liberalise capital movements. Finally, Section 5 will consider the Treaty of Lisbon and the possibility of future interventions by the legislature. By looking at the patterns that run through the different parts, this chapter will attempt to engage with the question of whether the approaches were products of their historical context, or whether they can be applied to other areas within the capital movement sphere.

Union experience of social dialogue and collective participation in India

The labor regulatory framework in India provides a conducive environment for social dialogue and collective participation in the organizational decision-making process (Venkata Ratnam, 2009). Using data from a survey of workplace union representatives in the federal state of Maharashtra, India, this paper examines union experiences of social dialogue and collective participation in public services, private manufacturing, and private services sector. Findings indicate that collective worker participation and voice is at best modest in the public services but weak in the private manufacturing and private services. There is evidence of growing employer hostility to unions and employer refusal to engage in a meaningful social dialogue with unions. These findings are discussed within the political economy framework of employment relations in India examining the role of the state and judiciary in employment relations and, the links between political parties and trade unions in India.

Do labour laws protect labour in India? Union experiences of workplace employment regulations in Maharashtra India

The debate over labour market regulations in India is highly polarised. Advocates of labour market deregulation suggest that the labour law framework in the country confers disproportionate powers on workers and trade unions in the formal sector of the economy, resulting in industrial conflicts and poor productivity. Using workplace union survey data from the state of Maharashtra, this paper examines the veracity of these claims. Maharashtra is recognised as a state with a broadly pro-worker labour law framework. We find that even pro-worker labour laws at best offer only weak protection to workers and unions in the formal sector establishments. Unions find themselves increasingly vulnerable to employer hostility. We discuss these findings in the context of the role of state and judiciary in employment relations and of union links with political parties.